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Abstract 
In a metaphor such as that lawyer is a shark, the concept lawyer, which is the metaphor 
topic, and the concept shark, which is the metaphor vehicle, interact to produce a figurative 
meaning such that lawyers are predatory. Some theorists argue that sensorimotor properties 
of the vehicle are the basis of metaphor comprehension (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Paivio, 
1979; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). As such, that lawyer is a shark is processed by an embodied 
simulation where sensorimotor imagery associated with sharks is simulated (e.g., sharks 
hunting in deep water). However, the long-standing assumption is that metaphors are 
processed abstractly and sensorimotor representations play no role (e.g., Gentner & Bowdle, 
2008; Glucksberg, 2008). This thesis examines the role of sensorimotor simulation in 
processing metaphor. In Studies 1 – 2, participants rated metaphors on comprehensibility. 
The metaphors contained vehicles that varied on a semantic richness variable known as 
body-object interaction (BOI), which characterizes the degree to which a concept is easy to 
interact with (Siakaluk et al., 2008). A high-BOI metaphor contains a vehicle concept that is 
easy-to-interact with (e.g., life is a bicycle) whereas a low-BOI metaphor contains a concept 
that is difficult-to-interact with (e.g., life is a rainbow). Participants rated low-BOI metaphors 
to be more comprehensible than high-BOI metaphors, a finding that suggests sensorimotor 
properties are not heavily involved in metaphor processing. In Study 3 participants created 
novel metaphors by pairing abstract topics with words that varied on BOI to serve as 
vehicles. In creating metaphors, participants chose more low-BOI words to serve as vehicles 
than high-BOI words. However, to interpret their created metaphors, participants used 
language reflective of an embodied simulation for both high and low-BOI metaphors, 
indicating that nominal metaphors do indeed involve sensorimotor imagery. In Studies 4 – 7, 
 i 
 
a priming paradigm showed that processing novel metaphors (e.g., highways are snakes) 
immediately activates sensorimotor properties (e.g., slither) whereas familiar metaphors (e.g., 
lawyers are sharks) do not activate sensorimotor properties (e.g., bite) but rather, activate 
abstract associations (e.g., killer). In sum, the experiments in this dissertation are the first to 
demonstrate novel metaphors are processed by sensorimotor simulations. 
Keywords 
Cognitive Psychology, Metaphor Processing, Semantic Processing, Psycholinguistics, 
Embodied Cognition, Semantic Richness. 
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Chapter 1  
General Introduction 
  Metaphor is a conceptual and linguistic tool wherein one concept is related with 
another, semantically distinct concept. For example, consider the dialogue from the 
popular television crime-drama, Breaking Bad. In this scene, the main character Walter, 
who produces methamphetamine, tries to embolden his accomplice and distributor Jessie, 
who is too intimidated to sell drugs in territories controlled by gangs. 
Walter: Jessie, look at me. You are a blowfish. 
Jessie: What? 
Walter: A blowfish, think about it. Small in stature, not swift, not cunning; easy prey for 
predators, but the blowfish has a secret weapon, doesn’t he? Doesn’t he? What does the 
blowfish do Jessie? What does the blowfish do? 
Jessie [confused]: I don’t even know what a – 
Walter [moving his arms outward to mime expansion]: The blowfish puffs up, okay, the 
blowfish puffs himself up four – five times larger than normal and why, why does he do 
that? So that it makes him intimidating, that’s why. Intimidating so that the other scarier 
fish are scared off and that’s you. You are a blowfish. You see, it’s just all an illusion. It’s 
nothing but air. Now, who messes with the blowfish, Jessie? 
Jessie: Nobody...  
Walter: You’re damn right. 
Jessie: I’m a blowfish... 
Walter: You are a blowfish. Say it again. 
Jessie: I’m a blowfish. 
Walter: Say it like you mean it! 
Jessie [enthusiastic]: I’m a blowfish! 
Walter: You’re a blowfish! 
  This dialogue contains a perfect example of a novel metaphor; namely, that Jessie 
is a blowfish. In this case, the topic of the metaphor is Jessie whereas the vehicle, or the 
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thing that Jessie is likened to, is blowfish
1
.  In this metaphor, two nouns are juxtaposed to 
illustrate a semantic resemblance; as such, this metaphor is considered a nominal 
metaphor. However, metaphors take on multiple varieties; for example, metaphors can be 
based on adjectives, (e.g., a seductive deal), adverbs (e.g., thunderous applause), and 
verbs (e.g., I killed the final exam). Moreover, some seemingly literal language, such as 
(1) he spends two hours a day exercising, (2) I wasted precious time, and, (3) you need to 
budget more time for your homework, is actually metaphorical (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
That is, according to conceptual metaphor theory, such seemingly unrelated phrases are 
rooted in an unconscious understanding characterized by the conceptual metaphor TIME 
IS MONEY (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). According to this view, conceptual metaphors 
organize thought and language. Thus, many utterances reflect underlying conceptual 
metaphors. For example, the utterances (1) the two went their separate ways, (2) we are 
spinning our wheels, and (3) they reached a dead-end street can describe actual journeys, 
or, can be used to metaphorically describe relationships. As such, these utterances are 
rooted in the LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor. Therefore, metaphoric 
language spans multiple varieties.  
  Cognitive scientists interested in metaphor processing utilize different approaches 
for studying the metaphor varieties reviewed above. Nominal metaphors, and to a lesser 
                                                          
1
 The subject and predicate terms are referred to differently throughout the metaphor literature. I use the 
terms topic and vehicle. However, some authors use the terms tenor and vehicle. The respective terms are 
also referred to as the target and base in the analogy literature, or as the target and source in the cognitive 
linguistics literature. 
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extent, verb, adverb, and adjective-based metaphors, have been studied primarily within 
behavioural experiments in the cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics literatures. In 
this tradition, metaphors are assumed to be linguistic expressions that function 
independently from one another. On the other hand, conceptual metaphors have been 
mostly studied in the cognitive linguistics literature, where the primary methodology is 
discourse analysis. In this tradition, metaphoric utterances are assumed to be rooted in 
thought and not mere linguistic expressions (Lakoff, 1993). These different approaches to 
metaphor, which reflect different levels of analyses, have yet to be unified in a general 
theory. Nonetheless, in this dissertation, I adopt the tradition most studied in the cognitive 
psychological literature and focus on nominal metaphors. Thus the research presented 
here does not assume or examine so-called underlying conceptual metaphors.  
The Psychological Tradition in the Study of Metaphor 
  Clearly, the blowfish metaphor introduced earlier is anomalous if understood 
literally, as is true of metaphor in general. Therefore, the broad research goal of cognitive 
psychologists and psycholinguists that study metaphor is to determine how the topic and 
vehicle interact to produce meaning. To that end, researchers have addressed two main 
questions: First, “does metaphoric meaning require additional processing than literal 
meaning?” And second, “what semantic properties are involved in metaphor 
processing?” Below, I review the literature that addresses these questions and argue that 
only the first has been satisfactorily answered whereas the second question, regarding 
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semantics, continues to fuel debate. Moreover, the research presented in this thesis 
empirically addresses the debate regarding the second question, namely the nature of the 
semantic properties employed in the processing of metaphor. 
The Time-Course of Metaphor Processing 
 Perhaps the most conclusive finding since the emergence of psycholinguistic 
studies of metaphor is that processing metaphoric meaning occurs automatically and 
without additional effort than processing literal meaning (Holyoak & Stamenkovic, 
2018). This has been demonstrated, for instance, by Glucksberg, Gildea and Bookin 
(1982). In their experiment, participants read literally-true statements (e.g., some fruit are 
apples), metaphors (e.g., some jobs are jails), and anomalous sentences (e.g., some jobs 
are apples) and categorized each as literally-true or literally-false while reaction times 
were recorded. Although both metaphors and anomalous sentences are literally-false, 
participants took longer to categorize the metaphors as such. This result is interpreted as 
an interference effect; the automatically processed metaphoric meaning must be ignored 
to decide the item was literally-false, which results in longer response times to metaphors 
than anomalous sentences, which do not automatically produce meaning. As such, this 
study empirically demonstrates that metaphoric meaning is computed automatically. 
  Since then, other studies demonstrated that metaphoric meaning is immediately 
processed. For instance, Blasko and Connine (1993) showed that figurative meaning for 
most metaphors is available as early as literal meaning. In their experiments, participants 
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listened to sentences that included metaphor (e.g., the belief that hard work is a ladder is 
common to this generation). At the offset of the vehicle (e.g., ladder), participants made 
lexical decisions to visually presented target words that were associated with the 
metaphor’s figurative meaning (e.g., advance), literal meaning (e.g., rungs), or were 
unrelated to the metaphor (e.g., pastry) along with non-words. Both words related to the 
metaphor’s figurative meaning (e.g., advance) and literal meaning (e.g., rungs) were 
responded to faster than unrelated words (e.g., pastry), suggesting that figurative and 
literal meaning is immediately available after one hears a metaphor. 
  Another study demonstrating the equivalency between metaphoric and literal 
processing comes from McElree and Nordlie (1999). They showed that understanding 
metaphors undergoes the same time-course as understanding literal sentences. Their task 
involved categorizing visually presented metaphors (e.g., some mouths are sewers), 
literal sentences (e.g., some tunnels are sewers) and anomalous sentences (e.g., some 
turnips are curtains) as comprehensible or incomprehensible. Participants were prompted 
to make a speeded decision to categorize the sentence when they heard a response signal 
presented 28 to 2800 ms after the final word of the sentence. The results showed that the 
rate with which metaphorical and literal sentences were correctly categorized as 
comprehensible was the same for both sentence types. Therefore, metaphoric and literal 
meaning is computed in equal time. 
  Taken together, the aforementioned studies empirically demonstrate that 
metaphors are automatically processed as such, and their meaning is immediately 
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available alongside literal meaning. These findings contradict the assumption that 
figurative meaning is processed only after a literal processing stage results in failure to 
interpret the metaphor (e.g., Searle, 1993). Moreover, these studies blur the distinction 
between metaphoric and literal processing and are consistent with computational models 
that assume the two processes are similar (e.g., Kintsch, 2000). However, these studies do 
not address how the semantic representations of the topic and vehicle interact to produce 
meaning. As will be reviewed below, research addressing this question has not resulted in 
a theoretical consensus.  
Theories of Semantic Processing of Metaphor 
  Virtually all psychological theorists agree that metaphor comprehension is a result 
of an interaction between the topic and vehicle’s semantic representations. Moreover, 
there is near unanimous agreement that processing is typically directional and entails 
semantic properties of the vehicle being assigned to the topic (but see Goodblatt & 
Glicksohn, 2017 for a special issue of papers on bidirectionality in metaphor). However, 
there is no agreement in regards to the particular semantic properties that underlie 
metaphor comprehension. For instance, in some metaphor processing theories, the 
assumption is that amodal properties underlie metaphor processing (e.g., Gentner & 
Bowdle; 2008; Glucksberg, 2008; Kintsch; 2008). By amodal, theorists are describing 
representations unrelated to the perceptual modality with which the concepts are 
experienced (i.e., a concept’s sensory or motor properties). In these theories, metaphor 
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comprehension works by identifying conceptual information related to the vehicle and 
assigning it to the topic. The amodal approach can be contrasted with the embodied 
approach, in which sensorimotor representations of the vehicle play a critical role in 
metaphor processing (Paivio & Walsh, 1993; Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Jamrozik, 
McQuire, Cardillo & Chaterjee, 2016)
 2
.  I review the amodal and embodied theories that 
have been articulated to describe nominal metaphor processing next.  
Amodal Theories of Metaphor Processing 
  Amodal theories of metaphor processing make up the bulk of the literature on the 
subject. In such theories, it is argued that the semantic representations of the topic and 
vehicle interact to identify properties that are relevant for the metaphor’s meaning. Such 
theories are considered amodal because the properties which are relevant for metaphor 
comprehension are removed from sensorimotor activation. Therefore, in this approach, 
metaphors get their meanings from amodal semantic properties (often in the form of other 
words) of the topic and vehicle, rather than the bodily actions or imagery they may 
denote.  
   One major amodal approach to metaphor is based on Gentner’s (1983) structure-
mapping theory, which is a general theory of similarity. According to this theory, 
metaphors are processed by uncovering the similarity between the topic and vehicle. In 
                                                          
2
 This lack-of-consensus regarding the role embodiment plays in metaphor processing is a microcosm of 
the embodied cognition debate. For more on that, see the recent exchange between Glenberg and Mahon in 
the Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2015, Vol. 69 No. 2, pg. 157-181. 
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this framework, metaphor comprehension is the result of two processing stages. The first 
stage is structural alignment, in which the shared features between the topic and vehicle 
are linked. In this stage, metaphor processing is bidirectional; that is, the directionality of 
the metaphor is ignored in order to find common attributes of the topic and vehicle. The 
second stage is projection, in which additional relations that characterize the vehicle are 
cast onto the topic. In this stage, the directionality of the metaphor is apparent because 
only vehicle-specific relations are projected to the topic. In fact, if we recall the blowfish 
metaphor introduced earlier, we see that Walter’s explanation reflects the processing 
steps of the structure-mapping model; the shared attributes between Jessie and blowfish 
were initially uncovered in the structural-alignment stage; namely, “small in stature, not 
swift, not cunning, easy prey, etc.” After the common structures are aligned, a vehicle-
specific relation (i.e., suddenly becomes intimidating) is projected to the topic, Jessie, 
resulting in comprehension. Importantly, structure-mapping suggests that metaphors are 
primarily understood by the topic and vehicle’s relational similarity (i.e., intimidating) 
rather than their attributive similarity (i.e., small).
3
 
  There is considerable empirical evidence in support of the structure-mapping 
position. Consider one elegant study by Wolff and Gentner (2011) where they 
demonstrated that the bidirectional alignment stage precedes the directional projection 
stage. In their task, participants were presented with forward (e.g., some suburbs are 
                                                          
3
 Although adults understand metaphors by relational similarity, children understand metaphors by 
attributive similarity because relational thought is yet to be developed – see Gentner, (1988). 
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parasites) and reversed (e.g., some parasites are suburbs) metaphors along with 
anomalous and literal statements for either 600 or 1600 ms. The participants’ task was to 
quickly (within 400 ms) rate the sentences as either comprehensible or incomprehensible. 
When the metaphors were presented for 600 ms, the forward and reversed metaphors 
were rated the same in comprehensibility; at this presentation deadline, participants were 
insensitive to directionality. The anomalous statements were rated lower in 
comprehensibility than the metaphors whereas the literal statements were rated higher 
than metaphors, suggesting participants were still able to process meaning at this stage. 
Critically, when stimuli were presented for 1600 ms, the forward metaphors increased in 
comprehensibility ratings whereas the reversed metaphors decreased. According to Wolff 
and Gentner, the 600 ms presentation deadline reflected the bidirectional alignment stage. 
During that stage, forward and reversed metaphors are equally comprehensible. However, 
the later projection stage is evident by 1600 ms; during which, metaphor directionality 
matters and only forward metaphors are comprehensible. Numerous other studies 
demonstrate additional empirical support for predictions arising from the structure-
mapping model (e.g., Gentner, 1988; Gentner & Bowdle, 2001; Wolff & Gentner, 2000). 
  In an alternative amodal approach, metaphor comprehension is argued to be a 
product of categorization rather than structure-mapping (Glucksberg, 2008). According to 
this view, metaphor comprehension is similar to understanding literal categorization 
statements such as a robin is a bird in which the first concept, robin, is understood to be a 
category member of the second concept, bird. Moreover, in this view, it is argued that in 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
metaphors the vehicle refers to an ad-hoc category. For example, in the blowfish 
metaphor, blowfish represents an ad-hoc category of things which are suddenly 
dangerous when provoked to which Jessie is categorized as being a member. An 
important feature of the categorization model is dual-reference; that is, although the 
vehicle may typically reference a literal blowfish that swims in the ocean, this literal 
representation is irrelevant for comprehending the metaphor. Rather, in metaphors, the 
vehicle references an ad-hoc category which suggests relevant, abstract properties, such 
as suddenly dangerous or deadly, which are relevant in the blowfish metaphor. 
Furthermore, the claim is made that in the act of metaphoric categorization the literal 
properties of the vehicle are inhibited for the more abstract properties which define its 
category. Thus, Jessie is a blowfish can loosely be paraphrased as Jessie is a member of 
the blowfish-category of suddenly dangerous things rather than Jessie is like a literal 
blowfish.   
  In categorization, effective metaphor comprehension is achieved in part by how 
well the vehicle exemplifies an ad-hoc category (Glucksberg, McGlone & Manfredi, 
1997). Consider two words which may be used as metaphor vehicles, shark and virus. 
According to Glucksberg et al., (1997), these vehicles differ in ambiguity
4
; shark is 
unambiguous in its reference to a single category of vicious predators whereas virus is 
ambiguous because it can refer to multiple ad-hoc categories, such as things that may get 
                                                          
4
 This is not what psycholinguists call ‘lexical ambiguity’ which is related to polysemy.  
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stronger, things that can be easily passed, things that cannot be cured, etc. Moreover, 
recall that in categorization, the topic is not compared to the vehicle, but is rather 
assigned to its category. This is achieved in part by the topic constraining which category 
properties are relevant (Glucksberg et al., 1997). For example, the topic lawyer varies on 
few within-category dimensions; that is, lawyers only meaningfully differ in terms of 
their efficacy in practicing law, rather than on their gender, height, ethnicity, etc. On the 
other hand, the topic man can differ on numerous dimensions, such as height, weight, 
occupation, aggressiveness, etc. Some of these dimensions may be related to an ad-hoc 
category exemplified by the vehicle, others not. As such, the metaphor that lawyer is a 
shark has a different meaning than that swimmer is a shark because each respective topic 
constrains different aspects of the shark category. Therefore, in the categorization model, 
the topic and vehicle provide different sources of information for understanding 
metaphors, and interact differently than suggested by structure-mapping. 
  Glucksberg et al. (1997) demonstrated how topic constraint and vehicle ambiguity 
affect metaphor processing. In their task, participants read metaphors and pushed a button 
when they felt they could interpret their meaning. The metaphors either had high-
constraint topics (e.g., Jealousy is an infection) or low-constraint topics (e.g., Her family 
is an anchor), along with ambiguous (e.g., Rumors are viruses) or unambiguous vehicles 
(e.g., Alcohol is a crutch). Before the presentation of each metaphor, either a topic prime, 
vehicle prime or no prime was presented. The prediction that follows from the model is 
that reading the topic or vehicle prior to the metaphor should have a facilitative effect 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
only for metaphors that have high-constraint topics or unambiguous vehicles. 
Presumably, seeing the unambiguous vehicle will provide a processing advantage 
because the relevant category will be identified prior to processing the metaphor. An 
ambiguous vehicle is not facilitative as a prime because it does not identify the relevant 
category. Similarly, a high-constraint topic will provide relevant dimensions that 
constrain category properties, and is thus an effective prime. A low-constraint topic 
varies on many dimensions, and as such, does not provide relevant information which 
will facilitate processing if presented prior to the metaphor. Glucksberg et al. (1997) 
found these exact results in support of the categorization model; only high-constraint 
topics and unambiguous vehicles prime metaphor comprehension. Moreover, they argued 
that structure-mapping cannot explain their findings because it predicts topic and vehicle 
primes (irrespective of constraint or ambiguity) should facilitate metaphor processing 
(e.g., Wolff & Gentner, 2000).  Numerous other empirical studies are interpreted in 
support for the categorization model (e.g., Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson & Werner, 
2001; McGlone & Manfredi, 2001; Glucksberg, Newsome & Goldvarg, 2001). 
  In recognition of the empirical support for both structure-mapping and 
categorization, more recent approaches have combined the two processes in single 
models. For example, the structure-mapping framework now includes an extension, the 
career-of-metaphor hypothesis (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). This hypothesis states that the 
career, or conventionality of the metaphor, affects its processing mechanism. Novel 
metaphors are understood as similarity-based comparisons, whereas conventional 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
metaphors can be understood as categorizations, because the abstracted sense of the 
vehicle becomes more apparent after repetitive use. On the other hand, the categorization 
framework now includes the quality-of-metaphor hypothesis (Glucksberg & Haught, 
2006). In this hypothesis, metaphor quality, or aptness, determines the processing 
mechanism; apt metaphors are categorizations, whereas inapt, or poor quality, metaphors 
are similarity-based comparisons. In the literature, the structure-mapping and 
categorization models are considered at odds with one another. However, these models 
share in common the assumption that amodal properties underlie metaphor processing. 
The main difference between them is that in structure-mapping, figurative relations are 
drawn from the literal representation of the vehicle whereas, in categorization, properties 
are drawn from an abstraction of the vehicle. 
Predication Model 
  The last major amodal approach articulated for nominal metaphor processing (and 
sentences in general) is Kintsch’s (2000; 2001; 2008) predication algorithm. According to 
this approach, the topic and vehicle representations are not defined in terms of relations, 
such as in structure-mapping, or abstract categorical properties, such as in categorization. 
Rather, in this approach, a concept’s representation is defined by its semantic 
neighbourhood, which is the group of words it co-occurs with in natural language. 
Semantic neighbourhoods are computed by co-occurrence models such as latent semantic 
analysis (LSA) (e.g., Landauer, Foltz & Laham, 1998 for an introduction). Latent 
semantic analysis models semantic memory solely from mathematically analyzing 
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discourse. In LSA, a word’s meaning is represented in a multidimensional space as a 
vector and the semantic distance to other word vectors can be calculated. Semantic 
neighbours are therefore words that are close to each other in the space. For example, 
according to LSA, the semantic neighbourhood of the word dog is made up of the 
numerous words it co-occurs with, such as: barked, dogs, wagging, collie, leash, etc. 
Moreover, semantic neighbours as determined by LSA are represented as amodal units 
because they do not encode directly experienced sensorimotor properties (Landauer et al., 
1998).  Kintsch’s (2000; 2001) predication algorithm uses representations determined by 
LSA to compute a metaphor’s meaning.   
  To compute a metaphor’s meaning, such as my lawyer is a shark, the algorithm 
first constructs a spreading activation network to search the semantic neighbourhood of 
the vehicle to find words that are also (though distantly) related to the topic. Because the 
topic and vehicle are unrelated, the search can potentially involve over one-thousand 
items. After finding any related words, such as vicious, for example, the remaining 
unrelated words are inhibited.  A metaphor vector based on the topic, vehicle, and their 
shared semantic neighbours is then computed.  The metaphor vector represents the 
meaning of the metaphor within the semantic space. The model’s accuracy can be 
determined by comparing the resultant metaphor vector to other words which it ought to 
be related to. For example, Kintsch (2000) demonstrated how the predication algorithm’s 
vector for the metaphor my surgeon is a butcher is close to the word axe while the 
reverse, my butcher is a surgeon is close to the word scalpel. Thus, the model produces 
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intuitively plausible responses. The model has also successfully simulated human 
interpretations to metaphors (Kintsch and Bowles, 2002). Unlike the cognitive models, 
such as structure-mapping or categorization, the predication model does not lead to 
predictions of particular semantic properties, such as relations or category properties, to 
be involved in metaphor. Rather, the predication model bases its computation solely on 
semantic neighbours, without consideration of how they are related to the vehicle (e.g., 
relationally or categorically).  
  Despite the differences between the models reviewed above, they share an 
important similarity: all of these models essentially argue that metaphors get their 
meanings from amodal associations rather than sensorimotor properties. In this thesis, I 
consider sensorimotor properties to be perceptual or motoric properties that relate to the 
topic or vehicle’s literal referents. For example, recall again the metaphor lawyers are 
sharks. In this metaphor, sensorimotor properties of sharks may be in the form of 
imagery, such as sharks hunting in deep water, or the actions carried out by sharks, such 
as biting. Thus, sensorimotor properties are broad in the sense they are multimodal (i.e., 
visual, motoric, auditory, tactile, or olfactory). However, they are nonetheless sourced 
from the vehicle’s literal representation. Note that sensorimotor properties are ignored in 
amodal models, where the basis of metaphor is in the form of categorical or relational 
associates, such as vicious or preys, respectively. The main aim of this thesis was to test 
whether sensorimotor properties play an important role in metaphor comprehension, as is 
suggested by embodied approaches to nominal metaphor.  
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Embodied Approaches 
  Although the majority of psycholinguistic evidence demonstrates support for 
amodal processes, recent approaches have embraced the embodied perspective to 
metaphor. In this newer perspective sensorimotor experience is thought to play a central 
role in metaphor processing. This is reflective of the general theory of embodied 
cognition where it is proposed that the body plays a significant role in cognitive 
processing (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Lakoff, 2008; 2012; Gibbs, 2006; Wilson, 2002).  
  The general theory of embodied cognition can take-on multiple varieties, as 
outlined in a useful framework by Wilson (2002). For example, Wilson described how 
cognition is embodied in that 1) cognition is situated in the environment (e.g., the 
environmental inputs affect cognition); 2) the environment produces temporal pressure on 
cognition (e.g., rapid cognition for survival); 3) difficult cognitive operations can be 
made easier by off-loading them in the environment (e.g., solving a puzzle by trying 
solutions in the environment rather than mentally); 4) the cognitive system includes the 
environment (e.g., characterizing the mind is impossible without reference to the 
environment); 5) cognition is related to action (e.g., motoric properties from the 
environment are stored for future cognitive tasks); 6) sensorimotor experience learned 
from the environment may re-occur in off-line cognition (e.g., previous sensorimotor 
experience affects cognition in the form of embodied simulations, such as mental 
imagery).  
  In this dissertation, when referring to embodiment and nominal metaphor, I am 
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focusing on the 5
th
 and 6
th
 dimensions delineated by Wilson (2002), in which a concept is 
defined in part by its motoric affordances, and its sensorimotor properties may be 
retrieved from semantic memory during metaphor processing.  In this approach to 
embodied cognition, it is argued that the representational system includes sensorimotor 
properties that one encounters in the environment. For example, when one processes the 
conceptual representation of a chair, one engages in an embodied simulation where 
sensorimotor properties that were acquired from previous interactions with chairs are 
partially accessed, such as their appearance, feel and the bodily positions they afford, 
(Barsalou, 1999). According to this view, abstract concepts are also represented by 
sensorimotor information. For example, part of the meaning of the abstract concept desire 
is thought to-be-represented by sensorimotor properties of hunger, because desire and 
hunger naturally co-occur (Gibbs, Lima & Francozo, 2004).  
  For an illustration of an embodied cognition effect, consider Hauk, Johnsrude and 
Pulvermuller’s (2004) study, where participants passively read action words (e.g., kick, 
pick, lick etc.) in a brain-scanner. The brain regions activated in response to reading 
action words, overlapped with motor and premotor cortex areas that are involved with 
actually moving the respective body part denoted by the word, such as areas related to 
moving the leg, arm, or face, respectively. Such a finding is taken as evidence by 
embodied cognition theorists that semantic and sensorimotor processes are related. In 
short, embodied approaches to cognition assume that semantic processing involves the 
activation of sensorimotor information. 
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  According to an embodied approach articulated for nominal metaphors, 
comprehension is achieved, at least partly, through simulating actions denoted by the 
vehicle (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). Returning to our blowfish 
example above, this is partially how Walter explains the metaphor to Jessie; that is, 
Walter uses gestures to simulate a scene in which a blowfish expands and scares other 
fish away. Unlike the amodal approaches (i.e., structure-mapping, categorization or 
predication), the simulation model posits that running an embodied mental simulation 
relevant to the metaphor’s meaning is crucial to comprehension. Although Walter 
actually simulates expansion with his arms, this model suggests that the simulation is 
typically mental (i.e., subconscious) rather than overt. Importantly, the simulation 
mechanism proposed by Gibbs and Matlock is not necessarily independent from any 
amodal processing; that is, simulation may run alongside creating an ad-hoc category 
(Gibbs & Matlock, 2008).  Accordingly, although embodied simulation may not be 
sufficient for complete metaphor understanding, it is nonetheless a necessary component 
in the comprehension process. As such, Gibbs’ embodied simulation theory in general is 
related to Lakoff’s (2008; 2012) neural theory of language, in which it is argued that 
‘neural circuits’ that process sensorimotor information are always activated during 
language processing (Gibbs & Colston, 2012).  
  Although there has yet to be a study testing if simulation is used to comprehend 
nominal metaphors, there is evidence demonstrating that other forms of metaphoric 
language is understood in part by embodied simulation. For example, Wilson and Gibbs 
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(2007) demonstrated that reading sentences in which a verb is used metaphorically, such 
as grasp the concept, or, swallow your pride are comprehended faster if participants 
physically or imaginatively perform those actions (i.e., grasping or swallowing) prior to 
reading the phrases, than if unrelated or no movement was performed. Wilson and Gibbs 
(2007) drew a distinction between the metaphoric phrases used in their experiments, and 
nominal metaphors, such as Jessie is a blowfish, which do not overtly reference bodily 
actions. However, they maintain that it is possible that nominal metaphors may be 
understood via embodied simulation. They state, “We suggest, nonetheless, that even 
some aspects of how people infer the metaphoric meanings of metaphors like ‘Lawyers 
are sharks’ could engage bodily simulation processes as people create imaginative 
scenarios in which the metaphor makes sense (e.g., lawyers are like sharks in moving 
quickly and aggressively toward their victims)” (pg. 729). Moreover, Gibbs and Matlock 
(2008) reported indirect evidence of simulation in processing nominal metaphors; in an 
online workshop, teachers came up with and interpreted metaphors that describe their 
teaching philosophies. Often times the teachers interpreted such metaphors by describing 
the bodily actions relevant to the metaphor. For example, the teacher who provided the 
metaphor a teacher is a dolphin interpreted it as follows, “Always wise to the hazards 
that may approach, but excited and enjoying life along the way. I ride the waves of the 
classroom, with all their ups and downs. No matter how out of control it gets I always go 
back for more in search of that perfect ride”. Although this is anecdotal evidence, it does 
suggest that there is a simulation basis for nominal metaphor understanding, at least in an 
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offline comprehension task. One of the questions this dissertation addresses is whether or 
not bodily actions do indeed play a role in both offline and online nominal-metaphor 
processing tasks. Approaches other than Gibbs’ simulation model also consider 
sensorimotor representations to play important roles in metaphor comprehension; namely, 
dual coding theory and sensorimotor shedding theory. 
Dual Coding Theory of Metaphor 
  Dual coding theory (DCT) is a general framework of cognition proposed by 
Paivio (1971; 1986; 2007). The main premise of this approach is that cognition is 
mediated by two distinct subsystems; namely the verbal and image systems. The verbal 
system processes amodal, associative, representations whereas the image system 
processes multimodal representations derived from sensorimotor experience. The 
subsystems are independent but interconnected such that activity in one system can (and 
often does) spread to another. According to this approach, cognition in general can be 
carried out with amodal representations or mental imagery, making DCT a hybrid 
theory
5
.  The dual coding theory has been adapted for metaphor processing (Paivio 1979; 
Paivio & Clark, 1986; Paivio & Walsh, 1993).  
                                                          
5
 Dual coding theory was first articulated (in 1971) prior to the embodied revolution and uses different 
terminology than more recent theories of embodied cognition. For example, in DCT, “imagery” is the 
terminology used to describe sensorimotor processes and representations that may be called “embodied 
simulation” by theorists such as Gibbs. However, Paivio (2007) himself recognized that embodied 
simulation is virtually the same as imagery, describing recent theories of embodiment as “…recognized 
generally as old wine in new bottles” (pg. 117). 
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  Paivio and Walsh (1993) delineated how the verbal and imagery systems 
conjointly underlie metaphor processing. Like other models of metaphor, in the dual 
coding approach, the topic and vehicle play different roles in processing, with some of 
the vehicle’s properties being assigned to the topic. However, DCT differs from previous 
frameworks by emphasizing the joint contributions of imagery and associative 
representations in finding relevant properties shared between the topic and vehicle. In this 
approach, the topic and vehicle retrieve different information from long-term memory; 
both topic and vehicles retrieve associative information, but the vehicle additionally 
retrieves imagery. Moreover, the topic and its amodal associates constrain the vehicle 
imagery such that only relevant images are retrieved and integrated into an understanding 
of the metaphor. Finally, according to DCT, metaphor comprehension can also occur 
more-so within a single system, such as finding relevant associates between the topic and 
vehicle, or imagery they may share. The important consideration here is that metaphor 
comprehension can be achieved by both verbal processes, which are amodal, and imagery 
processes, which are embodied and multimodal.  
  Although the general framework proposed in dual coding theory has been relevant 
for decades, receiving more support than alternative theories (see for instance McRae & 
Jones, 2013), its metaphor processing framework has not gained traction. In fact, to my 
knowledge, only one study tested some of dual coding theory’s assumptions regarding 
metaphor processing. Paivio and Clark (1986) employed metaphors in which topics and 
vehicles both independently varied on imagery in a factorial manipulation. Participants 
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were asked to read metaphors and release a key when they formed an interpretation, 
which they then produced. The results showed that metaphors with high-imagery vehicles 
resulted in shorter reaction times to form interpretations than metaphors with low-
imagery vehicles. Topic imagery had a negative effect such that high imagery-topics 
resulted in longer interpretation times than low-imagery topics. Moreover, participants 
were more likely to successfully interpret metaphors with high-imagery vehicles than 
those with high-imagery topics.  
  In another experiment, Paivio and Clark (1986) asked participants to indicate 
which they thought about first when interpreting a metaphor, and which was thought 
about more –the topic or vehicle. Participants indicated that, when forming metaphor 
interpretations, they thought about topics before the vehicles, but thought more about the 
vehicles than topics. These findings demonstrate the different effects afforded by topics 
and vehicles, and the role vehicle imagery plays in metaphor processing, consistent with 
DCT. In summary then, the dual coding theory of metaphor, like Gibbs’ simulation 
model, places heavy emphasis on the sensorimotor representation of the vehicle. 
However, unlike Gibbs’ simulation model, this approach does not necessitate the 
activation of vehicle imagery; rather, its functional architecture is flexible enough to 
accommodate amodal associative mechanisms for understanding some metaphors. The 
important point here is that DCT can support associative, imaginal, or combined 
processing.  
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Graded Embodiment and Sensorimotor Shedding 
  Graded embodied cognition views, such as Chaterjee’s (2010), argue for amodal 
and sensorimotor representations underlying cognition, much like Paivio’s (2007) dual 
coding theory. However, in graded embodiment, it is argued that additional factors 
influence the degree to which processing is embodied. For example, the sensorimotor 
shedding hypothesis argues that the degree to which a concept or metaphor is processed 
by embodied simulation is dependent on stimulus familiarity (Jamrozik, McQuire, 
Cardillo & Chaterjee, 2016). According to this approach, literal concepts are understood 
as embodied simulations; however, as concepts begin to be used in novel contexts, the 
sensorimotor representations are “shed” and abstracted meanings are directly processed. 
This sensorimotor shedding process is thought to be similar to the shift in meaning from 
literal to abstracted, as spelled out by the career-of-metaphor hypothesis described earlier 
(Jamrozik et al., 2016).  
  Let us consider how nominal metaphor processing is described in the 
sensorimotor shedding framework (see Jamrozik et al., 2016 for additional examples of 
conceptual processing). According to this approach, the novel metaphor negotiation is a 
muscle would draw upon sensorimotor properties of the vehicle, such as through motor 
imagery. However, if used repeatedly, especially in other contexts (e.g., concentration is 
a muscle, reading is a muscle, etc.) the vehicle representation acquires an abstracted 
meaning (i.e., something that improves with practice) and no longer draws upon 
sensorimotor properties. Moreover, this approach argues that metaphor is the means in 
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which concepts acquire abstracted meanings.  The result of sensorimotor shedding is that 
the familiar metaphor will draw upon an abstraction whereas less familiar metaphors 
draw upon literal and embodied representations of the vehicle. Therefore, like DCT, 
sensorimotor shedding hypothesis is a hybrid model embracing both amodal and 
multimodal representations. However, sensorimotor shedding considers how familiarity 
can result in a metaphor’s (and concept’s) meaning change, and makes firm predictions 
regarding when processing is amodal or embodied. Despite making firm predictions, this 
framework has yet to be empirically tested a-priori. 
  In summary, a wide range of theories regarding the processing of A is B 
metaphors have accumulated. The theories are all in agreement regarding the different 
roles played by the topic and vehicle terms; namely, that the representation of the vehicle 
provides properties that are assigned to the representation of the topic. However, the 
theories differ in the particular roles the topic and vehicle play in determining metaphor-
relevant properties, and more importantly, in the nature of the vehicle-properties. Amodal 
theories, such as Gentner’s structure-mapping, Glucksberg’s categorization model and 
Kintsch’s predication model consider metaphor processing to be disembodied. In these 
approaches, sensorimotor properties of the vehicle do not play a special role in processing 
metaphoric meaning. In contrast, Gibbs’ model proposes that, sensorimotor simulations 
of the vehicle play a primary role in constraining metaphoric meaning. In Paivio’s model, 
metaphor processing typically involves vehicle imagery, along with associative 
information related to both topic and vehicle. Lastly, in sensorimotor shedding, embodied 
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representations are thought to play a major role in understanding novel metaphors, but 
attenuate as a metaphor becomes familiar. Therefore, the major disagreement in the 
theories reviewed above is the role embodiment plays in metaphor processing, with some 
theories predicting no role and others predicting the opposite. 
Research Objectives and Overview of Experiments 
  As reviewed above, research on nominal metaphor processing has mostly ignored 
the potential role of embodiment, focusing only on amodal representations. To that end, 
the research objective in this dissertation is to empirically test for the possibility that 
embodiment plays an important role in the processing of nominal metaphors. In Chapter 
2 I present a series of experiments in which participants rated metaphors for the degree of 
comprehensibility. As a proxy for embodiment, the metaphor vehicles differed in what is 
called Body-Object Interaction (BOI), namely the degree to which it is easy to physically 
interact with objects. From this perspective the word bicycle represents a high-BOI (i.e., 
easy to interact with) concept, whereas the word rainbow refers to a low-BOI (i.e., 
difficult to interact with) concept (Siakaluk, et al. 2008). I hypothesized that, if embodied 
simulation underlies metaphor comprehension, participants should find metaphors with 
high-BOI vehicles, such as bicycle, to be more comprehensible than metaphors with low-
BOI vehicles such as rainbow. The hypothesis follows from an embodiment argument 
that bicycle should afford motoric and other sensorimotor interaction to a much greater 
extent than found with low-BOI concepts, such as rainbow. The results of the 
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experiments in Chapter 2 showed that contrary to an embodied cognition account, 
participants rated low-BOI metaphors to be more comprehensible than high-BOI 
metaphors. 
  In Chapter 3, I present an experiment where participants created metaphors and 
subsequently interpreted them. To create metaphors, participants were provided with 
abstract words to serve as topics, and concrete words to serve as vehicles. For every 
topic, the task of the participants was to choose a vehicle from the options provided that, 
in their judgement, produced an apt and comprehensible metaphor. The vehicle options 
differed on BOI. If embodied theories are correct, participants should prefer to complete 
the metaphor with high-BOI vehicles.  In a second phase of this study, participants, after 
they had completed producing the set of metaphors, were then asked to interpret them. 
The interpretations were then analyzed to see if the verbal descriptions produced 
employed language that is consistent with an embodied simulation. The results showed 
that, despite choosing more low-BOI items to serve as vehicles than high-BOI items, 
participants generally interpreted metaphors (both low and high-BOI) using perceptual-
embodied language consistent with embodied cognition.  
  Unlike Chapter 2 and 3 in which the experiments were based on offline tasks, in 
Chapter 4  I employed cross-modal priming experiments to determine when properties 
related to embodied simulation are available during the time-course of metaphor 
comprehension. Participants listened to metaphors (e.g., lawyers are sharks) and, after 
the offset of the vehicle (e.g., sharks), read visually presented target words. Target words 
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varied in their association to the vehicle; some were bodily-actions (e.g., bite) whereas 
others were general associates (e.g., killer). Other target words were unrelated to the 
vehicle (e.g., jeans). To determine the type of semantic information of the vehicle is 
available online, I determined if bodily-actions and general associates were read faster 
than unrelated controls. The results showed that unfamiliar metaphors activate embodied 
properties online; conversely, familiar metaphors activate general associates. Therefore, 
Chapter 4 investigated if processing a metaphor’s meaning triggers embodied properties 
online, and, if so, the time-course of that activation.  
  Collectively, the studies reported in this dissertation are the first to investigate if 
nominal metaphors, which are the most studied metaphor variant in psycholinguistics, are 
understood via embodied simulation. To that end, the experimental tasks differ and 
emphasize metaphor comprehension, production, and interpretation, with the aim of 
providing converging evidence regarding the nature of embodiment of nominal 
metaphors using well-established psycholinguistic methodology. Details with respect to 
each study are provided in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 2  
Introduction 
  In the previous chapter I reviewed the critical difference between amodal and 
embodied approaches to metaphor processing; namely, in the latter (but not former), 
sensorimotor properties of the vehicle are thought to play a critical role in processing. 
Moreover, in Gibbs’ simulation model (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007), 
bodily-actions related to the vehicle are particularly involved in metaphor processing, 
even for nominal metaphors of the form A is B. Despite these claims, experimental 
evidence for embodied approaches to nominal metaphor processing is scarce. One reason 
for this is that it is particularly challenging to construct appropriate stimuli because, in 
nominal metaphors, vehicles typically do not overtly reference sensorimotor information. 
On the other hand, verb-based metaphors, such as push the argument overtly reference 
bodily-actions, making them amenable for studying embodied simulation, as Wilson and 
Gibbs (2007) showed.  
  Despite the fact nominal metaphor vehicles do not overtly denote sensorimotor 
properties some evidence suggests that sensorimotor representations may still be involved 
in metaphor processing. For example, nominal metaphors typically have concrete (and 
therefore imageable) vehicles rather than abstract ones and as Paivio and Clark (1986) 
demonstrated, metaphors with high-imagery vehicles are interpreted faster than 
metaphors with low-imagery vehicles. Furthermore, Katz (1989) found that when 
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participants are asked to choose vehicles to complete metaphor frames (e.g., Chemistry is 
the _____ of sciences), they choose concrete vehicles more than abstract ones. Taken 
together, these studies demonstrate that vehicles rich in sensorimotor properties are 
advantaged over vehicles with less sensorimotor properties, a finding which indirectly 
suggests a simulation mechanism may be underlying metaphor. However vehicle 
concreteness does not necessarily suggest sensorimotor representations are involved in 
metaphor processing because one cannot rule out the influence of amodal processes. For 
example, Katz (1992) suggested that concrete vehicles provide a processing advantage in 
metaphor not because of imagery, but rather because they are in a dense semantic space 
with many associations. Moreover, in amodal theories of metaphor, such as Glucksberg’s 
(2008) categorization model, vehicle concreteness is not necessarily tied to imagery. 
Recall that in this model, a vehicle is thought to be a basic-level category member that 
stands in for an ad-hoc category. Therefore, it is likely that concrete vehicles (e.g., shark) 
are more unambiguous in their reference to an ad-hoc category than abstract vehicles 
(e.g., virus),
6
 As such, facilitative effects of vehicle concreteness in metaphor processing 
tasks are consistent with embodied approaches to metaphor, but do not rule out amodal 
processes.  
                                                          
6
 Although Glucksberg did not suggest concreteness per se is associated with referencing ad-hoc 
categories, this nonetheless seems plausible given basic-level concepts are more concrete than super-
ordinates concepts (Rosch, 1978). 
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 In the studies reported in this chapter the vehicles employed in the nominal 
metaphors used as stimuli were concrete nouns. Because concreteness may not be the 
most appropriate variable to characterize sensorimotor representations I employed 
concrete concepts that differ in their association to sensorimotor properties. Specifically I 
examined the possibility of physically interacting with a concrete concept. For example, a 
cloud can be experienced only by sight whereas an apple can be felt, tasted, smelled and 
even heard when bit. These differences are captured in a normed variable, body-object 
interaction (BOI) (Bennett et al., 2011; Tillotson et al., 2008). A word such as apple is 
high-BOI whereas a word such as cloud is low-BOI; moreover, high-BOI words are 
considered semantically richer than low-BOI words, as the former refer to more 
properties than the latter. The common finding between high and low-BOI words is that 
the latter usually result in shorter response times in lexical decision and semantic 
categorization tasks; as such, high-BOI words are processed faster than low-BOI words 
(Siakaluk et al 2008). Importantly, these studies match high and low-BOI words on 
concreteness, imageability, subjective familiarity, and a variety of other relevant 
psycholinguistic variables.  
  The BOI effect has been teased apart by Heard, Madan, Protzner and Pexman 
(2018). They asked participants to rate BOI words on related variables such as 
graspability, ease-of-pantomime, number of actions, animacy, size, danger, and 
usefulness. In hierarchical regression analyses, Heard et al. found that the biggest 
predictor of BOI ratings is graspability, followed by number-of-actions and then by ease-
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of-pantomime, along with animacy, which negatively predicted BOI ratings. Therefore, 
high-BOI concepts tend to be easier to grasp, afford more actions, are easier to 
pantomime, and tend to be inanimate, relative to low-BOI concepts. The logic of the 
studies reported in this chapter is that BOI is an appropriate variable to test Gibb’s 
simulation model, as Gibbs and Matlock (2008) argued that bodily-actions are critical in 
metaphor processing.   
  In the studies reported below, BOI was used for the first time in a metaphor 
comprehension task. Artificial metaphors were created by randomly pairing topics and 
vehicles, with vehicles being either high-BOI or low-BOI words. The task involved 
participants rating the metaphors on comprehensibility. Gibbs’ simulation model, to my 
understanding, leads to the prediction that metaphors with high-BOI vehicles should be 
more comprehensible than those with low-BOI vehicles. For example, a metaphor such as 
education is a ladder has a high-BOI vehicle whereas education is a pyramid has a low-
BOI vehicle
7
. Furthermore, the topic words were either abstract or concrete. In theories of 
embodied cognition, it is argued that abstract concepts are understood through 
sensorimotor experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980); if this is the case, a topic-
concreteness by vehicle-BOI interaction should be obtained such that the 
comprehensibility ratings for metaphors with high-BOI vehicles will be higher for 
                                                          
7
 BOI ratings have been collected from native speakers of English living in North America, and as such are 
normed on a sample similar to those tested in the current study. Moreover, the ratings are subjective and 
likely culturally biased. For example, someone living in Cairo may consider a pyramid to be easy to 
interact with. 
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abstract-topics than concrete-topics. 
  In addition to vehicle BOI level, in the studies reported below the influence of the 
vehicle’s semantic neighbourhood was considered. Recall that a word’s semantic 
neighbourhood is made up of other words with which it co-occurs. Semantic 
neighbourhoods vary, and can be described as dense or sparse, with density defined as the 
average distance between a word and its neighbours (Buchanan, Westbury & Burgess, 
2001). Therefore, this particular definition of semantic neighbourhood density (SND) 
refers to how many near neighbours a word has. Words with many close semantic 
neighbours are in a dense neighbourhood (i.e., high-SND words) whereas words with few 
close semantic neighbours are in a sparse neighbourhood (i.e., low-SND words). Because 
SND quantifies a word’s position among its associates in the semantic lexicon, I am 
considering it an amodal variable. Al-Azary and Buchanan (2017) found that metaphors 
made up of topics and vehicles from sparse semantic neighbourhoods are more 
comprehensible than metaphors made up of topics and vehicles from dense semantic 
neighbourhoods. In the studies below, SND was first held constant in order to focus 
solely on BOI (Study 1), and subsequently manipulated alongside BOI to examine 
potential interactive effects between these two semantic richness variables (Study 2).  
  Semantic richness refers to the multidimensional properties a concept can refer to 
(e.g., Pexman, Hargreaves, Siakaluk, Bodner & Pope, 2008). That is, concrete concepts, 
due to their high imagery, may be considered semantically richer than abstract concepts. 
Similarly, and in a narrower distinction, high-BOI concepts, due to their high motor 
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imagery, may be considered semantically richer than low-BOI concepts. Similarly, high-
SND concepts, due to their many near associates, may be considered semantically richer 
than low-SND concepts. Thus, BOI is considered a dimension related to a concept’s 
embodied representation whereas SND is considered a dimension related to a concept’s 
amodal representation. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants
8
 
   Forty-five University of Western Ontario students enrolled in an undergraduate 
psychology course participated for partial course credit. Eligibility criterion was English 
as a native-language. 
Materials 
  Artificial metaphors were created by randomly pairing topics with vehicles. 
Topics were either (30) abstract or (30) concrete nouns whereas vehicles were all 
concrete nouns and either (30) high or (30) low on rated BOI. Topic words were taken 
from a previous study on metaphor comprehension (Al-Azary & Buchanan, 2017). For 
the vehicles, BOI was determined using the Bennett et al. (2011) norms of multisyllabic 
                                                          
8
 The participants in this dissertation are all self-identified as native speakers of English. Because I 
am interested in universal effects, no other demographic information, such as age or gender, will 
be reported. 
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nouns which contain values ranging from 1 – 7.  Low-BOI was defined as < 3 on the 
scale whereas high-BOI was defined as > 5. The orthogonal combination led to four 
resulting conditions: abstract topic-high BOI vehicle (e.g., Indecision is a Hammer); 
abstract topic-low BOI vehicle (e.g., Elevation is a Grasshopper); concrete topic -high 
BOI vehicle (e.g., A Coast is a Razor); and concrete topic-low BOI vehicle (e.g., A 
Coach is an Eagle). Fifteen metaphors were created for each condition which resulted in 
a total of 60 for the experiment. Moreover, vehicle-SND was held constant such that 
vehicles were all low-SND words (using WINDSORS; Durda & Buchanan, 2008). In the 
present experiment, only low-SND vehicles were used because it was previously 
demonstrated (i.e., Al-Azary & Buchanan, 2017) that low-SND metaphors are more 
comprehensible than high-SND metaphors. As such, only using low-SND vehicles ought 
to result in more comprehensible metaphors in the present experiment. The SND variable 
in the WINDSORS database ranges from zero to one, however the median is 0.36. As 
such, low-SND words are those with SND values below the median in the WINDSORS 
database.  
  In addition to SND, vehicles were also similar in concreteness and frequency. 
Concreteness was determined by consulting Brysbaert, Warriner, and Kuperman (2014) 
norms, in which words were rated on concreteness using 5-point rating scales (e.g., 1 
being highly abstract and 5 being highly concrete and 2 – 4 serving as intermediate 
values). Low-BOI and high-BOI vehicles were similar on rated concreteness (i.e., 4.75 
and 4.87, respectively). Frequency was determined by consulting the English Lexicon 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
Project (Balota et al., 2007). Low-BOI and high-BOI vehicles were also similar on 
printed frequency (i.e., 7.77 and 8.07 per million words, respectively).  See Appendix A 
for stimuli. 
Procedure 
  Participants were instructed on screen and orally that they are to rate metaphors 
from 1-6 on how comprehensible they seemed, with higher scores representing items that 
are more comprehensible. Stimuli were presented on a computer in a self-paced 
comprehensibility rating task. Participants first rated three practice metaphors (Love is a 
journey, Time is money, Ignorance is bliss) and the artificial metaphors followed, 
presented in a random order. The three practice items were all conventional metaphors in 
order to bias the participants to treat the experimental items metaphorically rather than 
semantically anomalous. Participants rated all items from each condition. 
Results and Discussion 
  Due to the random nature of creating the metaphors, it would be likely that many 
might seem anomalous and hence rated fairly low in comprehensibility. Consequently, 
the focus is in determining relative differences between the conditions regardless of the 
overall comprehensibility of the statements. Data were analyzed in a 2 (abstract topic vs 
concrete topic) by 2 (high-BOI vehicle vs low-BOI vehicle) repeated measures ANOVA 
by subjects (F1) and in a between ANOVA by items (F2). A main-effect of concreteness 
was obtained such that abstract-topic metaphors (M = 2.43, SE = .10) were rated to be 
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more comprehensible than concrete-topic metaphors (M = 1.98, SE = .10), F1 (1, 44) = 
46.88, p = <.001, p

= .52, F2 (1, 56) = 6.97, p = .01, p
. Moreover, main-effect of 
BOI was also obtained, showing that metaphors with low-BOI vehicles (M = 2.38, SE = 
.09) were rated as more comprehensible than metaphors with high-BOI vehicles (M = 
2.04, SE = .10), F1 (1, 44) = 67.41, p = <.001, p
= .60, F2 (1, 56) = 4.06, p = .049, 
p
.  Lastly, topic-concreteness did not interact with BOI (Both Fs < 1).  
  The main effect of BOI was in the opposite direction from that predicted from 
Gibbs’ embodied simulation position. Assuming that the BOI variable is an appropriate 
operationalization of sensorimotor richness which is amenable to simulation, such results 
are inconsistent with Gibbs’ simulation model. Moreover, there was no topic-
concreteness by BOI interaction, which is also inconsistent with embodied simulation 
models where it is argued that abstract concepts are rooted in sensorimotor experience 
(e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Rather, the results are more consistent with an amodal 
view where it is assumed that sensorimotor properties play no particular role in metaphor 
comprehension. A tentative interpretation suggests that the semantic representation of 
high-BOI items contains too many sensorimotor properties, many of which are irrelevant 
for any given metaphor, and therefore interfere with computing the metaphor’s meaning. 
Al-Azary and Buchanan (2017) proposed a similar semantic richness explanation for 
their finding that metaphors made up of high-SND topics and vehicles were less 
comprehensible than those made up of low-SND topics and vehicles. That is, they argued 
that semantically dense concepts activate too many irrelevant properties that must be 
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inhibited. Similarly, Paivio and Clark (1986) found that priming the vehicle before 
presentation of a metaphor increases metaphor comprehension times rather than 
decreases them, relative to no-primes and topic-primes. They suggested that the vehicle 
may contain irrelevant information which actually interferes with processing when 
presented prior to its respective metaphor. A similar argument could explain the BOI 
effect observed here. 
  Despite the main effects reported above, the overall comprehensibility of the 
items was low (M = 2.21) ranging from 1.2 (A Tooth is a Giraffe) to 3.8 (A Coach is an 
Eagle; Destiny is a Fire), which is due to the random pairing of topic and vehicle, often 
times resulting in anomalous sentences. In the next experiment, artificial metaphors were 
again constructed but only three abstract metaphor topics were employed (Love, Life and 
Time), with any participant only rating one of these topics. Once again, the vehicles were 
manipulated such that they were either high or low-BOI. The logic of using only one 
topic is to induce participants to consider the topic in depth, increasing comprehensibility 
overall and possibly that the variables manipulated within the vehicle will be made more 
salient.  
  Recall the semantic richness argument that has been employed to explain the 
higher comprehensibility for low-SND over high-SND metaphors reported in another 
study (Al-Azary & Buchanan, 2017), and by extension to the higher comprehension for 
low-BOI metaphors here. Consequently, vehicles were also manipulated on SND 
resulting in four semantic conditions (i.e., high BOI-high SND; high BOI-low SND; low 
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BOI-high SND; low BOI-low SND) so that the semantic richness hypothesis can be 
tested. If the semantic richness hypothesis is correct one would expect that metaphors low 
SND-low BOI vehicles to be the most comprehensible. 
Study 2  
Method 
Participants 
  Seventy-four University of Western Ontario undergraduate students participated 
for partial course credit. Twenty-four participated in the time condition; 25 in the life 
condition; and 25 in the love condition.   
Materials 
  One-hundred eighteen multisyllabic BOI words were used as vehicles for each of 
the three topics. To obtain high and low cut-offs, values were arranged from low to high 
on BOI ratings. Then, these items were selected if they were also in the WINDSORS 
database containing SND values. The BOI cut-offs were the same used in Study 1 
whereas the SND cut-offs were the same used by Al-Azary and Buchanan (2017) in 
which a median split differentiated high and low-SND words. This resulted in 118 
vehicles across four conditions; 32 high BOI – high SND (e.g., pillow camera, bicyle); 27 
high BOI – low SND (e.g., apple, balloon, hammer); 23 low BOI – high SND (e.g., 
butterfly, mountain, submarine); 36 low BOI – low SND (e.g., lighting, tiger, volcano) 
which were each used in the three topic sets (Love, Life, and Time).  The four vehicle 
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conditions (i.e., high BOI – high SND, high BOI – low SND, low BOI – high SND and 
low BOI – low SND) were comparable on concreteness (i.e., 4.92, 4.87, 4.87, and 4.75 
respectively) and frequency (i.e., 8.06, 7.55, 8.07, and 7.70, per million words 
respectively). See Appendix B for complete list of stimuli.  
Procedure 
  The procedure of Study 1 was employed again. The only difference is that topic 
was a between-subject variable. 
Results and Discussion  
  A 3 (topic word) by 2 (vehicle BOI) by 2 (vehicle SND) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted, with topic as the between variable A main-effect of topic was obtained, F (2, 
71) = 4.02, p = .02, p

= .10, with Tukey post-hoc tests revealing that metaphors about 
love were rated as more comprehensible than metaphors about life (mean difference = 
0.54), p = .018. No other mean differences between metaphors made up of different 
topics reached significance. The main-effect of BOI was nonsignificant, F (1, 71) = .00, p 
= .989, p

= 0, as was the main-effect of SND, F (1, 71) = 2.149, p = .147, p

= .029. 
The BOI by SND interaction was also nonsignificant, F (1, 71) = .615, p = .435 p

= 
.009. Furthermore, BOI did not interact with topic, F (2, 71) = .203, p = .817, p

=   .006 
nor did SND, F (2, 71) = .839, p = .437, p

=   .023. However, a three-way interaction, F 
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(2, 71) = 3.562, p = .034, p

= .091 was obtained. As Table 1 shows, the effects of 
vehicle BOI and SND varied, albeit marginally, across different topics.  
Table 1. Mean comprehension ratings broken down by topic and vehicle condition. 
Topic High BOI  
High SND 
High BOI  
Low SND 
Low BOI  
High SND 
Low BOI 
 Low SND 
Life 1.94 2.07 2.02 2.01 
Love 2.54 2.54 2.52 2.63 
 Time 2.28 2.19 2.15 2.22 
   
  The argument that having people concentrate on just a single topic would lead to 
an increase in comprehension ratings was not observed. For instance, nearly half (48%) 
of all the trials consisted of ratings of 1, indicating the respective items were considered 
anomalous.  To provide items that reflected some metaphorical understanding, all items 
that received a comprehensibility rating of less than 2 were removed. Across participants, 
this resulted in the removal of 77 of the Life metaphors, 56 of the Time metaphors, and 33 
of the Love metaphors. As can be seen in Table 2, the pattern of items removed varied by 
the topic type, with love metaphors overall being considered as most comprehensible, 
with the fewest items rated less than 2.0. Moreover, more low-BOI items were removed 
than high-BOI items. 
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Table 2. Percentage of items removed due to low comprehensibility ratings (< 2). 
Topic High BOI  
High SND 
High BOI  
Low SND 
Low BOI  
High SND 
Low BOI  
 Low SND 
Life 62.5% 66.67% 69.57% 63.89% 
Love 18.75% 25.93% 30.43% 36.11% 
Time 43.75% 40.74% 60.87% 47.22% 
 
  After the removal of poor items, a 3 (topic word) by 2 (vehicle BOI) by 2 (vehicle 
SND) mixed ANOVA was conducted again, with topic as the between variable
9
. A main 
effect of BOI was observed, F (1, 71) = 22.055, p < .001, p

= .237. Metaphors with 
low-BOI vehicles (M = 2.93, SE = .10) were rated higher in comprehensibility than those 
with high-BOI vehicles (M = 2.68, SE = .10), replicating the main effect in Study 1. 
However, similar to the prior analysis, a main-effect of SND was nonsignificant, F (1, 
71) = 1.447, p = .233, p

= .020.  Moreover, BOI did not interact with SND, F (1, 71) = 
.622, p = .433, p

= .009, nor did BOI interact with topic, F (2, 71) = 1.332, p = .271, 
p

= .036.  However, SND interacted with topic, F (2, 71) = 5.217, p = .008, 
p
Furthermore, a reliable three-way interaction was also observed, F (2, 71) = 
4.331, p = .017, p

= .109. Two-way (vehicle BOI by vehicle SND) repeated measures 
                                                          
9
 I did not perform an item analysis due to the unequal and small number of items in each condition. 
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ANOVAs for each topic were then conducted. See Table 3 for the means of each 
condition. 
Table 3. Mean comprehension ratings broken down by topic and vehicle condition after 
the removal of anomalous items. 
Topic High BOI  
High SND 
High BOI   
Low SND 
Low BOI  
High SND 
Low BOI 
 Low SND 
Life 2.47 2.86 2.83 2.86 
Love 2.74 2.79 2.86 3.17 
 Time 2.68 2.54 3.06 2.86 
 
  For the Love metaphors, a main-effect of BOI was observed, F (1, 24) = 6.75, p = 
.016, p

= .220, with low-BOI (M = 3.02, SE = .17) metaphors being rated as more 
comprehensible than high-BOI metaphors (M = 2.77, SE = .17), along with a main-effect 
of SND, F (1, 24) = 12.97, p = .001, p

= .351. Low-SND metaphors (M = 2.98, SE = 
.16) were rated more comprehensible than high-SND metaphors (M = 2.80, SE = .16). A 
significant interaction, F (1, 24) = 6.56, p = .017, p

= .220, revealed that low-BOI and 
low-SND metaphors were rated the most comprehensible than the remaining conditions, 
which were rated equally comprehensible (see Table 3 for means).  
  For the Time metaphors, the only significant effect is of BOI, F (1, 23) = 17.954, 
p < .001, p

= .438, with, once again, low-BOI (M = 2.96, SE = .20) metaphors rated as 
more comprehensible than high-BOI metaphors (M = 2.61, SE = .18). The main-effect of 
SND was nonsignificant, F (1, 23) = 3.343, p = .081, p

= .127 as was the BOI by SND 
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interaction, F (1, 23) = .0760, p = .785, p

= .003. 
  Lastly, for the Life metaphors, the only significant effect is an interaction, F (1, 
24) = 4.96, p = .036, p

= .171, showing that high BOI – high SND metaphors were rated 
as the least comprehensible (see Table 3 for means). The main-effect of BOI was 
nonsignificant, F (1, 24) = 2.27, p = .145, p

= .086 as was the main-effect of SND, F (1, 
24) = 2.52, p = .125, p

= .095. 
  In total, the results of Study 2 (after removal of anomalous items) either replicate 
the BOI main effect in Study 1, or produce interactions which demonstrate low-BOI and 
low SND metaphors are rated as the most comprehensible, or the converse, that high-BOI 
and high-SND metaphors are the least comprehensible. These findings (a) do not support 
the notion that high-BOI metaphors should be more understandable because of embodied 
simulation and (b) suggest that the low-BOI effect found in Study 1 and low-SND effects 
found in earlier studies (Al-Azary & Buchanan, 2017) might be due to amodal factors 
based on the degree of inhibition required to produce metaphoric meaning. However, the 
results of Study 2 are not entirely straightforward as a high number of items were 
removed on the basis that they were rated as very low on comprehensibility (< 2 which 
makes them anomalous rather than metaphoric). Moreover, more low-BOI items were 
removed than high-BOI items, making the obtained BOI effects inconclusive. The 
experiments reported here are based on artificial metaphors created by the pairings of 
topic and vehicle nouns and it is unclear that the findings found here would extend to 
natural items. In the next Chapter I employed a procedure that should permit for the 
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construction of more meaningful, apt metaphors while still permitting for examination of 
BOI, and where relevant, SND. 
General Discussion 
 In two experiments, metaphors with low-BOI vehicles were rated as more 
comprehensible than high-BOI counterparts. Although preliminary, this finding runs 
counter to the predictions of Gibb’s simulation theory (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008), if one 
assumes that high-BOI vehicles in metaphors are more likely to invite embodied 
simulation processing mechanisms than would low-BOI vehicles. As mentioned 
previously, this assumption is reasonable when one considers the fact that high-BOI 
concepts result in faster reaction times in semantic processing tasks (Siakaluk et al., 
2008). Moreover, BOI was chosen as a word-level proxy for embodied accessibility 
specifically because it is associated with bodily-actions, which is a critical component in 
Gibb’s model.  
  Other embodied theories, such as dual coding (Paivio & Walsh, 1993) and 
sensorimotor shedding (Jamrozik et al., 2016) do not place a heavy emphasis on bodily-
actions per se. These theories are less constrained than Gibbs’ model and consider the 
vehicle’s sensorimotor representations in general to be involved in metaphor 
comprehension. As such, the finding of higher comprehension ratings observed for low-
BOI vehicles is not particularly troublesome for dual coding theory or sensorimotor 
shedding if one assumes that concreteness alone is a source of sensorimotor properties. 
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However, such theories do not address why low-BOI metaphors are easier to comprehend 
than high-BOI metaphors. 
  The tentative speculation regarding the detrimental effects of high-BOI vehicles 
on metaphor comprehension ratings can be related to the semantic richness hypothesis of 
Al-Azary and Buchanan (2017). Recall that this hypothesis states that semantic richness 
of vehicles results in difficulties in determining semantic properties relevant for a 
metaphor’s meaning. Evidence for this hypothesis comes from the finding that metaphors 
made up with topics and vehicles with many near semantic neighbours are rated less 
comprehensible (in both offline and online tasks) than metaphors made up of topics and 
vehicles with few near semantic neighbours. Thus, the BOI main effect is similar to 
previously reported effects regarding SND in metaphor; namely, high-BOI concepts refer 
to many semantic properties that complicate finding metaphor-relevant ones. Moreover, 
the unrelated properties may need to be inhibited (e.g., Kintsch, 2000) or suppressed 
(Gernsbacher et al., 2001). Further support for the semantic richness hypothesis comes 
from the finding that for Love metaphors, the semantically poorest condition (i.e., low 
BOI – low SND) was rated the most comprehensible whereas for the Life metaphors, the 
semantically richest condition (high BOI – high SND) was rated the least 
comprehensible. Such interactions either demonstrate the facilitative effect of less-
semantically rich vehicles, or the opposite, the detrimental effect of more-semantically 
rich vehicles.  
  Despite the obtained effects found in both Studies above, caution is warranted for 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
two main reasons. First, the items were overall rated low in comprehensibility, which in 
Study 2, necessitated the removal of a significant number of items for analysis. 
Furthermore, a greater number of low-BOI items were removed as anomalies than were 
high-BOI items, perhaps skewing the observed results. Second, the assumption that low-
BOI vehicles are less likely to invite embodied simulation than high-BOI vehicles needs 
to be clarified. Recall that all of the metaphor vehicles, including low-BOI vehicles, are 
nonetheless concrete and hence likely easy to image. The data presented above do not 
directly test whether high-BOI metaphors are indeed easier to simulate or whether both 
high and low-BOI items (being concrete, imageable nouns) can simulate metaphoric 
meaning, perhaps within non-motoric modalities. Given the overall low 
comprehensibility ratings found with the artificial pairing of nouns to create metaphors, 
the preference is to treat the data reported here as pilot attempts in order to determine if 
BOI results in any effects in metaphor. Chapter 3 addresses the need to test the effects of 
BOI on apt and natural metaphors. 
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Chapter 3  
Introduction 
  The objective in this chapter is to detect influences of embodied simulation with a 
more sensitive test than used in Chapter Two. To that end, I asked participants to 
generate metaphors, which would be more apt than the artificial and randomly generated 
metaphors employed in the studies described in the last Chapter. Moreover, I 
subsequently asked participants to interpret metaphors, rather than merely rate them for 
comprehensibility, as done in the studies in Chapter 2.  
  The two tasks (metaphor production and interpretation) employed were based on 
the same participants and items. Participants first created metaphors and, second, 
subsequently interpreted them. This task closely approximates the one reviewed by Gibbs 
and Matlock (2008), where they cite evidence for embodied simulation in nominal 
metaphor understanding. Their evidence comes from an online exercise wherein teachers 
were asked first to create a metaphor that describes their occupation, and subsequently 
explain their choice. For example, one teacher created the metaphor a teacher is a 
fisherman, and explained it by writing the following: “Standing by the river, putting the 
hook into the water (no barbs on the hook). Constantly guiding the rod down the river, 
toward the sea of self-fulfillment. There are rapids that can cause the fish to experience a 
sense of confusion, but the tension from the rod is a constant, guiding them toward 
calmer waters. This journey cannot be completed by one fisher, the rod is passed to the 
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next fisher (teacher).”  Gibbs and Matlock (2008) consider such an interpretation, where 
the interpreter describes carrying out actions in an ‘as-if’ scenario, to be consistent with 
their model of embodied simulation.  
  Although the task discussed above is interesting, the descriptive support is 
anecdotal and non-experimental. Moreover, because the task consisted of teachers 
metaphorically describing their jobs, it is not particularly surprising that they interpreted 
their metaphors by describing bodily-actions apparent in other roles; that is, the task itself 
may invite one to engage in simulation. However, if metaphor interpretation is truly 
driven by embodied simulation processes, as Gibbs and colleagues propose, (Wilson & 
Gibbs, 2007; Gibbs & Matlock, 2008), then evidence for embodied simulation should be 
apparent even with simple nominal metaphors, of the form A is B. Recall that the 
metaphors used in the last Chapter were of the form A is B, but were randomly created, 
and consequently, artificial. Although there were relative differences between conditions, 
the metaphors overall were rated low in comprehensibility. As such, their poor quality 
may have contributed to the low comprehensibility ratings and precluded an opportunity 
for participants to engage in an embodied simulation (aptness is a critical factor in 
metaphor understanding; see Blasko & Connine, 1993). Therefore, in the current study, 
only apt metaphors were used in an interpretation task.  
  In order to develop comprehensible metaphors, participants were asked to create 
metaphors they consider both apt and comprehensible. After creating a series of 
metaphors, participants interpreted them. The metaphor interpretations were then 
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analyzed for content reflective of embodied simulation. Therefore, because the current 
experiment involves both metaphor production and metaphor interpretation, it is an 
analog to the task described by Gibbs and Matlock (2008) and should be a fair test of 
embodied simulation.  
Metaphor Production 
  Metaphor production remains understudied in the psycholinguistics and cognitive 
psychology literatures (Holyoak & Stamenkovic, 2018; Katz, 1989). However, there are a 
few notable studies that revealed effects relevant for the present experiment. For instance, 
Katz (1989) utilized a vehicle selection paradigm where participants completed metaphor 
frames (e.g., Sociology is the ________ of sciences) by choosing the single best word 
from a list to serve as a vehicle (e.g., robin, hawk, USA, Switzerland, etc.). Two primary 
semantic variables of the selected vehicles were analyzed; namely, the concreteness of 
the chosen vehicle and its semantic distance to the topic. In regard to vehicle 
concreteness, participants tended to choose concrete vehicles more than abstract vehicles. 
In regard to semantic distance, vehicles that were chosen were a moderate distance from 
the topic, rather than near or far. Therefore, Katz showed that a vehicle’s concreteness 
and its position among other concepts in semantic space both play a role in producing apt 
metaphors.  
  Whereas Katz (1989) determined semantic effects of metaphor production, 
Chiappe and Chiappe (2007) determined the underlying cognitive mechanisms. In their 
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study, participants working memory capacity was measured, with a particular focus on 
inhibitory control, using tasks such as reverse digit span among others. Participants then 
received metaphor frames consisting of a topic (e.g., Some lectures are _______) along 
with a predetermined property that is to be attributed to the topic (e.g., Boring and put 
you to sleep). For each frame, participants generated a vehicle that captured the property 
(e.g., sleeping pill, lullaby, etc.). Unlike the Katz (1989) study, no vehicle word-bank was 
provided; as such, participants could choose any word to serve as a vehicle. Their results 
showed that higher working-memory and inhibitory control is correlated with producing 
higher quality metaphors. They interpreted these results as follows: producing an apt 
metaphor requires inhibition of competing vehicles and semantic properties. This is 
consistent with the predication algorithm (Kintsch, 2000) and the related semantic 
richness hypothesis (Al-Azary & Buchanan, 2017), in which metaphor processing entails 
inhibiting properties of the vehicle that are unrelated to the metaphor.  
 The metaphor production component employed here will follow from the findings 
of both Katz (1989) and Chiappe and Chiappe (2007). Recall that Katz demonstrated 
concrete vehicles are favoured over abstract vehicles in metaphor production. However, 
no one to date has further characterized the concreteness of vehicles on other semantic 
dimensions. To that end, participants will create metaphors by pairing abstract topics with 
concrete vehicles that vary in BOI and SND. I chose BOI to extend the effects of 
Experiment 1 with a different paradigm and dependent variable; recall that in the earlier 
studies, low-BOI metaphors were rated as more comprehensible than high-BOI 
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metaphors. A conceptual replication would be obtained if participants chose to create 
metaphors from low-BOI, rather than high-BOI vehicles. Moreover, this would suggest, 
once again, that participants are not engaging in an embodied simulation when processing 
metaphor, assuming that high-BOI vehicles are more amenable to simulation than low-
BOI vehicles. In a similar vein, SND will extend previously found effects in metaphor 
comprehension, showing negative effects of high-SND vehicles (and topics) (Al-Azary & 
Buchanan, 2017) to metaphor production. Moreover, if both low-BOI and low-SND 
effects are obtained the semantic richness hypothesis will be supported. Alternatively, it 
is possible that participants will engage in embodied simulation processes such as those 
described by Gibbs and colleagues, and opt for high-BOI vehicles because they afford 
rich motor imagery. Such an effect will be supportive of the embodied simulation 
framework underlying metaphor processing. 
Metaphor Interpretation  
  The second component will involve participants interpreting their created 
metaphors in an open-ended task. Like metaphor production, metaphor interpretation is 
also understudied. However, some researchers have analyzed the content of participants’ 
metaphor interpretations for perceptual-embodied language, which is relevant for the 
current study. For instance, one of the most comprehensive studies on open-ended 
metaphor interpretations to date is Siltanen’s (1986) study. In this developmental study, 
children and adults interpreted metaphors varying in difficulty (i.e., easy, moderate, and 
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difficult), and the nature of their interpretations was assessed. Interpretations were scored 
regarding the degree they were perceptually-based, conceptually-based, or based on a 
combination of the two. For example, an easy metaphor, such as the river is a snake may 
be interpreted perceptually with properties such as “curvy” or “brown”. Or a more 
elaborate interpretation for the same metaphor could be “curvy evil things that kill 
people”; such an interpretation includes both perceptual and conceptual properties. 
Siltanen found that children (6 – 8 year olds) could only comprehend easy metaphors 
perceptually. However, adults (19-31) could interpret easy, moderate, and difficult 
metaphors conceptually and perceptually, with the great majority of interpretations being 
purely conceptual, or a combination of the two. Purely perceptual interpretations were 
only observed for some (33%) of the easy metaphors, and are therefore marginal overall. 
Therefore, for adults, metaphor interpretations were mostly conceptual, sometimes 
integrated with perceptual properties. Rarely were they only perceptual. 
  Although Siltanen analyzed a wide variety of metaphors across development 
stages, it is unclear how metaphor types (other than difficulty) may have influenced 
interpretations. For example, her items were technically nominal, but varied from 
suspicion is quicksand to the surf crashing on the seashore is a symphony.  Moreover, 
metaphors themselves occasionally involved perceptual content (e.g., jealousy is a green-
eyed monster; Sally’s spider web is a shimmering silver lace, etc.) which likely biased 
interpretations to include perceptual features.  
  Fraser (1993) reported interpretations to nominal metaphors, such as he/she is a 
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woodchuck. Although his study was a pilot experiment, Fraser found that most 
interpretations fit into three categories; namely, physical, behavioural, and functional. 
For example, for the woodchuck metaphor, a physical interpretation may include words 
such as “buckteeth, ugly, fat, hairy”. A behavioural interpretation includes properties 
such as “industrious, shy, introvert, persistent, eats continually, waddles, persistent etc.” 
along with functional interpretations “predicts spring”. Therefore, many of the 
interpretations seem to include physical properties and actions related to the literal 
referent of the vehicle (i.e. fat, waddles, eats), although, some are clearly abstractions 
(e.g., industrious). Like, Siltanen’s data, Fraser’s seems to include both perceptual and 
conceptual properties as well. However, Fraser (1993) used only a particular type of 
nominal metaphors which were all about people (e.g., he is a woodchuck). As such, these 
constrained metaphors may not generalize to others. Moreover, Fraser (1993) did not 
report the proportions of interpretations of any given type (i.e., physical, behavioural or 
functional). Upon consideration of Siltanen and Fraser’s data, it seems that perceptual or 
embodied language may play a role in understanding some metaphors; however, it is 
unclear to what degree general metaphor interpretations will include perceptual-
embodied language. Nonetheless, two particular models of metaphor comprehension lead 
to the prediction that perceptual-embodied language will underlie metaphor 
interpretations of the current study. 
  One model is Gibbs’ simulation hypothesis (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Wilson & 
Gibbs, 2007). Recall that, in this model, metaphor understanding arises from constructing 
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an embodied simulation where the aspects of the metaphor are imagined. For example, 
recall the metaphor, A teacher is a fisherman, described earlier. According to Gibbs and 
Matlock (2008, pg. 174), “… the new category of A teacher is a fisherman, for example, 
is created and appreciated by running the simulation, or engaging in an ‘as if’ scenario 
where bodily action and its effects are critical to the metaphor’s meaning.” Moreover, 
Wilson and Gibbs (2007) describe how the metaphor, lawyers are sharks, may “engage 
bodily simulation processes as people create imaginative scenarios in which the metaphor 
makes sense (e.g., lawyers are like sharks in moving quickly and aggressively toward 
their victims)” (pg. 729).  As such, bodily motion seems to play a particular role in 
Gibbs’ conception of embodied simulation, but sensorimotor representations in general 
are related to this model. Therefore, Gibbs’ model predicts perceptual-embodied 
language to be involved in metaphoric interpretations.  
  Another model predictive of perceptual-embodied language in metaphor 
interpretations is the dual coding theory of metaphor (Paivio & Clark, 1986; Paivio & 
Walsh, 1993). According to this model, the imagery of the vehicle, along with verbal 
associates of both topic and vehicle, produce metaphor comprehension and interpretation. 
In fact, this model places special emphasis on the concreteness of the vehicle in order to 
evoke imagery. Moreover, imagery involved in understanding the metaphor is not limited 
only for the vehicle concept in isolation; rather, the image system stores continuous 
imagery, synchronously available and analogous to the perceptual world. As such, 
imagery beyond that of the vehicle ought to play a role in metaphor understanding. As 
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Paivio and Walsh (1993) put it, “Think of the sun and you simultaneously think of the 
sky.” (pg. 322). This model considers imagery to be multimodal rather than only visual. 
Moreover, dual coding theory, argues that amodal associative information (stored in the 
verbal system separate of the image system) plays a role in forming metaphor 
interpretations as well. As such, this model does not predict as strongly as Gibbs’ model 
that metaphoric interpretation is purely rooted in perceptual-embodied representations. 
 Unlike Paivio’s dual coding theory and Gibbs’ simulation model, purely amodal 
approaches do not give any special status to perceptual-embodied language to form 
metaphor interpretations. Recall that in structure-mapping (Gentner, 1983) relations of 
the vehicle are thought to play the primary role in metaphor comprehension. However, in 
structure-mapping, shared attributes of the topic and vehicle (i.e., perceptual or non-
perceptual features) are aligned prior to the processing of relations. Therefore, if 
perceptual language is involved in metaphor interpretation, it is not particularly an issue 
for structure-mapping; however, this model would treat perceptual language as a 
precursor to processing relational information, which is accordingly fundamental to 
metaphor understanding. According to structure-mapping theory, even a metaphor that 
can involve bodily-actions, such as Socrates was a midwife is thought to be interpreted 
relationally, such as, "Socrates did not simply teach his students new ideas but rather 
helped them realize ideas that had been developing within them all along. (Bowdle & 
Gentner, 2005; pg. 196.)”. Clearly, this interpretation makes no reference to any bodily-
actions a literal midwife might perform, unlike Gibbs and Matlock’s (2008) a teacher is a 
56 
 
 
 
 
 
fisherman metaphor.  
  The categorization model (Glucksberg, 2008) suggests no prediction of 
perceptual-embodied language in metaphor interpretation. This is because, according to 
this model, metaphor processing does not involve the literal representation of the vehicle, 
but rather an abstracted sense of the vehicle (Glucksberg, 2008). Accordingly, the 
meaning of the metaphor, lawyers are sharks would be interpreted as a result of 
constructing an abstract category of ‘vicious things’. As such, the categorization model is 
purely associative with no consideration of imagery. Moreover, this model holds that 
literal properties of the vehicle are inhibited during metaphor processing. Consequently, 
processing literal properties of the vehicle (e.g., swim) prior to the processing of the 
metaphor (e.g., my lawyer is a shark), interferes with the time taken to comprehend the 
metaphor (McGlone & Manfredi, 2001). Therefore, this model places no role in 
perceptual-embodied properties of the vehicle in metaphor interpretation; if such 
language is obtained in metaphor interpretations, it would be a serious issue for the 
categorization model.  
  In summary, Gibbs makes a strong claim regarding the centrality of embodied 
cognition in metaphor interpretations; Paivio provides a hybrid model wherein both 
abstract associative and embodied perceptual structures are involved in metaphor 
processing; and finally there are a number of theories that attribute no special role to 
embodiment at all in the processing of metaphor (e.g., Gentner, 1983; Glucksberg, 2008; 
see also Kintsch. 2000). 
57 
 
 
 
 
 
Study 3 
  Participants were presented with abstract words (e.g., secrecy) and potential 
vehicles (e.g., sword, rat, castle, cloud, etc.). Their task was to choose a vehicle that 
produced a comprehensible and apt metaphor in their judgement (e.g., secrecy is a 
cloud). The topics were all abstract but differed in SND; half were high-SND and half 
low-SND. The vehicles were conjointly manipulated on BOI and SND like in Study 2 of 
Chapter 2. After creating the metaphors, participants then interpreted their meanings. 
Both production and interpretation tasks provided quantitatively analyzable data. The 
dependent variable for the metaphor production task is the frequency of vehicle choice, 
similar to Katz (1989). For the interpretation task, the dependent variable is the 
percentage of perceptual-embodied language used.  
Method 
Participants 
   Sixty people participated for $10. Participants were recruited from poster 
advertisements around campus, and the summer participant research pool at Western. 
Participants reported being native speakers of English.  
Materials 
Topics 
 Abstract words, determined by their ratings in the Brysbaert et al. (2014) 
concreteness norms, were used as topics. Words were chosen from the lowest 
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concreteness quartile and therefore are the most abstract. Eighteen of the topics are high 
SND whereas 18 are low SND. Furthermore, topics were low-frequency, ranging from 1 
– 40 per million words. The abstract-high SND and abstract-low SND topics did not 
differ significantly on abstractness, t (34) = 1.0076, p = 0.3208, or frequency, t (34) = 
0.3389, p = 0.74 but of course, differed on SND, t (34) = 9.24, p < 001. 
Potential Vehicles 
  The items chosen as potential vehicles are concrete nouns (all rated greater than 
4.5 on a 5 point concreteness scale; Brysbaert et al., 2014) differing on BOI. To develop a 
suitable list of items, as a starting point, we rejected the use of any vehicles which were 
used in metaphors that were rated less than 2 in either Study 1 or 2. For example, the 
word pelican did not work in Love is a pelican, Time is a pelican, Life is a pelican, or 
Diplomacy is a pelican. It is likely that pelican may be an acceptable vehicle for a 
particular topic in an appropriate context, but we exclude its use for the current study. 
Moreover, vehicles with somewhat similar meanings were reduced (e.g., lion and tiger) 
by choosing the one which satisfied other psycholinguistic constraints imposed on the 
stimuli (e.g., keeping frequency and concreteness matched).  Additionally, Study 1 and 2 
contained only the multisyllabic BOI nouns (Bennett et al., 201). To increase the number 
of potential items, in the current experiment, monosyllabic nouns were included as well 
(Tillotson, et. al., 2008). Lastly, each list of vehicles only had two animate items, which 
ought to further reduce unwanted variability that can occur with studying BOI. For 
example, low-BOI items tend to be animate while high-BOI items tend to be inanimate 
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(Heard et al., 2018). The result was four conditions of vehicles, each with 12 items (i.e., 
high BOI-high SND; high BOI-low SND; low BOI-high SND; low BOI-low SND). See 
Appendix C for stimuli. 
  One-way ANOVAs were conducted to ensure the four vehicle conditions only 
differed on BOI and SND. The vehicles did not differ in concreteness, (p = .119); or 
frequency, (p = .952). Critically, the manipulation of BOI is significant, (p < .001), with 
Tukey-HSD tests confirming that the high-BOI items, across SND, do not significantly 
differ (p = .97) nor do the low-BOI items, across SND (p = .75), but the high and low-
BOI items differ from one another (both p’s <.001). The same can be said for the SND 
manipulation
10
 (p < .001), with Tukey-HSD tests confirming that high-SND items do not 
significantly differ (p = .99) nor the low-SND items (p = .90), but the high and low-SND 
items do (both p’s <.001). 
Procedure 
  Participants were instructed that their task was to create metaphors by choosing a 
vehicle which, with the presented topic, creates a comprehensible and apt metaphor. The 
instructions included time is a river and time is a pickle to demonstrate that not every 
topic-vehicle pairing is suitable. A practice trial involved the word Time along with the 
48 vehicles. Participants were asked to choose a vehicle for the topic, and write out the 
                                                          
10
 The term ‘manipulation’ is used loosely here. This is technically a quasi-experimental manipulation 
because the BOI and SND values are not technically manipulated with the items themselves (i.e., 
manipulating a word’s BOI or SND level), which is not practical in psycholinguistic experiments.  
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entire metaphor on a provided sheet of paper. After this practice trial, the experimental 
trials followed. An experimental trial consisted of the presentation of a slide that included 
an abstract topic-word along with 48 vehicles presented below it. The order of the 
vehicles was pseudo-random such that each of the 36 slides contained a unique order of 
the vehicles. For each trial, participants were asked to choose a vehicle that, when paired 
with the presented topic, results in an apt and comprehensible metaphor, and 
subsequently wrote out the entire metaphor in the A is B format on their provided sheet in 
a numbered order from 1 - 36. After writing out the 36 metaphors, phase two was 
initiated. Participants expected this phase, but did not know it entailed writing out 
explanations for the metaphors. In this phase, a slide, which contained a blank text-box, 
prompted the participants to type a metaphor corresponding to a random number from the 
sheet, along with an explanation of the metaphor. Therefore, the metaphors were 
interpreted in a random order, independent of the order that they were produced. The 
study typically took less than one hour to complete. 
Results and Discussion 
  The data from 11 participants were not included in the analysis, for the following 
reasons: if they did not complete the entire study, created many similes despite the 
instructions given, or created extended metaphors. Thus the analyses are based on 49 
participants. The resulting participants created and interpreted nominal metaphors of the 
form A is B (although 5 of which each created a single simile - we included such 
participants because a single simile may not necessarily be strategic, but possibly 
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accidental). I will first report the results from the vehicle selection task followed by the 
interpretation task.  
Vehicle Selection Data 
  A topic (high-SND vs low-SND) by vehicle BOI (high vs low) by vehicle SND 
(high vs low) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the frequency of vehicles 
chosen from the four semantic conditions. A main effect of BOI was obtained, F (1, 48) = 
31.297, p = <.001, p
2 = .395; participants chose low-BOI vehicles (M = 5.08, SE = .104) 
56.4% of the time whereas they chose high-BOI vehicles (M = 3.918, SE = .103) less 
frequently at 43.5% of the time.  
  Two interactions were observed. First, a vehicle-BOI by vehicle-SND interaction 
was observed, F (1, 48) = 9.883, p = .003, p
2 = .171. As is depicted in Figure 1, the 
effect of BOI differs for high and low-SND vehicles: low-BOI vehicles were preferred 
for both high and low-SND items but this preference was greater for low-SND vehicles 
than high-SND vehicles. 
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Figure 1. Vehicle SND by Vehicle BOI interaction in Experiment 3. Error bars represent 
standard error. 
 
  Second, a three-way, topic SND by vehicle BOI by vehicle SND, interaction was 
observed, F (1, 48) = 9.089, p = .004, 2 = .159. As Figure 2 shows, the distribution of 
vehicle choices differs between high and low-SND topics. For high-SND topics, 
participants relied more on low BOI – low SND vehicles to construct apt metaphors. 
Presumably, this was to reduce the overall semantic richness of the metaphor because the 
topic is already from a dense semantic neighbourhood. Conversely, when the topic is 
from a sparse semantic neighbourhood, vehicle semantic richness does not matter as 
much.  
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Figure 2. Condition means in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error. 
   
  The main effect observed in the metaphor production task for low-BOI nouns is 
consistent with the effects of Studies 1 and 2 where participants rated artificial metaphors 
for meaning. In Studies 1 and 2, metaphors with low-BOI vehicles were rated as more 
comprehensible than those with high-BOI vehicles, and in the current experiment, people 
choose low-BOI vehicles more than high-BOI vehicles when creating novel metaphors. I 
have argued that these low-BOI effects suggest that embodied simulation processes are 
not involved in metaphor processing. Moreover, the low-BOI effects are consistent with 
previous experiments on semantic richness in metaphor processing, which also showed 
that semantically rich concepts (i.e., defined by semantic neighbourhood density) 
negatively affected metaphor comprehension in both offline and online tasks (Al-Azary 
& Buchanan, 2017). To date, I do not know of any studies demonstrating semantic 
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richness (beyond concreteness of the vehicle) is conducive for metaphor processing (e.g., 
comprehension and production).  
  Like the main-effect, the interactions obtained here also demonstrate how 
semantic richness is detrimental to metaphor processing. That is, the low-BOI preference 
was greater when vehicles were also low-SND than high-SND, resulting in the most 
choices for vehicles that were low-BOI and low-SND. Moreover, the prevalence of 
choices for vehicles that are both low-BOI and low-SND was higher when the topic was 
high-SND rather than low-SND. These findings also fit within a framework where 
semantic richness is detrimental to metaphor processing. When the topic itself has many 
associations, and people must choose a vehicle to pair it with, they prefer low-BOI and 
low-SND vehicles, presumably to reduce the overall semantic richness of the metaphor. 
That is, the semantic representations of the topic and vehicle interact to produce meaning 
(e.g., Black 1962), and this interaction is most efficient when the semantic 
representations are not too constrained, but are flexible (e.g., Al-Azary & Buchanan, 
2017). Therefore, the obtained main effect and interactions both extend the semantic 
richness hypothesis by showing the vehicles with sparser representations are favoured 
over those with richer representations. Presumably, semantically impoverished vehicles 
are more malleable to forming new associations in metaphor creation than their 
semantically rich counterparts. 
  Of course, the vehicle must not be too semantically impoverished. Virtually all 
metaphor processing theories view the vehicle as a source of semantic information that is 
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transported to the topic. Moreover, recall that Katz (1989) showed people choose 
concrete vehicles over abstract vehicles when creating metaphors. However, the results of 
this study further characterize the nature of concrete vehicles. Concreteness is typically 
enough richness for creating metaphoric meaning; additional richness, such as motor 
imagery and proximal semantic neighbours, seems to provide too much semantic 
information, on average. 
Metaphor Interpretation Data 
  The interpretations of the 49 participants were assessed. Each participant created 
and interpreted 36 metaphors, resulting in a total of 1764 interpretations. Trials were 
removed from analyses if they were left blank or the participant wrote “I don’t know”, or 
if participants accidentally interpreted the same metaphor twice (which occurred in four 
cases). The number of trials removed was low (29 cases, or 1.67% of the data), and left 
1735 metaphors and interpretations for analysis. Interpretations were then cleaned by 
removing button-presses recorded by the E-Prime software used to collect responses 
(e.g., spaces would be recorded such as {SPACE}), and corrected for spelling using a 
spell-checker, along with errors in grammar and punctuation. 
  The majority of interpretations involved explanations for why the created 
metaphor makes sense, oftentimes explaining the similarity between the topic and 
vehicle. The main question regarding the interpretation data is to what degree they 
contain perceptual-embodied language. The secondary question involves whether high-
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BOI metaphors elicit interpretations containing more perceptual-embodied language than 
low-BOI metaphors. 
  In their resemblance to embodied simulations, interpretations varied widely, with 
some interpretations lacking any perceptual-embodied properties, some other 
interpretations depicting a dynamic scene enriched with sensorimotor properties, and 
some other interpretations showing a mixture. To illustrate the variability in 
interpretations, consider how three metaphors with the same vehicle, butterfly, were 
interpreted. For instance, one person created the metaphor nostalgia is a butterfly, and 
interpreted it as “Butterflies are said to be happy and nostalgia is having a happy 
memory.” This interpretation makes no reference to sensorimotor properties; rather, an 
association of the vehicle (i.e., happy) is applied to the topic. As such, this interpretation 
is consistent with amodal processes such as comparison or categorization. 
 Other interpretations can be considered moderately embodied in which the literal 
sense of the vehicle is described as moving, albeit in a limited way. For example, one 
person created the metaphor luck is a butterfly and interpreted it as “It is hard to capture, 
especially when you are pursuing it, and it never stays for long.” This interpretation 
compares pursuing and catching a literal butterfly to experiencing good luck. As such, it 
involves characteristics of a butterfly that would result from simulating what it must be 
like to catch a butterfly (i.e., hard to capture, never stays for long). Despite lacking a rich 
sensorimotor experience, the interpreter is considering dynamic, physical qualities of the 
vehicle beyond its relations and abstract properties (i.e., its ability to quickly move). 
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  Lastly, some interpretations seemingly evoked the embodied simulations 
described by Gibbs and colleagues (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007), and 
by Paivio and Walsh (1993) where one simulates a scene with dynamic, rather than static, 
properties of the vehicle. For example, one person created the metaphor amusement is a 
butterfly, and interpreted it as follows; “Have you watched a butterfly flutter from flower 
to flower? In the sunshine and the tall grass and wildflowers, that is truly amusing.” This 
interpretation clearly involves a dynamic scene where the interpreter imagines a literal 
butterfly in its natural environment. Such simulations do not simply involve static 
perceptual properties; rather, the butterfly is in motion and other imagery is described 
(i.e. sunshine, tall grass). Moreover, the scene described has temporal order and events; 
that is, the butterfly is flying from flower to flower, in an apparent sequence.  
  The examples described above, and others, can be found in Table 4. Each sample 
interpretation was produced by a different participant. One particularly interesting finding 
is that the same continuum ranging from associative to embodied interpretations can be 
found for both high and low-BOI metaphors. This was not anticipated, as high-BOI was 
used as a means to invite embodied simulation. However, it seems from the sample 
interpretations that low-BOI items are also amenable to simulation. For example, recall 
the low-BOI metaphor described above, amusement is a butterfly involves a simulation of 
a literal butterfly in its natural environment as a source domain to describe the abstract 
concept, amusement. Similarly, a high-BOI metaphor, such as imagination is a balloon, 
likens releasing a balloon in the air and watching it float away with a child’s imagination. 
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Again, in this interpretation, a simulation involving a literal entity is taken as a source 
domain to describe an abstract concept. Therefore, it seems from the interpretation data, 
that high-BOI may not be a proxy for inviting embodied simulation; rather, concreteness 
alone may be sufficient. 
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Table 4. Sample interpretations varying in embodiment for high-BOI and low-BOI 
metaphors. Each interpretation was provided by a different participant. 
Interpretation 
Type 
High-BOI  
Metaphors 
Low-BOI  
Metaphors 
 
 
Disembodied  
Prestige is a sword: One can either use 
their prestige for good or evil. 
 
Luck is a balloon: Both bring most 
people joy but do not last forever. 
Nostalgia is a butterfly: Butterflies are said 
to be happy and nostalgia is having a happy 
memory. 
 
Narcissism is a storm: Just like a storm is a 
bad thing that can cause havoc so can 
having a narcissistic demeanor. 
 
 
 
 
Moderately 
Embodied 
 
Secrecy is a sword: When people keep 
secrets or you keep secrets, it can create 
thick drama and can hurt someone as if 
a sword cut them. 
Narcissism is a balloon: Narcissistic 
people do things to make themselves 
feel better, and are constantly filling the 
balloon, or their ego, with air and don't 
know when to stop. 
Luck is a butterfly: It is hard to capture, 
especially when you are pursuing it, and it 
never stays for long.  
 
Hatred is a storm: Hatred is like a storm 
brewing inside of you and it doesn't do any 
good to hang onto hatred - until you let it 
go, your insides will feel like a storm. 
 
 
 
 
Embodied 
Simulation 
Guilt is a sword: Guilt is like an 
imaginary sword that is stuck in you. 
Even though you've probably used that 
sword to hurt someone else, it comes 
back to stab you.  
Imagination is a balloon: Balloons 
represent children. Children like to 
imagine things, and they like to put in 
their energy and effort to blowing into 
the balloon, to make it large and to let it 
float into the air. The similarity lies in 
that both the balloon and the childrens' 
imagination reach an inevitable end, 
which is when reality sets in and breaks 
both entities. 
 
Amusement is a butterfly: Have you 
watched a butterfly flutter from flower to 
flower? In the sunshine and the tall grass 
and wildflowers, that is truly amusing.  
Obsession is a storm: Just like how a storm 
can start off very small before it gets big 
and out of control, obsession can also follow 
the same path. Occasionally thinking about 
something can become uncontrollable to the 
point where you cannot help yourself from 
thinking about that thing with every waking 
moment. Obsession can also creep up on 
you without you knowing just like how a 
light shower can suddenly turn into a 
thunderstorm. 
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  The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software was used to quantify 
the perceptual-embodied content of the interpretations (Pennebaker, Francis & Booth, 
2001). The LIWC determines the percentage of words in a text that are from a particular 
category. For example, a text passage may contain words that are related to perception, 
motion, or the body, and therefore, reflective of embodied simulation. In fact, Zator and 
Katz (2017) used the LIWC to assess embodiment in people’s verbally explained 
autobiographical memories. To analyze the degree of embodiment in the metaphor 
interpretations, I selected to following linguistic categories of the LIWC: perceptual 
words (e.g., look), broken down specifically by seeing (e.g., view), hearing (e.g., listen), 
and feeling (e.g., touch) words. I also included words relating to the body (e.g., hands), 
and biological processes (e.g., eat), along with words related to relativity (e.g., bend), 
motion (e.g., arrive), and space (e.g., in). As such, each of these subcategories will 
provide a finer grain analysis of metaphor interpretations than found in previous 
experiments (Siltanen, 1986; Fraser, 1993). 
  Each interpretation was inputted to the LIWC and the percentage of words from 
each of the categories described above was outputted. Therefore, for each interpretation, 
nine values representing embodiment were generated. The total word count for each 
interpretation was also obtained. Because each value represents only one dimension of 
embodiment (e.g., vision, motion, space, etc.), an average embodiment score was 
calculated as the mean of the nine sub-categories and therefore also expressed as a 
percentage. See Figure 3 for a histogram of the average embodiment scores. According to 
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the LIWC’s definition of perceptual, bodily and motion related words, there is a wide 
variety of scores, ranging from zero to 19 percent. 
 
Figure 3. Histogram of Interpretations’ Average Embodiment Scores. 
 
  For further analysis, the interpretations were grouped by vehicle-BOI. The aim of 
this analysis was to determine if high-BOI metaphors resulted in interpretations that 
contain language that is suggestive of an embodied simulation. As such, this was a check 
on my assumption that BOI is an appropriate variable to study embodied simulation in 
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metaphor processing. To that end, I compared the interpretations of the high-BOI 
metaphors (N = 752) with those of the low-BOI metaphors (N = 983) on average 
embodiment, along with the sub-categories related to embodied simulation described 
above. I anticipated that high-BOI metaphors would, on average, elicit interpretations 
with more words related to embodied simulation than low-BOI metaphors. I compared 
interpretations using independent samples t-tests. These comparisons are summarized in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5. Total word count and percentage of words from specific linguistic categories for 
high-BOI and low-BOI metaphors. p values are derived from independent samples t-tests 
with 1733 degrees of freedom. 
Linguistic Category High-BOI 
Metaphors 
(n = 752) 
Low-BOI 
Metaphors 
(n = 983) 
p 
 
Total Word Count 19.13 18.21 0.08 
Perceptual 3.2 3.89 < .05 
See 1.27 2.04 < .001 
Hear 0.23 0.18 .45 
Feel 1.33 1.15 .25 
Body .30 .14 <.01 
Biological 2.14 1.15 < .001 
Motion 2.05 2.51 < .05 
Space 7.84 8 0.685 
Relativity 13.98 14.94 .08 
Average 
Embodiment 
3.59 3.78 .126 
   
  Surprisingly, as can be seen in Table 5, both high and low-BOI metaphors’ 
interpretations are equal in their average embodiment scores. Moreover, low-BOI 
metaphors elicited interpretations with more perceptual-related, see-related, and motion-
related words than high-BOI metaphors. This is counter to the anticipation that high-BOI 
words would be more amenable to movement, in terms of imaginary interaction, than 
low-BOI words. Conversely, and less surprisingly, high-BOI metaphors elicited 
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interpretations with words relating to body parts and biological processes more-so than 
low-BOI metaphors. This is not surprising because high-BOI words, by their nature, are 
more related to a human body than low-BOI words. It is worth noting that the differences 
between interpretations of high and low-BOI metaphors are small. In fact, both high and 
low-BOI interpretations were significantly higher than zero in each of the individual 
linguistic categories chosen to approximate embodied simulation (all p’s < .001). 
Therefore, despite BOI level, the interpretations, on average, contained words indicative 
of an embodied simulation. This result is particularly interesting because the participants 
were not encouraged to think of the actions or images that are associated with the 
metaphors before they interpreted them.   
  One critical implication of the interpretation data is that low-BOI effects reported 
in Chapter 1 and above can no longer be taken as suggestive of a disembodied processing 
mechanism. As Table 5 shows, low-BOI vehicles are advantaged in eliciting perceptual 
and motion related words in their interpretations, and on average, evoke embodied 
interpretations as much as high-BOI metaphors. Therefore, the low-BOI advantages 
reported in Chapter 1 can be just as suggestive of embodied simulation mechanism as the 
low-BOI advantage reported here, and provides an alternative explanation to the results 
obtained thus far. For instance, participants in Chapter 1 could have been engaged in 
embodied simulation processes while they were trying to understand the metaphors they 
were rating. Moreover, when creating metaphors, participants could have engaged in 
embodied simulation processes as they were choosing vehicles. In both comprehension 
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and production tasks, participants may have shown preference for low-BOI vehicles 
because they are in fact more amenable to some aspects of embodied simulation, such as 
those related vision and motion. Therefore, the interpretation data provides a more 
complete picture of how concrete concepts, despite their BOI level, can contribute to an 
embodied understanding of metaphorical meaning. 
  Recall that the inclusion of vehicle-SND was to examine, with vehicle-BOI, 
semantic richness effects in metaphor production. Moreover, the main focus of the 
interpretation data was on the degree of perceptual-embodied language used in general, 
along with the role BOI plays in eliciting such language, rather than the role played by 
SND. However, for the sake of completion, the same analysis of perceptual-embodied 
language was conducted for the interpretations broken-down by vehicle-SND
11
. Table 6 
shows that the interpretations for high and low-SND metaphors differ in their perceptual-
embodied content. Metaphors with high-SND vehicles elicited interpretations containing 
more perceptual, hear, biological, and motion words, along with more average 
embodiment. On the other hand, metaphors with low-SND vehicles elicited 
interpretations containing more space-related words. Although not traditionally 
considered an embodied variable, SND appears to have a perceptual-embodied basis in 
metaphor interpretation, perhaps more-so than BOI. There is no a-priori explanation for 
vehicle-SND to be associated with perceptual-embodied language. However a post-hoc 
                                                          
11
 I am not conducting a factorial analysis because participants created vastly unequal numbers of items 
belonging to their respective semantic conditions.  
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speculation is that high-SND concepts, by chance, likely have more proximal semantic 
neighbours that are related to sensorimotor properties than do low-SND concepts, which 
have fewer near semantic neighbours in general.  
 
Table 6. Total word count and percentage of words from specific linguistic categories for 
high-SND and low-SND metaphors. p values are derived from independent samples t-
tests with 1733 degrees of freedom. 
Linguistic Category High SND 
Metaphors  
(n = 844) 
Low SND 
Metaphors 
(n = 891) 
p 
Total Word Count 18.62 18.60 0.967 
Perceptual 3.94 3.26 < .05 
See 1.63 1.78 .507 
Hear 0.30 0.11 <.01 
Feel 1.31 1.15 .28 
Body .22 .21 .808 
Biological 2.37 0.83 < .001 
Motion 2.67 1.96 < .01 
Space 7.52 8.32 <.05 
Relativity 14.53 14.52 .986 
Average 
Embodiment 
3.83 3.57 <.05 
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General Discussion 
 
  Despite the fact metaphor interpretations are scarcely studied in psycholinguistics, 
there are some studies with which the present data are consistent. For example, Gibbs, 
Gould and Andric (2006) asked participants listen to metaphorical sentences such as 
chew on the idea, and then form mental images of the actions in the metaphor. The 
participants were then asked to explain how the action related (e.g., chew) to the noun 
(e.g., idea), and often times produced interpretations that depended on the literal action; 
for example, one participant explained chew on the idea to mean “Chewing is related to a 
slow methodological activity and it could be related to turning something over in your 
mind to better understand it”. This type of answer is consistent with many of the 
interpretations provided by participants in the current study. Gibbs et al. (2006) explained 
their data in terms of embodied simulations, where bodily-action is the basis of 
metaphorical understanding. However, unlike in Gibbs et al. (2006), participants in the 
current study were not asked to form a mental image of their metaphor prior to 
interpreting it, nor were they encouraged to think of potential actions that are consistent 
with the metaphor. Moreover, the metaphors interpreted by the participants are nominal, 
and hence do not refer to any performable actions. Therefore, the current dataset extend 
Gibbs et al. (2006) findings of embodied metaphor interpretations to nominal metaphors, 
and suggest the effect is robust enough to appear without prompting a particular 
interpretation strategy. Therefore, the ubiquity of the perceptual-embodied language used 
in the metaphor interpretations is consistent with the predictions of Gibbs’ simulation 
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model along with Paivio’s dual coding theory of metaphor. 
  Although on average metaphor interpretations were significantly more embodied 
than zero, there was wide variability in interpretations’ average embodiment scores, as 
Figure 3 showed above. In fact, nearly 10% of the interpretations did not include any 
language associated with embodied simulation whatsoever (when using the LIWC to 
detect language related to embodiment). Models that predict perceptual-embodied 
language in metaphor interpretation differ in how they explain such variability. 
  According to the dual coding theory of metaphor, processing is mediated by two-
subsystems; the verbal and imagery systems. Recall that the verbal system primarily 
deals with linguistic information, such as associates, whereas the imagery system deals 
with multimodal information. Moreover, the image system stores a concept’s multimodal 
properties in integrated structures. This type of integrated storage allows for the 
embodied interpretations to emerge. For example, the interpretations describing a 
butterfly among the flowers, tall grass, and sunshine, suggests that the vehicle concept, 
when used metaphorically, gave rise to entire perceptual scenes rather than only the 
image of a single concept. Clearly, imaging a butterfly brought to mind other perceptual 
properties which are analogous to the perceptual world. Moreover, recall that in DCT, the 
verbal system alone can underlie metaphor interpretations. This was evident in the less 
embodied interpretations, such as the nostalgia is a butterfly metaphor, where one 
participant considered how an associate of butterfly (i.e., happy) can be related to the 
topic, nostalgia. Moreover, moderately embodied interpretations seem to be defined by 
79 
 
 
 
 
 
indirect imagery along with verbal associates. As such, DCT explains the diversity in 
interpretations; most interpretations likely stem from mental imagery of the vehicle, 
which in turn, activates related verbal associates. In some cases, the vehicle’s associates 
were enough to generate an interpretation, and as a result, the interpretations were scarce 
in imagery.   
  Alternatively, embodied simulation and mental imagery could always underlie 
metaphor interpretations, as put forward by Gibbs. Accordingly, interpretations with little 
to-no-mention of perceptual-embodied properties could arise simply because they were 
omitted from the written output. That is, in forming their interpretations, participants 
could have all simulated the sensorimotor properties of the vehicle, and then used this 
information to explain the relations or abstract properties shared by the topic and vehicle. 
In fact, Gibbs and Matlock (2008) stated that an embodied simulation may run alongside 
ad-hoc categorization processes (such as Glucksberg’s 2008 model suggests). The 
important point here is that both dual coding theory and Gibbs’ simulation theory can 
accommodate the wide-variety of interpretations obtained in this study. The difference 
between the two models is that in Gibbs simulation theory, embodied simulations are 
necessary for metaphor understanding. Therefore, if some metaphor interpretations are 
void of perceptual-embodied language, it is because the underlying embodied simulation 
is unconscious and therefore omitted from the overt interpretation. Conversely, in dual 
coding theory, metaphor understanding can be carried out primarily with the amodal 
representations of the verbal system. The role of the image system is not mandatory. 
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However, in most cases, both systems will provide contributions because they are 
interconnected. Therefore, the present data do not distinguish between dual coding and 
Gibbs’ simulation theories; rather, both theories predict average metaphor interpretations 
to contain perceptual-embodied language. 
  Amodal theories, such as structure-mapping (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) and 
categorization (Glucksberg, 2008) are mostly inconsistent with the obtained 
interpretations, which on average contained a significant amount of perceptual-embodied 
language. This inconsistency is especially true of the categorization model; recall that 
many of the interpretations contained literal reference of the vehicle. That is, a metaphor 
with butterfly as its vehicle elicited an interpretation that referred to a literal butterfly. 
Therefore, the categorization model in its current form is inconsistent with how people 
interpret metaphors. Structure-mapping also predicts little-to-no perceptual language in 
adults’ interpretations of metaphors. However, it treats the vehicle as a literal concept, 
and is therefore more consistent with the obtained interpretations than the categorization 
model. For example, structure-mapping can be amended to accommodate the obtained 
data. Recall that in structure-mapping, the topic and vehicle are aligned and attributes 
(which can be perceptual features) are mapped, and then relations of the vehicle are 
projected to the topic. It could be the case that, in the alignment stage, people are 
imagining the perceptual-embodied features of the vehicle to a greater extent than what is 
typically given in structure-mapping. Therefore, before the relations of the vehicle are 
identified, participants engage in an embodied simulation to infer what the shared 
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attributes between topic and vehicle may be (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008). However, the 
important point to consider here is that both structure-mapping and categorization, in 
their current forms, do not adequately explain the perceptual-embodied language used in 
the metaphor interpretations obtained in the current study. 
Conclusions 
  The metaphor creation task demonstrated that vehicle choice is affected by 
semantic richness. In creating metaphors, low-BOI concepts are preferred as vehicles 
more-so than high BOI concepts and this preference is magnified when the vehicle is also 
low-SND. Moreover, the low BOI-low SND vehicles are chosen the most when they are 
paired with a high-SND topic. In all cases, the data suggest that semantic richness makes 
it difficult for one to create novel metaphoric meaning. As such, people choose vehicles 
that will result in low semantic richness of the metaphor. Although the BOI and SND 
effects in the vehicle selection task are consistent with previous theory, their effects on 
metaphor interpretation are not straightforward. That is, high-BOI metaphors do not seem 
to invite embodied simulation more-so than low-BOI metaphors. Conversely, high-SND 
metaphors do seem to invite embodied simulation more-so than low-SND metaphors. As 
such, these variables will no longer be employed as proxies for embodied or amodal 
processing in the remainder of the studies in this dissertation.  
  On average, metaphor interpretations contained perceptual-embodied language. 
This suggests the involvement of embodied simulation (or mental imagery). This is 
consistent with predictions resulting from both dual coding theory (Paivio & Walsh, 
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1993) and Gibbs’ simulation theory (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008), but does not distinguish 
between the two. Classic theories such as structure-mapping (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) 
and categorization (Glucksberg, 2008) are inconsistent with the metaphor interpretations. 
  The metaphor interpretation task proved to be effective as a more sensitive test to 
detect embodied simulation than the comprehension-rating task used in Chapter 1. 
However, the interpretation task is an offline measure; as such, it does not demonstrate if 
embodied representations are immediately accessed when one interprets a metaphor. In 
Chapter 4, this research question is addressed.  
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Chapter 4  
Introduction 
 
The interpretations of the metaphors created in the previous chapter suggest the 
use of embodied simulation in metaphor processing. On average, people used perceptual, 
bodily, and motion related language to describe scenes or events that involved the 
metaphors’ vehicle referent. Oftentimes the metaphor vehicle was used in a literal, 
physical sense. This is precisely the speculated embodied simulation mechanism for 
nominal metaphors (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007; Paivio & Walsh, 
1993). However, interpretation tasks such as those described by Gibbs and Matlock 
(2008) and used in the previous chapter are offline and, as such, they do not characterize 
the time-course of processing. This raises questions regarding when embodied properties 
become available for use in interpreting the metaphor. For example, did people use an 
amodal or verbal associative approach to create metaphors, and then embellish the 
meaning with embodied simulation when they were asked to interpret them? Or, 
alternatively, was an embodied simulation active throughout the entire process thus, 
constraining the interpretations? It is possible too, that those seemingly disembodied 
interpretations observed in Chapter 3 arose from embodied simulation comprehension 
mechanisms, but any details related to the simulation were omitted from the reports 
produced as interpretations. In the current chapter these questions will be addressed by 
determining if embodied representations are accessible during online metaphor 
processing.  
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Embodied Simulation of Language 
 
  Evidence that embodied simulation underlies language comprehension comes 
from interactions between the embodied properties implied in sentences and performing 
sensorimotor tasks. This is exemplified by the action-sentence compatibility effect 
(ACE), discovered by Glenberg & Kaschak (2002). An ACE occurs when the implied 
motion in a sentence interacts with the physical motion required to make a response 
followed by reading the sentence. For example, in the sentences, open the drawer, 
Courtney gave you the notebook, and Liz told you the story, the implied motion is 
movement toward oneself. Embodied simulation is identified if a response about the 
sentence (i.e., sensibility) is made faster when the hand must be brought toward oneself 
to push a response-key than when it must be moved away from oneself to push a response 
key. The opposite is true for sentences implying motion away from oneself (e.g., close 
the drawer, you gave Courtney the notebook, you told Liz the story, etc.); in those cases, 
the response key that is far and thus requires movement away from oneself is pushed 
faster than the closer response key. These effects, where a physical movement is made 
faster if it is preceded by a sentence implying motion in the same direction, are taken as 
evidence that the semantic properties of sentences are being simulated. 
  Congruency effects similar to the ACE are observed also when mental imagery is 
assumed to be activated.  For example, Zwaan, Stanfield and Yaxley (2002) had 
participants read sentences such as the ranger saw the eagle in the sky and the ranger saw 
the eagle in its nest. After reading a sentence, a picture of an object appeared on the 
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screen. Participants were asked to determine if a presented picture contained an object 
that was mentioned in the sentence [Experiment 1], or simply had to name it [Experiment 
2]. In both cases, response latencies were shorter for pictures that matched the orientation 
implied in the sentence; for example, a picture of an eagle with wings extended matches 
the sentence the ranger saw the eagle in the sky whereas a picture of an eagle with wings 
folded matches the sentence the ranger saw the eagle in its nest. In a similar experiment, 
Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley and Aveyard (2004) employed sentences implying physical 
motion of an object coming toward or away the participant, such as you hurled the 
softball at the shortstop, or, the shortstop hurled the softball at you. After the auditory 
presentation of a sentence, participants determined if two serial images contained the 
same object. The objects in the images varied in size. A congruency effect was found 
such that if the sentence implied motion away from the participant, then responses to 
images of a large softball followed by a smaller softball (suggesting the ball is moving 
away) were made faster than to images of a small softball followed by a larger softball 
(suggesting the ball is moving toward). The opposite finding was observed for sentences 
that implied motion toward the participants.   
  The aforementioned studies demonstrate that people simulate at least some of the 
embodied and perceptual properties implied within sentences. However, Matlock (2004) 
demonstrated simulation of fictive motion sentences, such as the road runs through the 
desert. Such sentences do not imply actual motion or perceptual changes. In her task, 
participants read stories about someone traveling through an environment (e.g., a desert). 
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In the stories, the travel was described as either short or long [Experiment 1], rapid or 
slow [Experiment 2], or through easy or difficult-to-traverse terrain [Experiment 3]. After 
reading a story, participants read sentences that described fictive motion, such as the road 
runs through the desert and decided if it was related to the story read prior. The fictive 
motion sentences were read faster when they were preceded by stories implying short 
travel times (e.g., short distance, rapid travel, travel over easy terrain) than by stories 
implying long travel times. No effects were found in control experiments, where the 
sentence does not imply fictive motion (e.g., the road is in the desert). A follow-up 
experiment found this effect to be present in fictive motion sentences unrelated to travel, 
such as the fence follows the property line, further demonstrating the robustness of the 
effect. Such findings are taken to suggest that participants constructed an embodied 
simulation of the stories, and this influenced the reading of subsequent fictive motion 
sentences.  
Embodied Simulation and Metaphor Comprehension 
 
  The evidence of embodied simulation reported above comes from studies where 
researchers employed sentences varying in abstraction; nonetheless, they are all literal 
sentences that are relatively easy to imagine. However, embodied simulation is thought to 
underlie metaphoric language as much as it does literal language (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). Wilson and Gibbs (2007) provide the strongest demonstration of embodied 
simulation underlying metaphor comprehension. In their task, participants read sentences 
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which use a verb metaphorically, such as grasp the concept, or, swallow your pride, and 
pushed a key when they felt they understood them. However, prior to reading the 
sentences, the participants learned to perform the actions mentioned in the sentences, 
such as grasping and swallowing, by watching an actor perform them. Moreover, the 
actions were never associated with a verbal label. Instead, the actions were associated 
with an arbitrary icon (e.g., the symbol # was associated with the action of swallow; the 
symbol “ was associated with grasp, etc.). Prior to reading the sentences, participants 
were prompted, by the presentation of the icon, to perform an action. When participants 
performed actions congruent with the sentences (e.g., physically swallowing prior to 
reading the sentences swallow your pride), reading times were facilitated relative to 
performing incongruent actions or no actions at all. Interestingly, this effect was 
replicated when participants were asked to merely imagine the action instead of 
physically carrying it out.  
  The metaphors used in Wilson and Gibbs (2007) are conventional figures of 
speech. Other studies demonstrate a link between novel metaphor comprehension and 
embodied simulation. For example, Slepian and Ambady (2014) showed that novel 
metaphors can affect sensorimotor judgements. In their task, participants learned one of 
two novel metaphors; the past is heavy, or, the present is heavy. After learning the 
metaphors (which involved reading a passage describing how the past or present could be 
figuratively heavy), participants were asked to judge the weight of a visibly old or new 
book by either physically holding the book, or judging its weight from inspecting a photo 
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of the book. For those judging the weight of the old book, participants in the past-is-
heavy condition judged it to be heavier than participants in the present-is-heavy 
condition; the opposite was true for those in the present-is-heavy condition. Importantly, 
those making judgements of the book’s weight by viewing photographs showed no 
effects.  
  Another study showing a link between metaphor comprehension and sensorimotor 
processes found differential EEG scalp distributions for auditory and motion based 
metaphors (Schmidt-Snoek, Dew, Barile & Agauas, 2015). In this study, participants read 
motion metaphors, such as the rejection letter was a slap and auditory metaphors such as 
her marriage was a long sob. The final words were matched on numerous variables 
known to influence ERPs, including cloze probability. ERPs time-locked to the 
presentation of the final word (e.g., slap, sob) were recorded. Other than typical N400 
effects, such as larger negativities for anomalies than metaphors, and metaphors than 
literals, the scalp distribution of the N400 for the motion and auditory metaphors differed 
in left-center, left-posterior, and centre-posterior regions. Therefore, the modality 
underlying metaphorically used words may be reflected in the underlying neural 
generators, suggesting modality specific processing.  
  Despite the seemingly positive evidence reported above, one must be cautious in 
evaluating the studies reporting a link between metaphoric language and embodied 
simulation. For example, of the studies reported above, only Wilson and Gibbs (2007) 
demonstrated facilitation in metaphor comprehension times as a result of performing or 
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imagining a consistent bodily action. Conversely, Slepian and Ambady (2014) did not 
measure metaphor comprehension. As such, they can only report a relationship between 
learning a novel embodied metaphor and sensorimotor processing. In fact, it is possible 
that their participants learned the metaphors using amodal processes, and then after some 
time, created the conceptual embodied mapping between the past/present and heaviness, 
in time for the sensorimotor judgements. Schmidt-Snoek et al.’s (2015) results are also 
not convincing of embodied simulation underlying metaphor comprehension. For 
example, it is possible that the difference in N400 scalp distributions between motion and 
auditory metaphors was due to initial processing the words’ literal referent. This is likely, 
as their study showed differences in auditory and motion based literal sentences in 
addition to the metaphors. Therefore, not all embodied simulation effects are as 
convincing as those reported by Wilson and Gibbs (2007). 
  One characteristic with the studies reported above is they utilize stimuli that 
overtly reference a sensorimotor property. That is, the metaphors the past is heavy, 
swallow your pride or the rejection letter was a slap, although different in form, all use 
words that unambiguously denote a sensorimotor representation (i.e., heavy, swallow, 
slap). These types of metaphors are therefore fair candidates for evoking sensorimotor 
representations; however, this raises the question about the potential of the embodied 
simulation of the classic resemblance metaphors studied in psycholinguistics, such as 
lawyers are sharks. Such metaphors do not directly denote a sensorimotor activity. 
Therefore, it is difficult to study the potential embodied simulation of nominal metaphors 
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because they may evoke multiple sensorimotor properties. As such, it is difficult to 
determine precisely which sensorimotor properties of sharks, for example, may be 
involved. This is especially true if comprehending nominal metaphors involves an ‘as if’ 
scenario, where one must simulate what it must be like to be the vehicle concept (Gibbs 
& Matlock, 2008), or construct a dynamic scene where the vehicle concept is imagined 
(Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). In either case, according to embodied simulation theory, 
sensorimotor properties related to the vehicle ought to be employed during processing.  
  Demonstrating a relationship between processing metaphors and performing 
physical actions is impractical with nominal metaphor stimuli. For example, a study like 
Wilson and Gibbs (2007) cannot be replicated using nominal metaphors such as lawyers 
are sharks or suburbs are parasites because sensorimotor properties related to sharks or 
parasites cannot be performed by a participant in the same way as bodily-action verbs 
such as push or swallow. However, psycholinguistic tasks, such as cross-modal lexical 
priming (CMLP), were developed to study the activation of associative or semantic 
properties during sentence comprehension (Swinney, 1979). In this task, subjects hear 
linguistic stimuli and perform lexical decisions at varying time-points to assess when 
particular properties are activated, or responded to faster, relative to others. Although it 
was first used by Swinney (1979) to study lexical ambiguity resolution, Blasko and 
Connine (1993) extended the procedure to metaphor processing. In their experiments, 
participants heard metaphors in context, such as the belief that hard work is a ladder is 
common to this generation, and made lexical decisions to words related to the metaphor’s 
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meaning (e.g., advance), the literal meaning (i.e., rungs) and an unrelated control word 
(e.g., pastry). Their overall results showed that for apt metaphors (both familiar and 
unfamiliar), the metaphoric related word is activated (i.e., faster than controls) 
immediately after hearing the vehicle. For inapt metaphors, the metaphoric meaning is 
available 750 ms after vehicle offset.  
  In another CMLP metaphor study, Rubio-Fernandez (2007) compared the 
activation of different category-level properties of the vehicle. For example, in John is a 
cactus, the vehicle’s category is plant whereas its distinctive feature is prickly. 
Immediately after vehicle offset, both properties are activated (i.e., faster than controls) 
but the activation for plant is suppressed by 1000 ms, (i.e., equivalent to controls) 
whereas prickly remains activated. Therefore, the CMLP technique has been repeatedly 
employed to assess if properties relevant for metaphor processing are activated online. 
  The CMLP technique can be extended to determine if sensorimotor properties 
related to the vehicle are accessible during metaphor comprehension. For instance, 
suppose one hears lawyers are sharks in a context. If this metaphor is simulated in the 
way described by Gibbs and colleagues, then bodily-actions related to sharks should be 
primed when processing the metaphor. Recall that Gibbs’ model placed special emphasis 
on bodily-actions, perhaps more-so than other sensorimotor processes. Therefore, the 
word bite, which is an associate of shark, ought to be responded to faster than a bodily-
action unassociated with shark, such as enter. If so, this would suggest people can access 
sensorimotor properties of the vehicle, which will be supportive of the embodied 
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simulation framework.  
   Determining if a metaphor-vehicle primes bodily-actions is a more direct method 
to test embodied simulation than manipulating vehicle-BOI, which was done in Chapters 
2 and 3. Recall that BOI refers to the perceived ease of interacting with a word’s referent 
(Siakaluk et al., 2008). Nonetheless, this variable does not seem to be an appropriate 
proxy for embodied simulation of metaphor, as the previous chapter showed both low and 
high-BOI metaphors elicit interpretations containing perceptual-embodied language. 
Rather than consider the ease to interact with a vehicle’s referent, in the current study the 
activation of associates that denote particular bodily-actions of the vehicle were 
considered. As such, this current conceptualization is similar to using BOI, as motoric 
properties of the vehicle are under examination. However, unlike using BOI, the current 
method will directly test the activation of specific actions related to the vehicle. 
  It may seem counter-intuitive for a nominal metaphor to prime bodily-actions, 
especially when the vehicle concept is not described to be in a state of motion, such as in 
lawyers are sharks. However, evidence from Masson, Bub and Warren (2008) suggests 
that embodied information is activated even if it is apparently unrelated to the sentential 
context. In their task, participants heard sentences (e.g., the young lawyer kicked the 
calculator) and then were cued to perform hand-actions related or unrelated to the object 
(not the verb) in the sentence (e.g., related actions to calculator could be a poke, whereas 
unrelated actions could be a pinch). The speed at which actions were performed was 
measured, and activation was determined by subtracting time taken to perform related 
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actions from time taken to perform unrelated actions. Their results showed that hearing a 
sentence such as the young lawyer kicked the calculator activates bodily-actions related 
to calculator, such as poking or grasping, despite their irrelevance to the context. Even 
sentences that do not describe any motoric interaction, such as the young lawyer looked 
at the calculator, still prime functional body-actions related to the referent. Therefore, it 
seems plausible that bodily-action words associated to a metaphor vehicle can be primed, 
despite their apparent irrelevance to the context in general. 
The Current Studies 
 
In the experiments in this chapter (i.e., Studies 4 – 7), a cross-modal lexical 
priming design was used to assess the activation of semantic properties related to 
metaphor vehicles. In the first two studies, metaphors in a context served as auditory 
primes (e.g., everyone in the courtroom saw how those lawyers are sharks) for visually 
presented target words. The target words were presented immediately after the offset of 
the vehicle in Study 4, and after a 1000 ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI) in Study 5. 
Studies 6 and 7 were carried out as control experiments where the vehicle alone served as 
an auditory prime (e.g., sharks) for zero and 1000 ms ISI durations, respectively. For all 
the studies, target words were semantic properties of the vehicle in the form of free 
associates (Nelson et al., 2004) along with unassociated control words. Two distinct types 
of associates were used; namely, bodily-action associates and general associates.  
  Bodily-actions are anything involving a body that one can themselves perform, or 
94 
 
 
 
 
 
imagine another organism performing (human or otherwise). As such, they can vary in 
the motoric sequences required to perform them; for example, a bodily-action related to 
the word sharks is bite whereas a bodily-action related to the word sword is fight. 
Although bite and fight may differ in their respective motor sequences, with fight being 
arguably more complex than bite, they are both activities that can be simulated as a result 
of processing the respective metaphors they are related to. In Gibbs’ and colleagues 
(Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007) conception of embodied simulation 
(and Paivio’s conception of mental imagery), a relatively rich scene is constructed. As 
such, there are likely numerous bodily-actions related to any given simulation which 
should be activated during online metaphor processing. 
  It should be noted that activation of bodily-action associates of the vehicle is not 
evidence in support of associative models of metaphor comprehension (e.g., Genter & 
Bowdle, 2008; Glucksberg, 2008; Kintsch, 2000) which I have described as amodal. 
Although in amodal models it is assumed that metaphor processing involves associates, 
such models do not consider bodily-actions to play a primary role. As such, amodal 
models predict no activation of bodily-action associates in the same way embodied 
models do. However, amodal models predict activation of general associates that are 
drawn from an abstracted sense of the vehicle. 
  Associates of the metaphor vehicle that refer to general properties (e.g., killer is a 
general associate of shark) were used as a proxy for amodal processing, as described in 
categorization and structure-mapping. Recall that in the categorization model, the 
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metaphor vehicle does not refer to a literal-level concept, but rather refers to an 
abstraction (Glucksberg, 2008). For example, the word shark, when used metaphorically, 
only refers to abstract properties related to a broader class of concepts (e.g., vicious, 
predatory, etc.). Similarly, in structure-mapping, metaphor processing entails extracting 
figurative relations from the vehicle rather than concrete attributes (Gentner & Bowdle, 
2008). Therefore, both categorization and structure-mapping lead to the prediction that 
metaphor processing results in the activation of general properties rather than 
sensorimotor properties. As such, the general associates used in the following studies are 
related to the figurative and relational sense of the vehicle, and their activation is 
therefore consistent with the way metaphor processing is described in the categorization 
and structure-mapping models.   
  Another manipulation in this study is metaphor familiarity. Familiarity is an 
important consideration for testing theories of metaphor comprehension. In respect to 
embodied simulation, theories differ on the automaticity of sensorimotor processing. For 
example, in Gibbs’ simulation theory, it is argued that sensorimotor processing is 
mandatory for metaphors, regardless of their familiarity (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008). 
Conversely, sensorimotor shedding theory places familiarity as the determinant factor of 
sensorimotor processing (Jamrozik et al., 2016). Accordingly, unfamiliar metaphors are 
processed by embodied simulation whereas familiar metaphors are processed amodally. 
As such, familiarity can adjudicate between Gibb’s simulation model and sensorimotor 
shedding.  
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  Familiarity can also adjudicate between amodal models of metaphor processing. 
In structure-mapping (specifically the career-of-metaphor hypothesis), unfamiliar 
metaphors are described to be processed by drawing figurative relations from a literal 
representation of the vehicle. However, as metaphors become more familiar, the 
figurative relations become crystallized and more readily available than in unfamiliar 
metaphors (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). Therefore, according to the structure-mapping 
model, unfamiliar metaphors may initially prime bodily-actions, but only to a lesser 
extent than general properties. However, familiar metaphors should only prime general 
properties. In the categorization model, metaphor familiarity does not play a particular 
role (Glucksberg, 2008). Therefore, according to this model, both unfamiliar and familiar 
metaphors should only prime general associates.  
  The final variable under consideration is the duration of the inter-stimulus interval 
(ISI) between the offset of the vehicle and the onset of the target. Like most cross-modal 
designs, an ISI of 0 ms was used to assess the upstream activation of semantic associates 
of the vehicle. At this time-course, all associates are typically activated (Swinney, 1979). 
Moreover, an ISI of 1000 ms was used to assess the downstream activation of properties. 
Recall that Rubio-Fernandez (2007) found that by 1000 ms, vehicle properties irrelevant 
to the metaphoric meaning are no longer activated; however, those properties that are 
relevant remain activated. Therefore, the downstream time-frame will assess whether or 
not bodily-actions and general properties are relevant for familiar and unfamiliar 
metaphors.  
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  Four studies are reported in this chapter. In Study 4, participants were played 
metaphors spoken in a context (e.g., my dad reminded to drive slow and stay alert 
because highways are snakes) and performed lexical decisions to visually presented 
associates of the vehicles that are classified as bodily-actions (i.e., slither) or general 
properties (i.e., danger) along with unassociated control words and non-words. The target 
words and non-words were presented immediately after the offset of the vehicle (i.e., 0 
ms ISI). Moreover, the metaphors were either unfamiliar (e.g., highways are snakes) or 
familiar (e.g., alcohol is a crutch). This task was replicated in Study 5, with the only 
exception being that the ISI was 1000 ms in order to examine downstream effects. In 
Study 6, participants were only played vehicles (e.g., snakes) and performed lexical 
decisions on the same items visually presented immediately at the offset of the vehicle. 
Lastly, in Study 7, participants again were played the vehicle in isolation, but performed 
lexical decisions to visual stimuli presented after a 1000 ms ISI.  
Study 4 
Method 
Participants 
  Ninety-six undergraduate students from the University of Western Ontario 
participated for partial-course credit toward a psychology course. Participants were native 
speakers of English.  
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Materials 
Metaphors 
  Twenty-four nominal metaphors used in the experimental trials were selected 
from Roncero and Almeida’s (2015) items, which are normed on familiarity and aptness. 
Metaphors were chosen on the basis that the vehicle term was also in the Nelson et al. 
(2004) free association norms. Furthermore, all of the metaphors had different vehicles, 
to ensure repetition effects would not take place within the experiment (see Bowdle & 
Gentner, 2005). Metaphors below the median on familiarity (i.e., 4.15) were considered 
‘unfamiliar’ (M = 2.53; range: 1.2 – 4.05) whereas those above were considered 
‘familiar’ (M = 6.23; range: 5.2 – 7.7).  The items differed significantly on familiarity, t 
(22) = 10.19, p <.001. Although care was taken to choose metaphors that were 
sufficiently apt (metaphors were all above three on a 1-10 aptness scale), the novel (M = 
5.02) and familiar (M = 7.06) metaphors significantly differed on aptness, t (22) = 3.98, p 
< .001. Twenty-four other metaphors, comparable to the experimental items, were chosen 
for the non-word trials.  
  For each metaphor, a context in which the metaphor is plausible was created. For 
example, for the unfamiliar metaphor pets are kids, the context is the vet likes to remind 
her clients that pets are kids. The contexts were meant to bias the listener to process the 
metaphor figuratively. Moreover, all of the contexts were constructed so that they 
precede the metaphor, which was always uttered at the end of the sentence, resulting in 
the vehicle being the last word. A female native speaker of English was recorded reading 
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aloud the sentences. Audio files were trimmed at the offset of the vehicle, normalized, 
compressed, and put through a limiter, to make the sentences clearer than the original raw 
file. Pilot studies with those unfamiliar with the materials confirmed the sentences were 
audible.  
Associates 
  Each vehicle’s associates were searched for words that refer to bodily-actions and 
general properties in the Nelson et al. (2004) free-association norms. In cases where the 
vehicle was a plural word unavailable in the Nelson database, (e.g., sharks), the singular 
form (e.g., shark) was searched. Two critical associates for each vehicle were selected.      
  First, associates that refer to bodily-actions that can be performed by a human, or 
imagined to be performed, were selected as long as they were generally consistent with 
what an embodied-simulation reflecting the metaphor’s meaning may entail (e.g., bite is 
an associate of shark that is consistent with the meaning of the metaphor lawyers are 
sharks because it is an aggressive action). Second, general associates were those that did 
not refer to an overt bodily-action, but still consistent with the metaphor (e.g., killer is an 
associate of shark); general associates are analogous to Glucksberg’s (2008) attributive 
category properties and are therefore, more abstract than the bodily-action associates. It is 
important to note that, when choosing the associates, any word that was obviously 
unrelated to the metaphoric meaning was avoided. For example, some associates of shark 
that are likely unrelated to the metaphor meaning are, white, fin, whale, fish, meat, etc. 
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Both of the selected associate types did not significantly differ in their forward 
associative strength to the vehicle or in semantic distance to either the vehicle or topic 
(using Latent Semantic Analysis). See Table 7 for means and p-values.  
Table 7. Forward strength (FSG) between vehicle and associates, along with semantic 
distance to the vehicle (SD-V) and topic (SD-T) for unfamiliar and familiar metaphors. 
Semantic distances are determined from latent semantic analysis (LSA). p values reflect 
two-tailed t tests. 
Unfamiliar Metaphors Familiar Metaphors 
 Bodily-Action 
Associate 
General 
Associate 
p Bodily-Action 
Associate 
General 
Associate 
p 
FSG 0.06 0.08 0.62 0.03 0.05 0.14 
SD-V 0.30 0.23 0.31 0.33 0.23 0.13 
SD-T 0.11 0.14 0.63 0.13 0.08 0.27 
 
Control Words 
  For each associate, a word matched on unprimed reaction-time (within 1.5 
milliseconds) was selected to serve as a control unrelated to the vehicle. The English 
Lexicon Project database was used to determine unprimed reaction times (Balota et al., 
2007). For example, the control word for the bodily-associate bite is enter whereas the 
control for the general associate killer is jeans. Although cross-modal designs typically 
use one type of control word (e.g., Tabossi, 1996), I opted to use two because the 
fundamental difference between the associates; namely, that one type refers to a bodily-
action (i.e., verbs) and the other refers to a general property (i.e., mostly nouns or 
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adjectives)
12
. Therefore, facilitation effects would be better calculated if the control word 
differs from the associate only in its relationship to the vehicle, rather than other 
characteristics as well. Because control words were matched on unprimed reaction time, 
they were not matched on other variables. 
  So that participants heard metaphors only once, four lists were created. Each list 
had 24 experimental metaphors along with a set of three visually presented word targets 
from each of the four conditions (i.e., bodily-action associate, bodily-control, general 
associate, general control). Each list had the same non-words, which were derived from 
the English Lexicon Project, and paired with a filler metaphor. See Appendix D for 
complete list of stimuli.   
Procedure 
  Participants were made aware that the experiment is about metaphor processing, 
and were notified that they would hear sentences which ended in metaphors. They were 
told to try to understand the metaphorical meaning of the sentence. E-Prime software was 
used to present the audio files and visual stimuli, and record reaction times and responses. 
Each trial consisted of the audial presentation of the sentence, during which, a fixation 
cross remained on the screen. Zero ms after the end of the sentence (the offset of the 
vehicle), a letter-string replaced the fixation cross and remained onscreen until a response 
                                                          
12
 Thanks to Karen Hussey for this suggestion. 
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was made. Participants were instructed to quickly but accurately categorize the letter-
string as a word, by pressing the M key, or a non-word, by pressing the Z key. There 
were two practice trials and 48 experimental trials, 24 involving words and 24 involving 
non-words. Experimental trials were presented in a random order.  
Results 
 Trials with incorrect responses (3.8% of total dataset) were flagged. Of the errors, 
60.45% were to non-words. The remaining errors for word trials are broken down by 
condition in Table 8. As can be seen, error rates are not uniformly distributed across 
conditions with the greatest percentage of errors for familiar metaphors being for general-
unrelated words whereas for unfamiliar metaphors it is for unrelated bodily-actions. 
Means and standard deviations can be found in Table 9. Because the highest percentages 
of errors are for the relatively slow conditions, a speed-accuracy trade off does not appear 
to be present.  
Table 8. Table 8. Percentage of errors broken down by associate type and metaphor 
familiarity for Study 4. 
 Unfamiliar Metaphors Familiar Metaphors 
Word Type   
Bodily-Action Related 2.26% 2.82% 
Bodily-Action Unrelated 12.43% 5.65% 
General Related 0.56% 1.13% 
General Unrelated 1.13% 13.56% 
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Table 9. Mean reaction times and standard deviation by each condition for Study 4. 
Metaphor Target Word Relatedness M SD 
Familiar General Rel. 611 162 
  
Unrel. 653 165 
 
Bodily-Action Rel. 628 181 
  
Unrel. 656 179 
Unfamiliar General Rel. 599 154 
  
Unrel. 615 132 
 
Bodily-Action Rel. 617 155 
  
Unrel. 676 194 
 
  To clean the data, the same procedure was used in the all the studies reported in 
this chapter. Of the correct word responses, RTs greater than 2000 ms or less than 300 ms 
were removed (1.12%)
13
. For the subject-level analysis (F1), a 2 (metaphor familiarity: 
familiar vs unfamiliar) by 2 (associate type: bodily-action vs general) by 2 (associate 
relatedness: related vs unrelated) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with list as 
a between-subjects factor. For the item-level analysis (F2), familiarity and list are 
                                                          
13
In the CMLP literature, a wide-range of cut-offs are used. I opted to use 2000 ms as it was the 
highest reported in the CMLP literature (e.g., Holcomb & Anderson, 1993), and as such, would 
clean the data without removing excess trials. Holcomb and Anderson used 200 ms as the lower-
end cut-off. However, in Studies 4 and 5, all RTs were above 300 ms. In Studies 6 and 7, some 
RT’s were below 300 ms. For consistency across all studies reported herein, I opted to use 300 
ms as the lower cut-off for Studies 6 and 7. 
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between variables whereas associate type and relatedness are within variables. For both 
analyses, list is of no theoretical importance; rather, it was included as a factor to reduce 
error variance. Therefore, effects involving list will not be reported. 
  A main-effect of associate was obtained, F1 (1,92) = 10.59, p = .002, p
.103; 
F2 (1,16) = 4.63, p = .047, ηp² = .224. On average, general associates (M = 620 ms) were 
responded to faster than bodily-action words (M = 645 ms). A main-effect of familiarity 
was nonsignificant, F1 (1, 92) = 1.67, p = .199, ηp² = .017; F2 (1, 16) = .171, p = .685, ηp² 
= .011. However, a familiarity by associate interaction was obtained in the subject 
analysis, F1 (1,92) = 4.25,  p = 0.042, ηp² = 0.044, but not the item analysis, F2 (1, 16) = 
1.679, p = 0.213, ηp² = .095. A main-effect of relatedness was obtained, F1 (1,92) = 
21.35,  p < .001, ηp² = .188; F2 (1,16) = 5.26, p = .036, ηp² = .247. On average, related 
words (M = 614 ms) were responded to faster than unrelated words (M = 650 ms). 
Relatedness did not interact with familiarity, F1(1, 92) = .03, p = .863, ηp² = 0.0; F2 (1, 
16) = .007,  p = .934, ηp² =  0.0, or associate,  F1(1, 92) = 1.05, p = .308, ηp² = 0.01; F2 (1, 
16) = .307,  p = .587, ηp² =  0.019. Critically, a three-way familiarity by associate by 
relatedness interaction was observed, F1 (1,92) = 4.04,  p = 0.047, ηp² = 0.042; F2 (1,16) 
= 4.68, p = .046, ηp² = .226. To interpret the three-way interaction, the facilitation effects 
(facilitation = unrelated RTs – related RTs) are graphed in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Facilitation of Bodily-Action and General Associates across Familiar and 
Unfamiliar metaphors in Study 4. 
  To determine if conditions were significantly facilitated or suppressed, planned t-
tests (two-tailed) were conducted to compare general and bodily-action associates to their 
respective control conditions. For familiar metaphors, only the general associates were 
significantly faster (by 42 ms) than their respective controls, t (95) = 2.72, p = .008, d = 
.278. For the unfamiliar metaphors, only the bodily-action associates were significantly 
faster than their respective controls, (by 59 ms), t (95) = 3.32, p = .001, d =.339. The 28 
ms difference for the familiar metaphor bodily-action associates and their respective 
controls did not reach significance, t (95) = 1.59, p = .115, d =.162, neither did the 16 ms 
difference between the general associates and their respective controls for the unfamiliar 
metaphors, t (95) = 1.00, p = .319, d =.102. 
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Discussion 
  The main finding from this experiment is the three-way interaction. The locus of 
the interaction is an opposite pattern of effects among familiar and unfamiliar metaphors. 
In interpreting these results, I will first discuss the activation effects separately for each 
metaphor and then describe how the differential effects may be accounted for by the 
embodied and amodal models.  
  Familiar metaphors activated general properties of the vehicle, but not 
sensorimotor properties in the form of bodily-actions. However, the nonsignificant 28 ms 
activation effect for bodily-actions is likely not due to random factors, as this difference 
is still appreciably large. Rather, it is possible that the bodily-action associates were 
indeed activated, but began to attenuate by the time the visual target was presented. This 
is plausible upon consideration of Weiland, Bambini and Schumacher’s (2015) study 
which demonstrated that literal representations of vehicles are accessed initially during 
metaphor processing. In their experiment, which was an atypical cross-modal design, 
involving visual primes and auditory targets, participants heard metaphors in a context 
(These lobbyists are hyenas…). A masked prime (presented for 67 ms duration) 
consisting of a literal property of the vehicle (e.g., furry) was visually presented 100 ms 
before the onset of the auditory-presented metaphor vehicle (e.g., hyenas). The presence 
of the masked prime (e.g. furry) reduced the N400 to the target (e.g., hyenas), suggesting 
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that initial semantic processing of metaphor vehicles involves a literal representation
14
. 
Therefore, the lack of significance regarding the activation of bodily-action associates 
should not suggest they were not accessible, as experiments employing sensitive 
measures found evidence of literal representations influencing metaphor processing.  
  Effects directly opposite of the familiar metaphors were observed in their 
unfamiliar counterparts. Bodily-action associates were available immediately after 
hearing the metaphor vehicle. On the other hand, general associates showed no 
significant activation effects (16 ms) suggesting that this type of information about the 
vehicle is unavailable immediately after hearing the metaphor. This is inconsistent with 
previous cross-modal lexical priming studies, which found facilitation of all associates of 
the vehicle during upstream time-courses (Blasko & Connine, 1993; Rubio-Fernandez, 
2007).  
Implications for Embodied Simulation 
  The obtained results provide only partial support for Gibbs’ simulation model 
(Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). Recall that in this model, it is argued 
that the cognitive processing of metaphor involves simulating the bodily-actions that 
characterize the vehicle. Evidence for such an embodied simulation mechanism for 
unfamiliar metaphors is apparent by the activation effects for bodily-action associates. 
Therefore, embodied semantic information seems to be available immediately for 
                                                          
14
 The N400 amplitude is inversely related to ease of processing, such that a reduction in 
N400 amplitude suggests ease of processing. 
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processing unfamiliar metaphors. General semantic information, on the other hand, is 
unavailable, making it plausible that unfamiliar metaphors begin their processing mostly 
from accessing bodily-actions. This finding of initial activation of embodied properties 
for unfamiliar metaphors is so far consistent with both Gibbs’ simulation model and 
sensorimotor shedding theory. 
  Although embodied simulation seems to initially underlie the processing of 
unfamiliar metaphors, it seems to play at most, a marginal role for the familiar 
metaphors. That is, the familiar metaphors showed activation for the general associates, 
and little-to-no activation for the bodily-action associates. Therefore, at upstream time-
courses, familiar metaphors seem to be processed by accessing an abstracted sense of the 
vehicle, rather than constructing an embodied simulation. This finding, so far, is 
inconsistent with Gibbs’ simulation model, because accordingly, familiar metaphors 
should be processed by embodied simulation similar to unfamiliar metaphors. However, 
this finding regarding the familiar metaphors is consistent with sensorimotor shedding 
theory.  
  In sensorimotor shedding theory, stimulus familiarity affects the degree to which 
metaphors are processed by embodied simulation (Jamrozik et al., 2016). That is, 
conceptual representations are initially embodied, and after repeated use, become 
abstracted. The obtained results, at least for the upstream time-course of the current 
study, are in alignment with sensorimotor shedding. Unfamiliar metaphors are primarily 
understood by embodied simulation. As such, they only activate bodily-actions. Familiar 
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metaphors, on the other hand, are understood by abstraction. In this case, the familiar 
metaphors activate general properties more-so than bodily-actions. Therefore, the results 
thus far support the sensorimotor shedding theory more-so than Gibbs simulation model. 
Implications for Amodal Models 
  The finding of familiar metaphors activating general properties is consistent with 
both structure-mapping and categorization models of metaphor processing. Recall that 
structure-mapping (more precisely, the career of metaphor addendum) holds that 
conventional vehicles can readily access the abstract properties necessary for metaphor 
comprehension (Wolff & Gentner, 2011). Moreover, in the categorization model, abstract 
properties are the only basis for metaphor comprehension and as such, their activation is 
expected and arguably necessary (Glucksberg, 2008). Therefore, for familiar metaphors, 
the availability of general associates immediately after vehicle offset does not adjudicate 
between these two models. 
  The effects observed for the unfamiliar metaphors do adjudicate between the 
structure-mapping and categorization models. Bodily-actions, which are related to the 
vehicle’s literal sense, were available immediately after hearing the metaphor vehicle. 
Such results are partially consistent with structure-mapping theory, as familiarity 
determines which sense of the vehicle is activated. Accordingly, unfamiliar metaphors 
are processed by accessing relations from the vehicle’s literal representation. Presumably, 
the bodily-actions for unfamiliar metaphors are activated at the upstream time-course 
because the literal representation of the vehicle is immediately accessible. However, the 
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results are inconsistent with the categorization model, which predicts a facilitation of 
only general, but not literal, properties. Therefore, the categorization model is 
unsupported by the obtained results for unfamiliar metaphors at the upstream time-
course. 
  The obtained results, though consistent with theory (i.e., sensorimotor shedding 
and structure-mapping theories) are nonetheless surprising because previous work 
showed that semantic properties associated with the prime word, despite their irrelevance 
to the sentence context, are typically activated during upstream time-courses. For 
example, the word bugs in the sentence, he found several spiders, roaches and other bugs 
in his room initially activates the associate spy regardless of its irrelevance to the 
sentence meaning (Swinney, 1979). Moreover, this is also true for words categorically 
related to a metaphor vehicle, but unrelated to the metaphor meaning; for instance, in the 
metaphor John is a cheetah, cat is initially activated despite its irrelevance to the 
metaphoric meaning (Rubio-Fernandez, 2007). Therefore, the fact that activation was 
observed for only some of the associates of metaphor vehicles is surprising. There is no 
clear answer for this; however, the experimental context, where participants were 
encouraged to think about each metaphor’s meaning as they heard the audio, may have 
biased them to anticipate particular associates depending on metaphor familiarity (i.e., 
anticipate literal associates when a metaphor seems unfamiliar and general associates 
when a metaphor seems familiar – consistent with sensorimotor shedding theory).  
  The obtained interaction suggests that different semantic information is 
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immediately available to metaphors depending on their familiarity. However, it is not 
clear if this access is epiphenomenal, or a critical component of processing the 
metaphor’s meaning. To determine if the facilitation effects obtained are critical 
components of processing, the current experiment was replicated at a longer ISI duration. 
Rubio-Fernandez (2007) found some associates of the vehicle which were activated 
upstream (at a 0 ms ISI) become suppressed downstream, 1000 ms later. Moreover, 
Blasko and Connine (1993) found that even for most poor quality metaphors, words 
related to their metaphorical meaning were activated at an ISI of 750 ms (for apt 
metaphors, words related to their metaphorical meaning are activated at a 0 ms ISI). 
Therefore, as applied to the paradigm employed here, the meaning of the metaphor will 
already be partially realized by a 1000 ms ISI. Moreover, associates unrelated to the 
metaphor’s meaning should be attenuated by this time. As such, if the current activation 
effects obtained upstream are related to processing the metaphor’s meaning then they 
should remain downstream. Conversely, these effects may attenuate if they are unrelated 
to the metaphoric meaning. Lastly, the associates which were not activated upstream may 
become activated downstream if they are related to the metaphor’s meaning. 
  Each of the models reviewed above leads to a unique prediction regarding 
downstream activation effects. Gibbs’ simulation model suggests that both familiar and 
unfamiliar metaphors should prime bodily-actions and general properties. This is because 
embodied simulation is mandatory, but may occur alongside structure-mapping or 
categorization processes (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008). According to sensorimotor shedding, 
112 
 
 
 
 
 
only unfamiliar metaphors should prime bodily-actions whereas familiar metaphors 
should prime general properties. Furthermore, according to structure-mapping, both 
familiar and unfamiliar metaphors should prime general associates, but unfamiliar 
metaphors may prime additional literal properties, such as bodily-actions. Lastly, 
according to the categorization model, only general properties should be primed by both 
metaphor types.  See Table 10 for a summary of these theoretical predictions. 
Table 10. Summary of theories and the downstream semantic activation they predict for 
familiar and unfamiliar metaphors in Study 5. 
 Simulation Model Sensorimotor Shedding Structure-Mapping Categorization 
 
Familiar 
Metaphors 
 
activation of 
sensorimotor & 
general properties 
 
activation of general 
properties only 
 
activation of 
general properties 
 
 
activation of 
general properties 
only 
 
 
 
Unfamiliar 
Metaphors 
 
activation of 
sensorimotor & 
general properties 
 
activation of 
sensorimotor properties 
only 
 
activation of 
general and literal 
(sensorimotor) 
properties 
 
 
activation of 
general properties 
only 
 
 
 
113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study 5 
Method 
Participants 
  Sixty-Eight people participated for partial course-credit (as University of Western 
Ontario students taking a psychology course) or for monetary compensation ($5). 
Participants were native speakers of English. 
Materials 
  The same materials as in Study 4 were used here. 
Procedure 
  The same procedure was used as in Study 4, with the only exception being a 1000 
ms ISI between the offset of the vehicle prime and the visual presentation of the target 
stimulus. 
Results 
  Trials with incorrect responses (4.07% of total dataset) were flagged. Of the 
errors, 56.39% were to non-words. The remaining errors for word trials are broken down 
by condition in Table 11. Once again, error rates are not uniformly distributed across 
conditions with the greatest percentage of errors for familiar metaphors being for general-
unrelated words whereas for unfamiliar metaphors it is for unrelated bodily-actions. 
Similar to Study 4, the highest percentages of errors are generally for the relatively slow 
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conditions, suggesting the absence of a speed-accuracy trade off. Means and standard 
deviations can be found in Table 12. 
       Table 11. Breakdown of errors by condition for Study 5. 
 Unfamiliar Metaphors Familiar Metaphors 
Word Type   
Bodily-Action Related 0.75% 5.26% 
Bodily-Action Unrelated 12.03% 2.26% 
General Related 1.5% 2.26% 
General Unrelated 3.01% 16.54% 
 
Table 12. Mean reaction times and standard deviation by each condition for Study 5. 
Metaphor Target Word Relatedness M SD 
Familiar General Rel. 595 135 
  
Unrel. 642 176 
 
Bodily-Action Rel. 608 160 
  
Unrel. 623 137 
Unfamiliar General Rel. 606 187 
  
Unrel. 603 147 
 
Bodily-Action Rel. 596 137 
  
Unrel. 663 186 
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  After removing error trials, an additional 0.4% of correct word trials were 
removed from the analysis because RTs exceeded 2000 ms (no RTs were below 300 ms.). 
The remaining trials were analyzed in the same way as Study 4. Most of the effects 
obtained in Study 4 were replicated. Related target words (M = 601) were responded to 
faster than unrelated controls (M = 633); F1 (1, 64) = 15.49, p < .001, ηp² = .195; F2 (1, 
16) = 5.41, p = .034, ηp² = .253. Relatedness did not interact with familiarity, F1 (1, 64) = 
0.0, p = .99, ηp² = 0.0; F2 (1, 16) = 0.0, p = .995, ηp² = 0.0 or associate,  F1 (1, 64) =  1.44 
, p = .234  , ηp² = 0.022 ; F2 (1, 16) = 0.522, p = .480, ηp² = 0.032. As in Study 4, a main-
effect of familiarity was nonsignificant, F1 (1, 64) = 0.0, p = .998, ηp² = 0.0; F2 (1, 16) = 
0.012, p = .914, ηp² = 0.001, as was the main-effect of associate; F1 (1, 64) = 1.448, p = 
.233, ηp² = 0.022; F2 (1, 16) = 0.578, p = .458, ηp² = 0.035. However, a familiarity by 
associate interaction was again obtained, F1 (1, 64) = 5.24, p = .025, ηp² = .076, by 
subjects but not by items, F2 (1, 16) = 1.318, p = .268, ηp² = 0.076.  Lastly, the critical 
three-way interaction of familiarity by associate by relatedness was again obtained, F1 (1, 
64) = 9.60, p = .003, ηp² = .13; F2 (1, 16) = 10.81, p = .005, ηp² = .403. 
  As in Study 4, Bonferroni-adjusted t-tests revealed that, for familiar metaphors, 
only the general associates are responded to significantly faster than general controls t 
(67) = 3.102. p = 0.003, d =.3762 whereas for unfamiliar metaphors, only bodily-action 
associates are responded to significantly faster relative to controls, t (67) = 3.536, p < 
.001, d = .4288. See Figure 5 for a graph depicting the facilitation effects. 
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Figure 5. Facilitation of Bodily-Action and General Associates across Familiar and 
Unfamiliar metaphors in Study 5. 
 
Discussion 
  The same interaction found in Study 4 was replicated, which shows that the 
activation effects observed upstream remain downstream. Moreover, the lack of 
activation observed upstream continues downstream as well. Such results confirm that the 
activation observed previously, was not an epiphenomenon, but rather, a result of 
processing the metaphor’s meaning. Recall that Rubio-Fernandez (2007) found that the 
associates of the vehicle which are unrelated to the metaphor’s meaning are activated 
upstream but not downstream (i.e., after a 1000 ms ISI).  Moreover, Blasko and Connine 
(1993) reported that words representative of a metaphor’s meaning are immediately 
activated at a 0 ms ISI for apt metaphors and by 750 ms for inapt metaphors. Therefore, 
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the 1000 ms ISI used in the current study characterizes a time-course in processing where 
the metaphor’s meaning is at least partially realized. As such, the bodily-actions and 
general properties appear to be key semantic properties for unfamiliar and familiar 
metaphors, respectively. Moreover, the fact that both metaphors types immediately 
activated such key semantic properties suggests that they are apt.   
  The current results can be interpreted similarly to those obtained in Study 4. In 
regards to embodied approaches of metaphor, the results are consistent with the 
sensorimotor shedding theory (Jamrozik et al., 2016). Accordingly, in processing 
unfamiliar metaphors, sensorimotor properties are drawn from the literal-sense of the 
vehicle. However, an abstracted sense of the vehicle develops with metaphor familiarity. 
As such, in processing familiar metaphors, sensorimotor properties are bypassed for more 
abstract properties that are directly accessed. Therefore, the current findings demonstrate 
that metaphors activate semantic properties in the way described by sensorimotor 
shedding theory. The results obtained here, like in Study 4, are inconsistent with Gibb’s 
simulation model, in which it is argued that processing metaphors entails mandatory 
activation of sensorimotor properties of the vehicle (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008). Such 
mandatory sensorimotor processing appears to be present in unfamiliar metaphors, but 
not in familiar metaphors. Therefore, the central tenant of Gibb’s simulation model is 
unsupported in by the data obtained in the current study.  
  With respect to the amodal models; namely, structure-mapping and 
categorization, the current results are not supportive of either. Recall that according to 
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both models, metaphor comprehension involves the access of figurative properties of the 
vehicle. Therefore, the activation of general properties during the processing of familiar 
metaphors is supportive of both structure-mapping and categorization.  However, the 
activation effects obtained during the processing of unfamiliar metaphors do not support 
these models. In structure-mapping, the claim is made that processing unfamiliar 
metaphors involves extracting figurative properties from the literal-sense of the vehicle. 
Therefore, processing unfamiliar metaphors should activate general properties, and 
possibly, additional literal properties. This prediction was partially supported, as 
unfamiliar metaphors only activated literal properties (i.e., bodily-actions); however, the 
lack of activation for general properties is inconsistent with structure-mapping. 
Moreover, the activation of literal properties, in the form of bodily-actions, is inconsistent 
with the categorization model, where it is argued that metaphor processing involves 
inhibition of such properties.  
 In sum, the obtained effects are consistent with the sensorimotor shedding 
framework, where stimulus familiarity determines the degree of embodied processing of 
metaphor. Gibbs’ simulation model was unsupported, because processing familiar 
metaphors did not activate sensorimotor properties in the form of bodily-action 
associates. Moreover, structure-mapping and the categorization model were unsupported 
because unfamiliar metaphors did not activate general properties. 
  One particular issue that needs to be addressed is the complete lack of activation 
for general associates of unfamiliar metaphor vehicles and bodily-action associates of 
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familiar metaphor vehicles. Although such null effects have been explained within 
theoretical frameworks, it is possible that the items used in the current studies were 
simply unable to result in priming effects. That is, the target words which were never 
primed at either ISI may have been too weakly associated to their respective primes. This 
is possible because the associates, on average, were weakly associated to the vehicles (.03 
-.08). This is especially worrisome considering the previous work in cross-modal lexical 
priming showing that all associates are initially activated when presented at the offset of 
the prime (Swinney, 1979; Rubio-Fernandez, 2007).  
  In order to rule-out the possibility that the null effects were due to weak 
associations, only vehicles will serve as auditory primes in Studies 6 and 7. In Study 6, 
the duration of the ISI was 0 ms whereas in Study 7 it was 1000 ms. For both studies, no 
three-way interactions are predicted. Rather, comparable priming effects should be 
observed in all conditions. 
Study 6 
Method 
Participants 
  Sixty-five people participated for partial course-credit (as University of Western 
Ontario students taking a psychology course) or for monetary compensation ($5). 
Participants were native speakers of English. 
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Materials 
  Only the vehicles were used as audio primes. This was achieved by trimming the 
audio file up to the onset of the vehicle. Pilot testing confirmed that the spoken audio was 
comprehensible
15
. 
 Procedure 
  The procedure was similar to the previous experiments, with the main difference 
being that the prime consisted of the vehicle alone. Moreover, participants were told to 
pay attention to the words they heard in the headphones, because doing so may help make 
the lexical decision easier. 
Results 
  One subject’s data was removed from analysis because they scored less than 85% 
correct in the lexical decision data. Trials with incorrect responses (5.5%) were flagged 
and removed from the main analysis. Of the errors, 61% were for non-words. The 
remaining errors can be seen by condition in Table 13 whereas means and standard 
deviations can be found Table 14. 
                                                          
15
 This method of trimming audio can result in distorted speech, as a result of co-
articulation. To ensure the words were comprehensible, an additional five participants 
were asked to listen to the audio and write-out the words they heard, after data for Study 
6 and 7 was collected. For the experimental prime words, the accuracy across the five 
subjects was 99% (only one participant misreported a word). For the control prime words 
(non-word trials) the accuracy was 98% (two participants each misreported a different 
word). Furthermore, the vehicles were always the last words of the sentence; therefore, 
there is no preservative co-articulation (anticipation of an upcoming word).  
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        Table 13. Breakdown of errors by condition for Study 6. 
 Unfamiliar Vehicles Familiar Vehicles 
Word Type   
Bodily-Action Related 1.18% 2.96% 
Bodily-Action Unrelated 11.24% 4.14% 
General Related 2.96% 2.96% 
General Unrelated 4.14% 9.47% 
 
Table 14. Mean reaction times and standard deviations for each condition in Study 6. 
Vehicle Prime Target Word Relatedness M SD 
Familiar General Rel. 571 109 
  
Unrel. 615 149 
 
Bodily-Action Rel. 555 108 
  
Unrel. 609 131 
Unfamiliar General Rel. 548 88.6 
  
Unrel. 589 125 
 
Bodily-Action Rel. 554 138 
  
Unrel. 648 130 
 
  Of correct word trials, 0.61% of the data was removed due to responses made 
after 2000 ms or below 300 ms.  The remaining trials were analyzed in the same way as 
Study 4. A main-effect of relatedness was obtained, F1 (1, 60) = 40.03, p < .001, ηp² = 
.40; F2 (1, 16) = 23.41, p < .001, ηp² = .594, however relatedness did not interact with 
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associate F1 (1, 60) = 2.7461, p = .103, ηp² = .044; F2 (1, 16) = 2.579, p =.128, ηp² = .139 
or familiarity F1 (1, 60) = 1.7003, p = .197, ηp² = .028; F2 (1, 16) = 1.203, p =.289, ηp² = 
.070. The main-effect of familiarity was nonsignificant, F1 (1, 60) = .0901, p = .765, ηp² = 
.002; F2 (1, 16) = 0, p =.985, ηp² = 0.0, as was the main-effect of associate F1 (1, 60) = 
1.603, p = .210, ηp² = .026; F2 (1, 16) = 0.794, p =.386, ηp² = 0.047. However familiarity 
interacted with associate in the subject analysis F1 (1, 60) = 7.83, p = .007, ηp² = .115 but 
only marginally by items, F2 (1, 16) = 3.28, p = .089, ηp² = .17. Although Figure 6 may 
suggest a three-way interaction, it was nonsignificant, F1 (1, 60) = 2.44, p = .123, ηp² = 
.039; F2 (1, 16) = 1.86, p = .192, ηp² = .104 (The inclusion of list as a factor did not 
meaningfully change the p-value, suggesting this nonsignificant interaction was not due 
to excess variance in the error term). Therefore, the lack of facilitation effects in the 
previous experiments was not due to lack of associative strength. In summary, both types 
of associates were facilitated by at least 40 ms. 
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Figure 6. Facilitation of Bodily-Action and General Associates across Familiar and 
Unfamiliar vehicles in Study 6. 
Discussion 
  Study 6 confirms that the vehicles were capable of priming their respective 
targets. This suggests that the lack of activation observed in Studies 4 and 5 were due to 
top-down processes rather than associative weakness at the lexical level. One striking 
finding is the 94 ms priming effect for the unfamiliar vehicles and their bodily-action 
associates. Despite this, the interaction was nonsignificant. Furthermore, the sample size 
is similar to other studies of this nature, making it unlikely an interaction was not 
obtained due to lack of statistical power. Lastly, even if the interaction was significant, it 
would not rule-out the fact that the other targets were also primed. Therefore, the current 
results confirm the vehicles’ respective associates were related enough to result in 
priming. In order to compare the downstream effects, Study 6 was replicated but with a 
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1000 ms ISI. The same priming effects observed in Study 6 are expected to remain 
downstream.  
Study 7 
Method 
Participants 
  Sixty-four people participated for partial course credit (as University of Western 
Ontario students enrolled in a psychology course) or for monetary compensation ($5).  
Materials and Procedure 
  The same stimuli and procedure employed in Study 6 was used again, with the 
exception that now there was a 1000 ms ISI between the offset of the prime and the onset 
of the target. 
Results 
  Trials with incorrect responses (3.48%) were flagged and removed from the main 
analysis. 56.07% of the errors were for non-words. Table 15 shows the breakdown of 
errors by condition and Table 16 shows the means and standard deviations for each 
condition. 
 
125 
 
 
 
 
 
       Table 15. Percentage of errors by condition for Study 7. 
 Unfamiliar Vehicles Familiar Vehicles 
Word Type   
Bodily-Action Related 1.87% 3.74% 
Bodily-Action Unrelated 14.02% 7.48% 
General Related 0% 1.87% 
General Unrelated 3.74% 11.21%   
 
Table 16. Mean reaction times and standard deviations for each condition in Study 7. 
Vehicle Prime Target Word Relatedness M SD 
Familiar General Rel. 571 108 
  
Unrel. 619 108 
 
Bodily-Action Rel. 587 124 
  
Unrel. 626 132 
Unfamiliar General Rel. 584 131 
  
Unrel. 592 128 
 
Bodily-Action Rel. 580 94.6 
  
Unrel. 649 131 
 
  After removal of trials exceeding 2000 ms or below 300 ms (0.27% of correct 
word trials) the remaining trails were submitted to a two by two by two ANOVA. A 
main-effect of associate was obtained in the subject analysis, F1 (1, 60) = 5.25, p = .026, 
ηp² = .08, but not the item analysis, F2 (1, 16) = 1.372, p = .259, ηp² = .079; general 
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associates (M = 591.5) were responded to faster than bodily-action associates (M = 
610.5). Moreover, the main-effect of familiarity was nonsignificant. F1 (1, 60) = .0157, p 
= .901, ηp² = 0.0; F2 (1, 16) = 0.0, p = .997, ηp² = 0.0. Furthermore, familiarity did not 
interact with associate; F1 (1, 60) = .7851, p = .379, ηp² = 0.013; F2 (1, 16) = 0.5473, p = 
.470, ηp² = 0.033.  A main-effect of relatedness was obtained, F1 (1, 60) = 39.83, p < 
.001, ηp² = .399; F2 (1, 16) = 17.88, p < .001, ηp² = .528. However, relatedness did not 
interact with familiarity, F1 (1, 60) = .1167, p = .734, ηp² = 0.002; F2 (1, 16) = 0.179, p = 
.895, ηp² = 0.001, or associate, F1 (1, 60) = 3.0767, p = .085, ηp² = 0.049; F2 (1, 16) = 
1.9293, p = .184,  ηp² = 0.108. The three-way interaction was significant F1 (1, 60) = 
4.98, p = .029, ηp² = .077; F2 (1, 16) = 7.10, p = .017, ηp² = .307. As Figure 7 shows, the 
interaction suggests that the vehicles from the unfamiliar metaphors do not prime general 
associates at the 1000 ms ISI. This suggests that the isolated vehicle of unfamiliar 
metaphors results in similar priming effects as the vehicle when used metaphorically.  
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Figure 7. Facilitation of Bodily-Action and General Associates across Familiar and 
Unfamiliar vehicles in Study 7. 
 
Discussion 
  The vehicles of unfamiliar metaphors did not prime general associates, but 
priming was observed in the other conditions. It seems that the upstream effect, in which 
unfamiliar vehicles prime general associates, completely decays downstream. Such 
complete decay was not observed in the other conditions. Taken together with the results 
of Study 6 (the 0 ms ISI), it seems that familiar and unfamiliar metaphor vehicles differ 
in the strength to which they are related to different types of information. Familiar 
metaphor vehicles seem to be equally associated in strength to both sensorimotor and 
general properties. On the other hand, unfamiliar metaphor vehicles, although related to 
both sensorimotor and general properties, maintain stronger links to the former than the 
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latter. Moreover, this implies that the lack of activation for general associates during the 
downstream processing of unfamiliar metaphors is due to decay rather than active 
inhibition or suppression.  
 On the basis of the similar forward-associative strengths for the primes and their 
targets, this interaction was not predicted. Instead, priming effects similar to Study 6 were 
expected. Nonetheless, although these effects were not predicted, they do in fact fit with 
the general career-of-metaphor hypothesis. The career of metaphor hypothesis describes 
how a concept develops a figurative sense (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005).  Recall that in 
structure-mapping, metaphor comprehension is achieved by mapping shared structures of 
the topic and vehicle. For example, in a metaphor such as some suburbs are parasites, the 
matching process may identify the shared relation exists in dependence of a host. After 
such a mapping, relations unique to the vehicle, such as harms its host are projected to 
the topic (Wolff & Gentner, 2011). The career-of-metaphor hypothesis states that when a 
metaphor vehicle is used frequently, its abstracted meaning becomes lexicalized. That is, 
parasites readily refers to an abstraction because it is used frequently in metaphoric 
phrases. As such, the dictionary definition of parasites, obtained from Google, contains 
both the biological definition (i.e., “an organism that lives in or on another organism (its 
host) and benefits by deriving nutrients at the host’s expense”) along with the figurative 
definition (i.e., a person who habitually relies on or exploits others and gives nothing in 
return.). Moreover, sensorimotor shedding uses the career-of-metaphor framework as a 
foundation to describe how a concept’s embodied representation may become abstract 
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(Jamrozik et al., 2016). As such, conceptual representations are grounded in sensorimotor 
processes, but after repeated use in metaphoric contexts, develop stronger associations to 
an abstracted sense.  
  The results obtained in Study 7 provide support for this notion. The familiar 
vehicles, due to their frequent use in metaphor, can prime both associates related to a 
literal representation (i.e., bodily-actions) and associates related to an abstraction (i.e., 
general associates). Conversely, unfamiliar vehicles have yet developed strong links to 
their abstracted sense. Rather, they are still literal and primarily point to a literal 
representation when used in a metaphor. Although this reasoning is post-hoc, it is 
nonetheless consistent with sensorimotor shedding.  These results suggest that vehicles 
for familiar and unfamiliar metaphors differ in their lexical representations. Familiar 
vehicles are associated with a literal and abstracted sense whereas unfamiliar vehicles are 
associated with a literal sense more-so than abstracted sense. As such, the familiar 
vehicles prime both associate types upstream and downstream. Unfamiliar vehicles on the 
other hand, only prime both associates upstream; downstream, the general properties lose 
their activation because the vehicle concept has yet to develop a figurative abstraction.  
General Discussion 
  Unfamiliar metaphors activated sensorimotor, but not general, semantic properties 
of the vehicle whereas the opposite was found for familiar metaphors. This finding was 
observed in upstream (Study 4) and downstream (Study 5) time courses. In Study 6, 
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which served as a control experiment, it was found that the metaphor vehicles, 
irrespective of familiarity, activate both sensorimotor and general semantic properties 
during an upstream time course, thus ruling out the possibility that lack of activation 
observed in metaphoric contexts was due to weak associative strength between vehicles 
and their targets. In Study 7 it was found that the activation of general associates of 
unfamiliar vehicles decays downstream. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
unfamiliar metaphors are initially processed as embodied simulations whereas familiar 
metaphors are processed by amodal processes such as categorization. Moreover, the 
different overall pattern of results between the experiments employing vehicles in 
metaphor contexts (Studies 4 and 5) and those employing the vehicle in isolation (Studies 
6 and 7) suggest that participants were processing the metaphors figuratively. That is, the 
different pattern of results confirms the metaphors were attended to, and that participants 
were not simply ignoring the metaphors and paying attention only to the vehicles. If one 
were only attending to the vehicles, Studies 6 and 7 would replicate the effects found in 
Studies 4 and 5, respectively. 
  The experiments reported in this chapter are the first to demonstrate online 
evidence of embodied simulation in nominal metaphor processing. As such, the findings 
suggest that unfamiliar metaphors activate sensorimotor properties online. This finding 
can shed light on the results of Study 3, in which the use of perceptual-embodied 
language in metaphor interpretations was detected in an offline task. Recall that those 
results raised questions regarding whether embodied representations are accessible online 
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or offline. The current results suggest that embodied representations were available to 
participants online when they created and interpreted novel metaphors in Study 3. 
Therefore, the presence of perceptual-embodied language in the metaphor interpretations 
appears to be due to an embodied simulation where sensorimotor properties of the vehicle 
are immediately accessible for use in metaphor understanding.    
  The obtained results are relevant for characterizing online metaphor processing, 
along with adjudicating between psycholinguistic theories of metaphor comprehension. I 
will first compare and contrast the results with other metaphor studies that employed 
cross-modal priming tasks. Then I will describe how the obtained results can adjudicate 
between the classic amodal models, along with the more recent embodied models. 
Implications for Online Metaphor Processing 
 To date, two other cross-modal priming studies, using auditory metaphors as 
primes and visual targets, have been carried out (but see Stewart & Heredia, 2002 and 
Weiland et al. 2014 for variations of this technique). An overview of those studies’ 
results, along with the current study, can be found in Table 17. At the very least, the 
studies provide converging evidence that critical semantic information related to the 
metaphor is immediately available after hearing the vehicle. Moreover, immediately at 
the offset of the vehicle, for most metaphors, emergent properties related to the figurative 
meaning are already available. Unsurprisingly, other semantic information related to the 
vehicle, but unrelated to the metaphor, is also immediately available, likely as a result of 
132 
 
 
 
 
 
spreading activation. Such information includes the vehicle’s literal properties (Blasko & 
Connine, 1993), its superordinate category name, and its distinctive features (Rubio-
Fernandez, 2007). Some of this information, such as the vehicles’ distinctive features, 
remains facilitated downstream. Other information, such as the vehicle’s superordinate 
category, is no longer facilitated downstream, suggesting it is irrelevant for the 
metaphor’s meaning. Depending on the familiarity of the metaphor, differing semantic 
information is also involved. For familiar metaphors, general properties of the vehicle are 
immediately available, and remain so downstream. Conversely, for unfamiliar metaphors, 
sensorimotor properties of the vehicle are immediately activated, and remain so 
downstream. Taken together, the current and previous studies show that online metaphor 
processing immediately activates a wide array of semantic information, and a subset of 
particular information related to the vehicle remains activated downstream, a finding 
consistent with theories of sentence comprehension (e.g., Gernsbacher et al. 2001; 
Kintsch, 2000). 
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Table 17. Overview of related cross-modal priming experiments and findings 
Study Metaphors Targets ISI (ms) Findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blasko & 
Connine 
(1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
Familiar & Unfamiliar; 
(Highly Apt/Moderately Apt) 
 
e.g., Hard work is a ladder 
 
 
 
 
Metaphorical  
(e.g., advance) 
 
Literal  
(e.g., rungs) 
 
Control  
(e.g., pastry) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0, 300, 750 
 
0 & 300 ms: 
Activation of 
metaphorical and 
literal targets for 
familiar and highly 
apt unfamiliar 
metaphors; 
Activation of literal 
targets for moderately 
apt unfamiliar 
metaphors 
750 ms: Activation of 
metaphorical and 
literal targets for 
most moderately apt 
unfamiliar metaphors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rubio-
Fernandez 
(2007) 
 
 
 
Unfamiliar 
 
e.g., John was a cheetah 
 
Superordinate  
(e.g., cat) 
 
Distinctive Feature 
(e.g., fast) 
 
Unrelated Control  
(e.g., sleep) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0, 400, 1000 
 
0 & 400 ms: 
activation of 
superordinate and 
distinctive feature 
targets 
1000ms: activation of 
distinctive feature 
targets 
 
 
 
 
 
Current 
Study 
 
 
 
Familiar & Unfamiliar 
 
e.g., Time is a snail 
 
General 
Associate/Control 
(e.g., slow/afraid) 
Bodily-Action 
Associate/Control 
(e.g., crawl/rake) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0, 1000 
 
0 &1000 ms: 
activation of general 
associative targets for 
familiar metaphors 
and bodily-action 
associative targets for 
unfamiliar metaphors 
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Implications for Amodal Theories of Metaphor Processing 
  Although the current study was carried out to determine if embodied 
representations are accessible during online metaphor processing, the results can 
nonetheless be interpreted within the classic psycholinguistics debate between Gentner 
versus Glucksberg (and their colleagues). This debate is centered on how the topic and 
vehicle interact to produce figurative meaning, and more precisely, the nature of the 
vehicle’s representation. Recall that in Gentner’s structure-mapping framework, the topic 
and vehicle representations are aligned and their shared similarities are identified (e.g., 
the alignment of parasites and suburbs result in the shared structure of dependence on a 
host). This alignment allows for the relations in the vehicle to be identified and then 
projected to the topic (i.e., harms its host). This process is the same mechanism 
underlying analogical comparisons. As such, the vehicle is thought to refer to a literal 
representation in which relations are extracted from. Moreover, familiarity can constrain 
how the structure-mapping process is carried out (i.e., the career of metaphor hypothesis; 
Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). For familiar metaphors, the structure-mapping process is 
particularly efficient because the vehicle readily points to relations (e.g., parasite is 
readily associated with harms its host). Conversely, for unfamiliar metaphors, the 
vehicle’s abstraction must be computed from scratch (e.g., in a metaphor like science is a 
glacier, the vehicle does not readily point to an appropriate relation). In either case, the 
vehicle’s relations are derived from a literal representation. 
  Alternative to structure-mapping is the categorization model (Glucksberg, 2008). 
135 
 
 
 
 
 
According to this model, the vehicle refers to an abstract category constructed ad-hoc for 
comprehending the metaphor (e.g., in lawyers are sharks, sharks refers to a category of 
predatory, vicious things and not a literal fish). As such, the constructed category 
contains properties which are attributed to the topic. Unlike structure-mapping, the 
categorization model treats unfamiliar and familiar metaphors as the same; in either case, 
the vehicle refers to an abstract category. However, according to this model, aptness is a 
requirement for constructing a metaphor category (i.e., the quality of metaphor 
hypothesis; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006). That is, for an inapt metaphor, the vehicle may 
not typify a category, and as such, will be processed literally where features, rather than 
relations, maybe attributed to the topic.  
  In the current study, the metaphors varied on familiarity, but were all considerably 
apt, making them prime items to test structure-mapping and categorization models. On 
the one hand, structure-mapping leads to the prediction that the familiar and unfamiliar 
metaphors should be processed differently. On the other hand, the categorization model 
leads to the opposite prediction that the familiar and unfamiliar metaphors, because they 
are both apt, should be processed the same. The obtained results, in which familiar and 
unfamiliar metaphors demonstrated different semantic activation effects, support the 
structure-mapping model more-so than the categorization model. Nonetheless, the 
structure-mapping model does not satisfactorily account for all the obtained effects. That 
is, though a difference in processing between the familiar and unfamiliar metaphors is 
consistent with structure-mapping, the fact that unfamiliar metaphors only activate 
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sensorimotor properties is inconsistent with the model. Therefore, both amodal models 
cannot meaningfully account for the obtained results in which sensorimotor properties 
play a critical role in the processing of unfamiliar metaphors.  
Implications for Embodied Simulation 
  In Gibbs’ and colleagues’ embodied simulation framework, bodily-actions related 
to the metaphor are the basis of comprehension (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Wilson & 
Gibbs, 2007). Previous research found support for this framework but was limited to 
verb-based metaphors, such as swallow your pride and push the argument (Wilson & 
Gibbs, 2007). Such metaphors are unambiguous in their reference to bodily-actions. 
However, nominal metaphors, such as lawyers are sharks, do not reference particular 
bodily-actions. Nonetheless, because the vehicle’s referent is typically concrete, it is 
likely associated with bodily-actions. The current study is the first to investigate the role 
played by simulating bodily-actions during online metaphor processing, with results 
providing support for embodied simulation underlying unfamiliar, but not familiar, 
metaphors. 
  The activation of bodily-actions for unfamiliar metaphors indicates that such 
properties are accessible during online processing. Moreover, activation of bodily-action 
associates was observed both upstream and downstream, suggesting that such effects are 
not epiphenomenal. These findings are predicted by Gibbs’ embodied simulation theory 
(Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). Conversely, bodily-actions were not 
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activated for familiar metaphors upstream or downstream, suggesting such semantic 
properties are not accessed during the processing of familiar metaphors. Such findings 
are inconsistent with Gibbs’ embodied simulation theory, as bodily-actions are, 
accordingly, a critical source for constructing metaphorical understanding. As such, in 
Gibbs’s simulation theory, the activation of sensorimotor properties is mandatory for 
metaphor comprehension. The fact that evidence of embodied simulation was only 
observed for unfamiliar metaphors is a problematic issue for this model, and others with a 
similar position on mandatory activation of sensorimotor properties during language 
processing (e.g., Lakoff, 2008; 2012).  
  Hybrid embodiment theories, on the other hand, can accommodate such findings 
where sensorimotor processing is ubiquitous, although not mandatory. For example, 
according to dual coding theory, metaphor comprehension is carried out by joint 
processing of the verbal and image systems (Paivio & Walsh, 1993). Within the 
framework of this study, both associate types are represented in the verbal system, which 
houses the entire lexicon. However, words can also be represented in the image system, 
depending on the extent to which they denote imageable phenomena. Therefore, the 
bodily-action associates are additionally represented in the image system because they 
are rich in motor imagery. The general associates, on the other hand, are more abstract 
than the bodily-actions and are therefore represented mostly in the verbal system alone. 
Therefore, the isolated activation of either sensorimotor or general properties is consistent 
with the functional architecture of DCT. 
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  In processing unfamiliar metaphors, bodily-actions are activated; as such, both 
image and verbal systems are particularly involved. However, in processing familiar 
metaphors, general associates are activated and therefore only the verbal system is 
typically involved.  However, although DCT can explain how the different associate 
types are represented, it is unclear why any given metaphor, based on its familiarity, 
would activate one associate over another. That is, DCT does not lead to any a priori 
predictions regarding when the image system is involved in metaphor processing. 
Therefore, DCT is partially supported because the data demonstrate qualitative 
differences of activation based on imagery. However, DCT in its current form fails to 
describe why metaphor familiarity affects the degree of activation of the image system. 
  Unlike DCT, in the sensorimotor shedding theory stimulus familiarity is 
specifically described to be the factor that results in the activation of either sensorimotor 
or amodal representations (Jamrozik, et al., 2016). In this framework, sensorimotor 
representations are necessary for processing unfamiliar metaphors, but are no longer 
necessary for familiar metaphors which are processed amodally. Accordingly, unfamiliar 
metaphors can only be processed by sensorimotor simulation of the vehicle. However, 
after frequent use, an abstraction of the vehicle becomes readily accessible and 
sensorimotor simulation is no longer necessary. The current findings, where unfamiliar 
metaphors activate bodily-actions and familiar metaphors activate general properties, fit 
with such a framework. 
  Sensorimotor shedding is a general framework, not only to describe metaphor 
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processing, but also the gradual abstraction of concepts (Jamrozik, et al., 2016). 
Accordingly, concrete concepts are represented primarily by sensorimotor 
representations. However, concepts develop abstract senses when they are frequently 
used metaphorically. For example, a concept such as muscle primarily refers to a literal 
representation grounded in sensorimotor properties. However, as muscle is frequently 
used metaphorically, (e.g., negotiation is a muscle, concentration is a muscle, reading is 
a muscle, etc.), its sensorimotor representation attenuates and an abstracted sense, such 
as, something that improves with practice, becomes part of the conceptual representation 
(Jamrozik et al., 2016).  
  Further support for sensorimotor shedding comes from Studies 6 and 7, where the 
auditory prime consisted of the isolated vehicle. Recall that in Study 6, which 
characterized upstream processing, vehicles primed both the general and bodily-action 
associates. However, in Study 7, which characterized downstream processing, the 
vehicles of familiar metaphors primed both associate types, but the vehicles from 
unfamiliar metaphors only primed bodily-action associates. According to sensorimotor 
shedding, the vehicles from the familiar metaphors have developed strong links to an 
abstracted sense. As such, the familiar vehicles prime both associate types upstream and 
downstream. Unfamiliar vehicles on the other hand, only prime both associates upstream; 
downstream, the general properties lose their activation because the vehicle concept has 
yet to develop strong connections to its abstracted sense. Although the results of Study 6 
and 7 were not predicted, they are nonetheless consistent with sensorimotor shedding.  
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Conclusions 
  The experiments reported herein show that during processing, unfamiliar 
metaphors activate sensorimotor properties whereas familiar metaphors activate amodal 
properties. Such results cannot be accounted for models that stress mandatory activation 
of sensorimotor properties (e.g., Gibbs & Matlock, 2008) nor models that stress inhibition 
of such properties (Glucksberg, 2008). Rather, they are consistent with sensorimotor 
shedding theory (Jamrozik et al., 2016) in which sensorimotor and amodal processes are 
argued to underlie unfamiliar and familiar metaphors respectively. 
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Chapter 5  
General Discussion 
 
  The novel findings of this dissertation will be summarized, and their impact on 
theories of metaphor processing will be reviewed. In Chapter 2, participants rated 
artificially generated metaphors, which varied on vehicle-BOI, for comprehensibility. 
Metaphors containing low-BOI vehicles were rated as more comprehensible than those 
containing high-BOI vehicles. In addition, participants rated low-BOI metaphors as more 
comprehensible when the vehicle’s semantic neighbourhood is sparse (i.e., low-SND) 
rather than dense (i.e., high-SND). In Chapter 3, participants were presented with abstract 
words, and chose vehicles to create metaphors. Participants chose low-BOI vehicles more 
than high-BOI vehicles to create metaphors, thus conceptually replicating the low-BOI 
effects obtained in the comprehensibility studies of Chapter 2. Furthermore, to create 
metaphors, participants preferred to choose low-BOI vehicles when they were from 
sparse semantic neighbourhoods rather than from dense semantic neighbourhoods, also 
conceptually replicating the BOI by SND interaction obtained in Chapter 2. Lastly, the 
preference for low BOI – low SND vehicles was higher when the topic of the metaphor 
was high-SND rather than low-SND. Thus, participants consistently chose vehicles with 
poorer rather than richer semantic representations, especially when the topic itself had a 
rich semantic representation. Taken together, these findings support the semantic richness 
hypothesis of metaphor, which is based on SND effects (Al-Azary & Buchanan, 2017), 
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and demonstrate it generalizes to another richness variable, namely BOI.  
  The BOI and SND effects summarized thus far do not adjudicate between the 
amodal approaches to metaphor, which dominate the psycholinguistics literature, and the 
embodied approaches, which, though theoretically intriguing, lack empirical support. In 
Chapter 3 this gap was addressed by asking participants to verbally interpret the 
metaphors they had created. The verbal interpretations were assessed to the degree they 
contained perceptual-embodied language (i.e., words related to perception, motion, or the 
body). Irrespective of vehicle-BOI level, metaphor interpretations contained, on average, 
the same amount of perceptual-embodied language. This finding aligns with the 
predictions of embodied approaches of metaphor, which argue for such ubiquitous effects 
(Jamrozik et al., 2016; Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Paivio & Walsh, 1993). In Chapter 4, a 
cross-modal lexical priming paradigm was used to determine if embodied representations 
are accessible during online processing. The results showed that unfamiliar metaphors 
activated bodily-actions related to the literal sense of the vehicle. Familiar metaphors, on 
the other hand, activated general properties related to the abstract sense of the vehicle. 
Such results are supportive of hybrid models that consider both amodal and embodied 
representations to be involved in metaphor processing (Jamrozik, et al., 2016; Paivio & 
Walsh, 1993). Below I will outline how the obtained results align with specific amodal 
and embodied approaches to metaphor. The obtained semantic richness effects in 
metaphor will then be discussed.  
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Amodal Models 
 Recall that in amodal models of metaphor it is assumed that the topic and 
vehicle’s semantic representations are not tied to sensorimotor properties. The data 
obtained in this dissertation provide evidence against this assumption. Therefore, amodal 
models would need to be adjusted in order to account for the embodied effects obtained. 
Below I will suggest how amodal models might be reconciled with the obtained data to 
encompass a role for sensorimotor properties in metaphor comprehension. Each specific 
model will be discussed in turn. 
Categorization Model 
 In the categorization model, it is argued that the literal representation of the 
vehicle is inhibited; instead, metaphors only reference the vehicle’s abstract 
representation (Glucksberg, 2008). This assumption does not align with the obtained 
results in which sensorimotor properties (which are related to the literal representation of 
the vehicle) were accessed. For example, in the metaphor interpretation results Chapter 3 
(Study 3), participants oftentimes described the vehicle in literal terms. For example, the 
metaphor luck is a butterfly was interpreted in part by considering how literal butterflies 
are hard to capture, much like luck is hard to find. Moreover, the interpretations on 
average contained a significant amount of perceptual-embodied language, which further 
indicates participants were accessing concrete representations and not only abstractions, 
contrary to the categorization model’s assumption. 
  The findings from the cross modal lexical priming studies (Chapter 4, Study 4 and 
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5) are also problematic for the categorization model. Recall that during upstream and 
downstream time-courses, unfamiliar metaphors activated bodily-actions associated to 
the literal representation of the vehicle, but did not activate properties associated to its 
abstracted representation. This finding is inconsistent with the categorization model 
because accordingly, unfamiliar metaphors should be understood by accessing the 
abstracted sense of the vehicle. Conversely, familiar metaphors showed activation of 
general properties and non-activation of bodily-actions. This particular finding is 
consistent with the categorization model – accordingly, to understand such metaphors, an 
ad-hoc category made-up of abstract properties is constructed.  
  In sum, the majority of the effects obtained in this dissertation are inconsistent 
with the categorization model, where it is argued that the literal representation of the 
vehicle is inhibited in the processing of apt metaphors. One cannot argue the effects 
obtained in this thesis that do not support this model are due to the use of inapt 
metaphors. Evidently, the metaphors employed in the studies in Chapters 3 and 4 are apt. 
For instance, the participants in Chapter 3 interpreted metaphors that they created 
themselves and as such, those metaphors likely were apt from their perspective. 
Moreover, the unfamiliar metaphors used in Chapter 4 (Studies 4 and 5), although rated 
to be less apt than the familiar metaphors, are still sufficiently apt (recall that the mean 
aptness ratings for the familiar and unfamiliar metaphors are 7.06 and 5.02, respectively). 
Furthermore, their aptness ratings were obtained from a norming study in which 
participants rated the metaphors when they were presented in isolation rather than a 
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linguistic context (e.g., Roncero & Almeida, 2015). However, in Studies 4 and 5, the 
metaphors were placed in a linguistic context (e.g., the vet likes to remind her clients that 
pets are kids), likely increasing their aptness. In fact, hearing the unfamiliar metaphors in 
context immediately activated critical semantic properties, which is a feature of apt 
metaphors (Blasko & Connine, 1993). Therefore, the effects in Chapter 3 and 4 cannot be 
attributed to the use of poor quality metaphors. 
  Although the categorization model has been influential, the limited support for it 
in the current study raises questions about the future it has in metaphor processing 
research. One issue is that proponents of the categorization view argue that the literal 
representation contains properties unrelated to the metaphor, and this is why an ad-hoc 
category is necessary. However, as shown in Study 3, metaphor interpretations included 
imagery related to the literal sense of vehicle. Moreover, unfamiliar metaphors primed 
bodily-actions related to the literal sense of the vehicle in Studies 4 and 5.Therefore, in its 
current form, the categorization model cannot address the obtained data and I would 
argue, for continued viability, the categorization model must be re-articulated to consider 
the role of imagery. 
  Another issue with the categorization model is that it does not include topic 
concreteness in its framework. The majority of the stimuli employed in studies that 
support the categorization model are concrete metaphors (such as lawyers are sharks) 
when, in fact, metaphors often have abstract topics. Indeed, recall that in Study 1, people 
rated abstract metaphors as more comprehensible than concrete metaphors. Moreover, it 
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is not clear how an abstract metaphor can be processed in terms of a categorization 
mechanism. That is, in natural categorization, the category is more abstract than its 
members (e.g., fruit is more abstract than apple; Rosch, 1978). To illustrate how this 
mechanism is problematic for the processing of abstract metaphors, consider an abstract 
metaphor such as secrecy is a rat. According to the categorization model, the vehicle rat 
exemplifies an abstract category that is constructed ad-hoc in which the topic, secrecy, is 
included as a member. However, it is not clear how an ad-hoc category can be 
constructed for the inclusion of an abstract concept, because the category must be more 
abstract than the topic (e.g., the ad-hoc category exemplified by rat must be more abstract 
than the highly abstract word secrecy). Therefore, the categorization model in its current 
form can only account for the processing of familiar metaphors made up of concrete 
topics. 
  In conclusion, the categorization model has been influential in the 
psycholinguistics of metaphor literature, but it is difficult to see how it can lead to new 
predictions and explanations without some major revisions to its functional architecture. 
Moreover, if categorization is amended to include literal representations of the vehicle, 
then it will begin to resemble its rival theory, structure-mapping. 
 Structure-Mapping 
  Unlike the categorization model, in the structure-mapping framework (Gentner & 
Bowdle, 2008), figurative relations are drawn from the literal representation of the 
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vehicle. That is, although this model does not place emphasis on sensorimotor properties, 
its architecture does not preclude the potential access of sensorimotor representations. As 
such, the general structure-mapping framework can be made consistent with moderate 
views of embodiment (Wolff & Gentner, 2011). Nonetheless, in the structure-mapping 
theory of metaphor, a specific role for sensorimotor representations is not articulated. 
Rather, the focus is on how relations of the vehicle are computed, and, as currently 
formulated, this computation ignores imagery or simulation processes. Overall then, 
structure-mapping theory does not predict, a priori, perceptual-embodied language in 
metaphor interpretations, such as those observed in Chapter 3. However, such results do 
not undermine the theory’s central tenants.  
  Recall that the structure-mapping theory has the career-of-metaphor addendum, 
which states that, as metaphors become more familiar, their processing involves readily 
accessing abstractions from the vehicle (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). This property of the 
theory was partially supported in Chapter 4, where familiar metaphors activated 
associates related to the vehicle’s abstraction whereas unfamiliar metaphors activated 
bodily-actions related to the vehicle’s literal sense. This is only partial evidence however, 
because, the bodily-action associates remained active at the downstream time-course (i.e., 
1 second) which is inconsistent with the theory. Recall that Rubio-Fernandez (2007) 
showed that properties irrelevant to metaphor lose activation downstream. Therefore, the 
fact that the activation of sensorimotor properties remained downstream is inconsistent 
with structure-mapping theory. Overall then it appears the theory can be extended to 
148 
 
 
 
 
 
accommodate the empirical evidence presented in this thesis confirming the role of 
sensorimotor representations in metaphor, though still has difficulty with downstream 
activation of sensorimotor properties. Perhaps a revised model of structure-mapping can 
be created that stresses that imagery is drawn from the vehicle, alongside figurative 
relations, in forming metaphor interpretations. 
  Structure-mapping has been extended to many important domains of metaphor 
and figurative processing, namely, how figurative processing develops in children 
(Gentner, 1988), how metaphor relates to other similarity processes such as analogy (e.g., 
Gentner, Bowdle, Wolff & Boronat, 2001); the time course of metaphor processing 
(Wolff & Gentner, 2000; 2011); how metaphoric meanings become conventional 
abstractions (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) and importantly, has been implemented in a 
computational model (Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989). Given structure-
mapping’s already impressive contributions to theories of metaphor, and its empirical 
support spanning over three decades, it is difficult to envision future metaphor 
comprehension theories without structure-mapping involved in some way. 
Predication Model 
   In the predication model (Kintsch, 2008) properties underlying metaphor 
comprehension are drawn from semantic neighbourhoods, which are made-up of words 
that co-occur with the topic and vehicle. Recall the predication model does not make 
general predictions regarding the semantic content of metaphor interpretations or whether 
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sensorimotor properties (though represented amodally) are activated or not. Rather, the 
model computes a vector which represents a metaphor’s meaning in semantic space. Its 
accuracy can be determined by assessing the proximity of the metaphor vector to other 
vectors representing properties one expects to be related to the metaphor (Kintsch, 2000), 
or the proximity of the metaphor vector to a vector representing human interpretations of 
the metaphor (Kintsch & Bowles, 2002). Whether or not the metaphor vector contains 
sensorimotor properties depends on whether such properties are related to the topic and 
vehicle. 
  The predication model bases its computations on semantic representations 
determined by LSA. Therefore, the efficacy of the predication model in computing 
metaphor meanings partly rests on how well LSA models semantic memory. Recall that 
LSA is a co-occurrence model. As such, it does not include any direct sensorimotor 
experiences that may shape semantic memory (Landauer, Foltz & Laham, 1998); 
sensorimotor content is only indirectly captured by LSA to the extent that it is verbally 
coded in natural language (Landauer, Foltz & Laham, 1998). This raises the question of 
whether or not LSA contains enough sensorimotor properties to model the embodied 
simulation and mental imagery involved in novel metaphor understanding, such as in the 
interpretations generated by participants in Chapter 3. 
 Consider the embodied interpretation of the metaphor amusement is a butterfly 
provided by a participant: “Have you watched a butterfly flutter from flower to flower? In 
the sunshine and the tall grass and wildflowers, that is truly amusing”. Most of the key 
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properties in this interpretation are not, according to LSA, in the semantic neighbourhood 
of butterfly. For example, according to LSA, in the 1500 nearest neighbours of butterfly, 
sunshine, grass, wildflowers, flutter, or flower are not included (although crabgrass is 
included). On the other hand, for most of the unfamiliar metaphors in Chapter 4, the 
bodily-action associates were among the vehicle’s 1500 nearest neighbours. Therefore, it 
seems that LSA may lack the perceptual information from the physical world in order to 
construct mental imagery necessary for higher-order metaphor interpretations. 
  The issue of co-occurrence models lacking perceptual information has been 
recently addressed. Durda, Buchanan and Caron (2009) demonstrated that semantic 
features of words (obtained by McRae, Cree, Seidenberg & McNorgan, 2005) can be 
mapped onto co-occurrence vectors. Therefore, human-generated features of butterfly, 
such as flies, has wings, is colourful, and pollinates flowers (McRae et al., 2005) can be 
mapped onto the co-occurrence vector computed for butterfly. To that end, Durda et al. 
(2009) trained a feed-forward neural network to associate features to appropriate co-
occurrence vectors. After training, the model was able to correctly map features from 
concepts it was trained on to semantically related concepts that it was not trained on. This 
study thus supports the notion that co-occurrence models can be grounded with additional 
perceptual information that is not readily available in discourse, but available from 
human participants. Moreover, Durda et al.’s (2009) method, in principle, can be applied 
to other semantic variables such as BOI wherein a co-occurrence model can be trained to 
learn BOI values of concepts. One can then see whether this information is generated to 
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novel concepts related to the training items. Overall then, it is likely that, the predication 
algorithm could in principle generate metaphor vectors that contain adequate 
sensorimotor properties if LSA is bolstered with perceptual-embodied variables such as 
semantic features and BOI. 
Embodied Models 
 
  The obtained results described in the studies reported in this thesis are generally 
supportive of embodied models of metaphor processing. However, as I will review 
below, the embodied models differ in their ability to accommodate the data obtained in 
the online experiments (Chapter 4). As such, I argue that the data favours some models 
more than others. 
Gibbs Simulation Model 
  In Gibbs’ (Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007) model of metaphor 
processing, comprehension is necessitated by sensorimotor simulations evoked by the 
vehicle, with particular emphasis on bodily-actions. Therefore, a strong prediction that 
arises from this model is that perceptual-embodied language will be present in metaphor 
interpretations. This prediction was confirmed, even with the nominal metaphors 
generated and interpreted as described in Chapter 3. These data suggest that during 
metaphor understanding participants engage in an embodied simulation in which dynamic 
sensorimotor properties related to the vehicle shape their understanding of the topic. 
Importantly, in the simulation model, it is argued that embodied simulations are a 
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requirement for understanding metaphors. The data presented here support this claim: 
both high-BOI and low-BOI metaphors resulted in interpretations with similar levels of 
perceptual-embodied language. This finding is supportive of Gibbs’ model because it 
demonstrates the robustness of simulation. That is, the data show that people engage in 
simulations even when the vehicle concept is low-BOI, and hence difficult with which to 
interact. 
  Recall that the metaphors studied in Chapter 3 were relatively novel as they were 
created by participants from a list of presented words and hence not obviously based on 
dead metaphors or pre-existing live familiar metaphors. In Chapter 4 (Studies 4 and 5), 
familiar and unfamiliar (i.e., novel) metaphors were employed in an online processing 
task. In support of Gibbs’ model, processing unfamiliar metaphors (e.g., time is snail) 
resulted in immediate activation of bodily-actions related to the vehicle (e.g., crawl) at 
both upstream and downstream time-courses. Activation of such bodily-actions is 
expected if an embodied simulation is required to understand metaphor. However, Gibbs’ 
model predicts that familiar metaphors also are understood by embodied simulation 
processes; however, this was not observed. Familiar metaphors (e.g., lawyers are sharks) 
did not activate bodily-actions (i.e., bite) at upstream or downstream time-courses, 
suggesting that such metaphors are not understood as embodied simulations, a finding 
inconsistent with Gibbs’ model. Rather, processing familiar metaphors activated general 
associates (e.g., killer) not directly related to an embodied simulation. Gibbs and Matlock 
(2008) argued that psycholinguistic evidence (up to 2008) disagrees with the idea that 
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“people access…figurative meanings by simply accessing a pre-established sense from a 
mental lexicon without engaging in any imaginative bodily activities (pg. 174)”. 
However, as previously mentioned, the experiments in this dissertation are the first to test 
embodied simulation of nominal metaphors, and the evidence here shows that familiar 
metaphors are indeed understood by accessing a particular sense of the vehicle without 
consideration of relevant bodily-actions.   
  In sum, the findings from the studies conducted in this thesis partially support 
Gibbs’ model, as evidence for embodied simulation was found for novel metaphors in 
both offline and online tasks. It should be noted that Gibbs’ model is partly based on 
observations where seemingly dead metaphors, such as swallow your pride are 
understood by bodily simulation (Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). According to this model, if 
dead metaphors are processed as embodied simulations, so should familiar metaphors. 
However, recall that nominal metaphors, such as lawyers are sharks, do not denote 
bodily-actions. As such, these metaphors do not overtly draw attention to bodily-actions, 
unlike metaphors like swallow your pride. Therefore, nominal metaphors may 
automatically activate sensorimotor representations, but this activation attenuates when 
the metaphor becomes familiar and a path to an abstracted sense of the vehicle becomes 
immediately available (as described in the sensorimotor shedding theory; Jamrozik et al., 
2016). Overall then, Gibbs’ model cannot be reconciled with the data regarding the 
familiar metaphors in Chapter 4, where bodily-actions were not activated upstream or 
downstream, and general associates were immediately available. Finally it should be 
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noted that if Gibbs’ model is amended to include amodal processing for familiar 
metaphors, it will be indistinguishable from the sensorimotor shedding theory, discussed 
previously. 
Dual Coding Theory 
  Dual coding theory (DCT, e.g., Paivio, 1971; 2007) is a general theory of mental 
representation and processing, and only incidentally extended to the study of metaphor. 
The central tenant of dual coding theory as applied to metaphor extends its basic 
argument that, processing involves joint contributions of both amodal (i.e., verbal) and 
multimodal (i.e., imagery) representations. As such, one should find evidence for both 
non-sensory and sensory (imagistic) knowledge in the processing of metaphors. This 
position is supported by both the metaphor interpretation data (Chapter 3) and the online 
processing experiments (Chapter 4). In Chapter 3, the average metaphor interpretations 
contained multimodal descriptions including visual, motoric, and auditory properties. 
Such descriptions are consistent with DCT, as the imagery system stores multimodal 
properties. Moreover, the imagery in the interpretations often described an entire scene 
rather than the vehicle concept in isolation. This is consistent with how metaphor related 
imagery is described in DCT. That is, the image system stores continuous images that are 
analogues to the perceptual word, rather than discrete units. Conversely, some 
interpretations excluded mention of perceptual-embodied language. This finding is also 
consistent with DCT, as metaphor understanding can be achieved solely within the verbal 
(i.e., amodal) system. In sum, the wide variety of metaphor interpretations, with some 
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including multimodal content and others not, aligns with DCT. 
  Despite the offline evidence, the data obtained in the cross-modal lexical priming 
experiments do not completely align with DCT. On the one hand, both general (i.e., 
amodal) and sensorimotor (i.e., imageable) properties were activated during online 
metaphor processing, in support of DCT. On the other hand, the activation of amodal or 
sensorimotor associated information depended on metaphor familiarity. This particular 
finding is not predicted by DCT, although it does not threaten the theory’s central tenant. 
Moreover, the current version of the dual coding theory of metaphor (Paivio & Walsh, 
1993) may be underspecified. In fact, since its latest instalment, variables such as 
metaphor familiarity (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Blasko & Connine, 1993), aptness 
(Blasko & Connine, 1993; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006) and others have been 
demonstrated to affect metaphor processing. Therefore, although DCT remains an 
attractive position regarding general cognition, it lacks specificity in describing how 
variables other than verbal associations and imagery affect metaphor processing. 
Nonetheless, DCT possess the functional architecture to be reconciled with variables such 
as familiarity. Overall then, after considering the results of Chapter 3 (i.e., metaphor 
interpretation task) and 4 (i.e., cross-modal lexical priming tasks) it is difficult to imagine 
a complete model of metaphor processing that does not consider the joint contribution of 
amodal and sensorimotor representations, as has been argued in DCT for decades. 
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Sensorimotor Shedding Theory 
  In sensorimotor shedding theory, the degree to which processing is amodal or 
embodied depends on metaphor familiarity (Jamrozik et al., 2016). Novel metaphors are 
processed by embodied simulation whereas conventional metaphors, on the other hand, 
are processed by accessing amodal representations. As such, this is the only theoretical 
framework that is consistent with both the metaphor interpretation data obtained offline 
(Chapter 3) and the pattern of priming results obtained online (Chapter 4). Recall that the 
metaphors that were interpreted in Chapter 3 were relatively novel. Therefore, the use of 
perceptual-embodied language in the metaphor interpretations, as indeed observed, is 
predicted by sensorimotor shedding. Moreover, Studies 4 and 5 (Chapter 4) provided 
additional evidence for sensorimotor shedding’s position on metaphor familiarity. During 
online metaphor processing, different properties were activated depending on metaphor 
familiarity. That is, unfamiliar metaphors activated bodily-actions (i.e., sensorimotor 
properties) of the vehicle but not its general (i.e., abstract) properties, whereas familiar 
metaphors showed the opposite pattern of results. 
  Further support for sensorimotor shedding theory comes from Studies 6 and 7 
(Chapter 4), where the auditory prime consisted of the isolated vehicle. Recall that 
isolated vehicles primed both the general and bodily-action associates at the upstream 
time-course. However, during downstream processing, the vehicles from familiar 
metaphors primed both associate types, whereas the vehicles from unfamiliar metaphors 
only primed bodily-action associates. According to sensorimotor shedding theory, the 
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vehicles from the familiar metaphors have developed an abstracted sense and therefore 
prime both associate types upstream and downstream. Unfamiliar vehicles on the other 
hand, only prime both associates upstream; downstream, the more abstract properties lose 
their activation because the vehicle concept has yet to develop strong associations to an 
abstraction.  
 One can envision further tests of sensorimotor shedding theory. For instance, a 
demonstration of sensorimotor shedding can be achieved by a method known as in vitro 
conventionalization. In this approach, introduced by Bowdle and Gentner (2005) and 
replicated by Thibodeau and Durgin (2011), participants are provided with figurative 
sentences (e.g., hard work is like a ladder, education is like a ladder) and are then asked 
to complete a sentence frame by choosing a new topic that is consistent with the 
figurative meaning of the sentences (i.e., _______ is like a ladder). This method is 
thought to rapidly conventionalize metaphors. This method could be applied to the 
unfamiliar metaphors used in Chapter 4 (e.g., time is a snail). Prior to the 
conventionalization process, I would predict a replication of Studies 4 and 5. That is, pre-
conventionalization, metaphors should prime bodily-actions (e.g., crawl) but not the more 
abstract properties (e.g., slow), thus replicating the results obtained. However, a change in 
the type of activation should occur as a result of metaphor conventionalization. 
Therefore, post-conventionalization, metaphors should activate abstract properties more 
than bodily-actions. This method would permit an experimental test of whether novel 
metaphor vehicles indeed activate sensorimotor representations, and after they become 
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conventional, develop abstracted senses.  
  Overall, sensorimotor shedding leads to predictions that are confirmed by the data 
reported in Chapters 3 and 4. This theory is also consistent with recent neuroimaging 
work. Desai, Binder, Conant, Mano and Seidenberg (2011) asked participants to read 
literal (e.g., the daughter grasped the flowers), metaphoric (e.g., the jury grasped the 
concept) and abstract (e.g., the jury understood the concept) sentences in a brain-scanner. 
Their results showed numerous areas of activation, but critically, that literal and 
metaphoric sentences resulted in similar activation of sensorimotor areas that overlapped 
with performing hand actions. Moreover, activation of such areas is negatively correlated 
with stimulus familiarity; the less familiar the metaphor, the more activation is observed 
in the sensorimotor area. Furthermore, in another study, Desai, Conant, Binder, Park and 
Seidenberg (2013) conceptually replicated these findings. Like Desai et al., (2011), they 
studied literal, metaphorical, and abstract sentences, but also included idiomatic 
sentences (e.g., the congress is grasping at straws in the crisis), which are even more 
conventional than metaphors. They found a linear trend such that the strongest activation 
of a secondary motor area is observed during the reading of literal action-sentences, 
whereas minimal activation is observed during reading of idioms, the most conventional 
sentence type. Thus, words such as grasp, when used literally activate sensorimotor 
areas; however, the activation gradually attenuates during processing conventional senses 
of the same word (e.g., grasp the concept; grasp at straws). Therefore, two neuroimaging 
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studies provide converging evidence of sensorimotor shedding as a result of stimulus 
familiarity, complementing the results obtained in Chapter 4.  
Semantic Richness  
  Recall that the conclusions from Chapter 2 (i.e., comprehensibility rating tasks; 
Studies 1 and 2) indicated that BOI and SND showed parallel and sometimes interactive 
effects on the comprehensibility of artificial metaphors. That is, metaphors with vehicles 
with low-BOI and low-SND values were rated as the most comprehensible. Moreover, in 
the vehicle selection task (Chapter 3), vehicles with low-BOI and low-SND values were 
among the most chosen to create novel metaphors. The predictions in Chapter 2 and 3 
were that BOI, as a proxy for embodied simulation would show effects quite different 
than those found for SND, which is based on amodal representational units. However, the 
data I obtained showed that, contrary to predictions, BOI was not an appropriate variable 
to invite varying degrees of embodied simulation in metaphor processing tasks. Rather, in 
Chapter 3, high and low-BOI metaphors both resulted in interpretations including 
perceptual-embodied language. Moreover, the observed BOI and SND interactions were 
not predicted by the theoretical accounts reviewed. However, to the extent that BOI is an 
embodied variable, and SND an amodal variable, the obtained interactions support hybrid 
accounts (e.g., Jamrozik et al., 2016; Paivio & Walsh, 1993) that embrace both amodal 
and embodied representations. Given these findings the conclusion drawn was that both 
BOI and SND reflected an underlying semantic richness. I attempt below to consider how 
the semantic richness effects in metaphor processing tasks (including both BOI and SND) 
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might be explained in terms of computational processes. 
 The converging evidence from the experiments presented in this thesis and 
elsewhere (e.g., Al-Azary & Buchanan, 2017), is that semantic richness (beyond the 
concreteness of the vehicle) is detrimental to metaphor processing, for instance by 
making the item less comprehensible. I speculate that there are two main reasons for this, 
which are related. The first has to do with the total amount of semantic properties 
associated with a concept. Accordingly, semantically rich concepts, whether defined by 
SND or BOI, refer to more properties (i.e., associates and imagery, respectively) than 
semantically poorer concepts (e.g., low-SND words; low-BOI words). This can be an 
issue for processing metaphoric meaning, because only some of the vehicle’s semantic 
properties are relevant for understanding a metaphor (e.g., Black, 1962). Therefore, when 
the vehicle of a metaphor is high-SND for example, a large network of close associates 
must be searched to determine metaphor-relevant properties. The same can be said if a 
vehicle is high-BOI; it will not only refer to visual imagery, but also to additional motor 
and perhaps tactile, olfactory or other forms of sensory imagery. When such semantically 
rich concepts are encountered in a metaphor processing task, cognitive control 
mechanisms must determine the relevant properties for the metaphor. If there are many 
properties, it is arguably more difficult to find the relevant comparisons than when there 
are few properties from which to choose. The remaining unrelated properties arguably, 
are then inhibited (e.g., Kintsch, 2000) or suppressed (e.g., Gernsbacher, et al., 2001). In 
sum, the argument is that, less semantic information can be more effective for metaphor 
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processing because a less exhaustive search can be carried-out, and less subsequent 
inhibition of unrelated properties is required.  
  The second reason that semantic richness might be detrimental for metaphor 
processing is related to what follows from a concept having a rich semantic 
representation. For instance, a particular consequence of semantic richness (defined by 
SND, BOI, or otherwise) is that the conceptual representation is “better-specified” 
(Pexman, Siakaluk & Yap, 2013, pg. 1). I speculate that the degree of semantic 
specification limits accessibility to the taking on of new meaning, a hallmark of 
metaphor. For example, consider a high-SND word that has many near neighbours which 
consequently, constrain its meaning. This neighbourhood would be too dense to 
accommodate new semantic associations, necessary for novel metaphor comprehension 
(see Al-Azary & Buchanan, 2017 for more elaboration). A low-SND concept, on the 
other hand, has fewer near neighbour and as such, has  more ‘room’ in the space to form 
novel semantic associations. Therefore, in this regard, low-SND concepts are more 
semantically malleable than high-SND concepts. I speculate that, as with high-SND 
concepts
 
a similar effect holds for BOI in which high-BOI words have a rich semantic 
representation, which specifies their meaning further
16
, constraining the degree of 
malleability. For example, a high-BOI concept’s semantic representation is well-specified 
for particular motor interactions, which can be resistant to novel semantic change. In 
                                                          
16
  Thanks to Nick Reid for the thought-provoking suggestion that high-BOI concepts are so semantically 
specified. 
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similar ways, high-SND and high-BOI concepts are not as semantically malleable as their 
less-specified counterparts (i.e., low SND and low BOI). Thus, the detrimental effects of 
BOI on metaphor processing are similar to the previously reported detrimental effects of 
SND (Al-Azary & Buchanan, 2017).  
  To illustrate how a well-specified semantic representation can be inflexible for 
novel associations, consider the classic phenomenon of functional fixedness from the 
problem solving literature. When functional fixedness occurs, one has difficulty using an 
object for a new purpose other than that for which it most commonly used. For example, 
when an object is presented in a functionally specified way (e.g., a box holding objects) 
rather than a functionally unspecified way (e.g., an empty box) one may fail to use the 
object for a new use (e.g., using the box as a platform), despite the object’s efficacy for 
the new use (Duncker, 1945). I speculate that a similar phenomenon occurs with 
semantically rich concepts. They are less likely to be used in a conceptually novel way 
(i.e., in a metaphor) because their semantic representation is more ‘fixed’. My hypothesis 
regarding the degree of malleability as a function of the degree of semantic richness is 
empirically testable. For example, consider a concept’s number of semantic features 
(McRae, et al., 2005), number of associates (Nelson et al., 2004) or number of meanings 
(Hino & Lupker, 1996). The hypothesis is that metaphors with topics and vehicles based 
on a low number of features, associates or senses will be more comprehensible than those 
with a high number of the respective variables. Moreover, vehicle frequency may also 
play a role, with less-frequent vehicles resulting in more comprehensibility than more-
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frequent vehicles. Therefore, variables associated with a word’s meaningfulness may 
provide converging results in metaphor comprehension tasks, such that less defined 
semantic representations are more conducive to metaphor processing. Paradoxically, a 
metaphor’s meaningfulness is inversely related to its constituents’ meaningfulness.  
Conclusions 
 
  In this dissertation I tested psycholinguistic models of metaphor processing that 
assume embodiment. I found evidence that sensorimotor representations partially 
underlie semantic processing of metaphor. This evidence is contrary to the dominant 
experimentalist position that assumes only amodal processing of metaphor. The total 
evidence from offline and online experiments favours hybrid models that include amodal 
and embodied processing of metaphor. Moreover, novel findings regarding semantic 
richness were found. Interactive effects of BOI and SND showed that vehicles made-up 
of less-specified semantic representations facilitate metaphor comprehension and 
production, thus extending recent findings on the topic. In sum, the findings of this 
dissertation are the first to demonstrate sensorimotor activation in nominal metaphors 
using traditional psycholinguistic tasks, along with further characterizing detrimental 
effects semantic richness of metaphors. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Stimuli used in Study 1. 
Abstract High-BOI Abstract Low-BOI Concrete High-BOI Concrete Low-BOI 
Shelter is Popcorn Fervour is a Robot A Woodpecker is an 
Umbrella 
A Coach is an Eagle 
Mastery is a Paper Depth is a Pillar A Broom is a Needle A Scarecrow is a 
Pirate 
Joy is a Shovel Elevation is a Grasshopper A Pool is a Table Gear is a Panda 
Imagination is a Vacuum Discovery is a Kangaroo A Bug is an Orange A Shell is a 
Chimney 
Daydream is a Slipper Infusion is a Fountain Coin is a Balloon Roots is a Closet 
Departure is a Band-Aid Conduction is a Windmill A Coast is a Razor A Cover is a Genie 
Digestion is a Puzzle Art is a Hippo A Motor is a Tweezers A Wallet is a 
Donkey 
Acclaim is a Paperclip Elegance is Lightning Shelf is a Wallet A Tooth is a Giraffe 
Turbulence is a Pencil Arrival is a Turtle A Trunk is a 
Lawnmower 
A Tube is a Cowboy 
Digestion is  Lipstick Exercise is a Rainbow A Mirror is an Apple A Politician is a 
Pillar 
Cohesion is a Wheelchair Censorship is a Fireman A Sanctuary is a 
Toaster 
An Armchair is 
Music 
Cuisine is a Yo-Yo Destiny is a Fire Veins are Glasses An Egg is a Rooster 
Indecision is a Hammer Diplomacy is a Pelican A Sign is Handcuffs Darkness is an 
Alligator 
Confusion is a Stroller Absorption is a Policeman Star is a Teapot A Sidewalk is a 
Waiter 
Hesitancy is a Scissors Advantage is a Desert A Pond is a Helmet Candy is a Parrot 
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Appendix B. Stimuli used in Study 2 (Replace Love with Time and Life for the other 
conditions). 
High BOI - High SND High BOI - Low SND Low BOI - High SND Low BOI - Low SND 
Love is a bathtub Love is a wheelchair Love is a camel Love is a kangaroo 
Love is an earring Love is a toilet Love is a zebra Love is an anvil 
Love is pliers Love is a slipper Love is a statue Love is a tiger 
Love is a towel Love is a band-aid Love is a butterfly Love is a cowboy 
Love is a flashlight Love is a balloon Love is a rocket Love is a peacock 
Love is a backpack Love is a teapot Love is a leopard Love is a alligator 
Love is a typewriter Love is a tweezers Love is a dragon Love is an eagle 
Love is a pillow Love is a yo-yo Love is a gorilla Love is a chimney 
Love is a toothbrush Love is a paper clip Love is a dolphin Love is a genie 
Love is a telephone Love is popcorn Love is an elephant Love is a music 
Love is a football Love is lipstick Love is a mountain Love is a pillar 
Love is a skateboard Love is a wheelbarrow Love is a lizard Love is a giraffe 
Love is a ruler Love is hammer Love is a porcupine Love is an igloo 
Love is a necklace Love is umbrella Love is a castle Love is a desert 
Love is a motorcycle Love is a paper Love is a monkey Love is a hippo 
Love is a finger Love is a helmet Love is a submarine Love is a rooster 
Love is a cigarette Love is a puzzle Love is a dinosaur Love is a lighthouse 
Love is a spatula Love is scissors Love is a skeleton Love is a raccoon 
Love is a bicycle Love is a shovel Love is a cannon Love is a pelican 
Love is a trumpet Love is a pencil Love is a scorpion Love is a unicorn 
Love is a guitar Love is a stroller Love is a squirrel Love is a panda 
Love is a jacket Love is a hammock Love is a beaver Love is a pyramid 
Love is a camera Love is a vacuum Love is a walrus Love is a donkey 
Love is a banjo Love is a hamburger Love is a pirate 
Love is a sweater Love is an apple Love is an eskimo 
Love is a baby Love is a screwdriver Love is a fire 
Love is a bottle Love is a thermos Love is a windmill 
Love is a pitcher  Love is a city 
Love is a envelope  Love is a lion 
Love is a saxophone  Love is a llama 
Love is a piano  Love is an octopus 
Love is a violin  Love is an ostrich 
   Love is a penguin 
   Love is a rainbow 
   Love is a volcano 
   Love is a lightning 
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Appendix C. Stimuli used for Study 3 
 
Topics: 
High SND Low SND 
eternity luck 
euphoria legacy 
courage revenge 
loyalty irony 
repentance prestige 
honesty destiny 
epiphany imagination 
serenity betrayal 
empathy nostalgia 
patience temptation 
obsession innocence 
ambition persuasion 
sadness metaphor 
narcissism miracle 
guilt boredom 
sincerity secrecy 
hatred solitude 
cowardice amusement 
 
Vehicles: 
High BOI 
High SND 
High BOI 
Low SND 
Low BOI 
High SND 
Low BOI 
Low SND 
typewriter shovel butterfly lighthouse 
flashlight umbrella submarine volcano 
violin balloon statue pillar 
pillow wheelchair medal tiger 
ant pencil anchor pendulum 
bicycle puzzle airplane rainbow 
cigarette rat cannon palace 
seed clay dinosaur eagle 
wine hammer rocket lightning 
sword vacuum castle prairie 
camera gate storm cloud 
fish cat mountain desert 
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Appendix D. Stimuli used in Studies 4 – 7 
Unfamiliar Metaphors and Targets: 
Topic-Vehicle  Bodily 
Action 
Bodily Action 
Control 
General General Control 
Highways-Snakes slither gnash danger sugar 
Health-Glass break nap fragile eager 
Christ-Door open take way pride 
Hearts-Closets hide wrap dark sweet 
Time-Snail crawl rake slow afraid 
Jobs-Jails lock chew bad icy 
Eyelids-Curtains close slip shade skill 
Peace-River swim dance flow coach 
Sermons-Sleeping Pills swallow mingle medicine marketplace 
Pets-Kids play kicks love house 
Money-Oxygen breathe vomit life staff 
Bible-Sword fight leap weapon wallpaper 
 
Familiar Metaphors and Targets: 
Topic-Vehicle  Bodily Action Bodily Action 
Control 
General General Control 
Alcohol-Crutch limp sigh aid cow 
Winter-Death bury twist dread hustle 
Wisdom-Ocean surf curl deep sorry 
Love-Rose smell pray beauty spoon 
Education-Stairway climb worry up quart 
Life-Beach swim stand fun phone 
Knowledge-Money spend digest rich special 
Music-Medicine taste flick cure clergy 
Insults-Daggers stab cough weapon spotlight 
Memory-Sponge wash grip absorb convert 
Minds-Computers type race data plant 
Lawyers-Sharks bite enter killer jeans 
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Appendix E Metaphors in contexts for Studies 4 and 5. 
Topic-Vehicle  Context 
Highways-
Snakes 
My dad reminded me to drive slow and stay alert because HIGHWAYS ARE SNAKES.  
Health-Glass The doctor explained to the patient that HEALTH IS GLASS.  
Christ-Door At the gospel reading, Fred was reminded that CHRIST IS A DOOR. 
Hearts-Closets Some people don't like to talk about their emotions because for them, HEARTS ARE 
CLOSETS. 
Time-Snail Sometimes at work, my colleague says that TIME IS A SNAIL.  
Jobs-Jails Some people who work long hours believe that JOBS ARE JAILS. 
Bible-Sword For those who need strength in their faith, THE BIBLE IS A SWORD 
Peace-River During his meditation lessons, Elijah learned that PEACE IS A RIVER. 
Sermons-
Sleeping Pills 
During the Sunday morning mass, the young children demonstrated that SERMONS ARE 
SLEEPING PILLS.  
Pets-Kids The vet likes to remind her new clients that PETS ARE KIDS.  
Money-Oxygen The investment banker believes that MONEY IS OXYGEN. 
Eyelids-Curtains When she has trouble falling asleep, Anna's mom tells her to pretend that her EYELIDS 
ARE CURTAINS.  
Alcohol-Crutch Lisa's friends were concerned about her drinking and tried to convince her that ALCOHOL 
IS A CRUTCH.  
Winter-Death For those who like sun and warmth, WINTER IS DEATH.  
Wisdom-Ocean The most important lesson that the professor ever taught her students was that WISDOM IS 
AN OCEAN.  
Love-Rose  In the wedding vows, the bride said that LOVE IS A ROSE. 
Education-
Stairway 
My academic counsellor told me that EDUCATION IS A STAIRWAY.  
Life-Beach My friend told me that I shouldn’t stress because LIFE IS A BEACH. 
Knowledge-
Money 
The valedictorian began her speech by saying KNOWLEDGE IS MONEY'. 
Music-Medicine People sometimes like to say that MUSIC IS MEDICINE.  
Insults-Daggers During the argument, Anthony realized that INSULTS ARE DAGGERS. 
Memory-Sponge Philosophers once believed that MEMORY IS A SPONGE.  
Minds-
Computers 
When she watched him do complex math in his head, she realized that MINDS ARE 
COMPUTERS.  
Lawyers-Sharks Everyone in the courtroom agreed that those LAWYERS ARE SHARKS.  
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